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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three empirical papers that investigate the impacts of equity 
incentives on accounting fraud from the perspective of the risk it presents for CEOs 
and controlling shareholders.    
As a prerequisite for this thesis, the first paper investigates whether AAERs 
constitute a reliable accounting fraud database, despite their partial coverage of 
misreporting cases and the resource constraints of the SEC. Using comprehensive 
samples covering three financial misreporting databases from the U.S., I find that, 
compared to securities class action lawsuits and restatements, AAERs are composed 
of firms that are more likely to represent material accounting irregularities, which are 
characterised by aggressive adoption of accruals, strong financing needs, and 
significant market impact of misreporting cases.  
The second paper investigates whether CEOs change their misreporting behaviours 
at higher levels of equity incentives, at which they may begin to seriously consider the 
risk side of incentives. Using both unmatched and matched accounting fraud samples 
from the U.S., I find that, contrary to misreporting patterns at average equity incentives, 
CEOs’ option delta is negatively associated with accounting fraud propensity, whereas 
their stock ownership is positively related to this at respectively higher levels.  
The third paper examines the extent to which, in the context of accounting fraud, 
controlling shareholders’ control-ownership wedge interacts with their ownership 
concentration - a common feature of business groups - and with the additional 
imposition of government regulation on Korean chaebols. Using matched samples 
from Korea, I find that control-ownership wedge is positively associated with 
xiv 
accounting fraud propensity, whereas business group and chaebol affiliations are not.  
Overall, the results suggest that the impacts of equity incentives on accounting fraud 
propensity hinge critically on how CEOs and controlling shareholders perceive the 
risk of accounting fraud commitment.
1Chapter 1 
Overview 
1.1. Motivation  
Investment decisions in capital markets are made based on the credibility of 
accounting information (see Penman 2002; Dechow et al. 2010). Governance controls 
within reporting firms, auditing by independent and outside auditors, and even 
periodic reviews by accounting regulators (e.g., the Division of Corporate Finance of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)) support the investors’ belief in true 
and fair accounting information. However, despite these external and internal 
governance systems, firms often exploit discretions in Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP), and in more rare cases deviate from their bonding mechanisms by 
crossing into GAAP violations (see Christie and Zimmerman 1994; Dechow et al. 
1996; Core 2010). These latter aberrations have critical consequences for financial 
statement users, since accounting fraud seriously undermines the credibility of 
financial reporting systems (see also Karpoff et al. 2008a, 2008b)1 . Therefore, the 
investigation of mechanisms through which accounting fraud is committed has highly 
significant and practical implications for both accounting regulators and financial 
statement users.  
1 For example, when Enron Corp.’s accounting scandal was revealed in late 2001, its share price 
plummeted to below $1 per share; compared to its peak price in 2000, market value of $65 billion had 
evaporated, which represents the GDP at market prices of the 47th ranked country in the world 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries?page=1). 
2Equity incentives 2  are one of the most widely recognised determinants of 
accounting fraud because they tend to induce equity holders to opportunistically 
misreport with the intent to benefit from stock price increases (see Core 2010). Indeed, 
extensive research has shown that managers’ option holdings and controlling 
shareholders’ stock ownership are positively associated with firms’ accounting fraud 
propensity and/or aggressive earnings management (see 1.2. Review of literature). 
However, previous studies have mainly focused on the reward effect of equity 
incentives that motivates equity holders to misreport (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Efendi et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2008; Peng and Röell 2008), but they have failed to 
consider the potential risk effect of accounting fraud commitment that discourages 
them from misreporting seriously (see Armstrong et al. 2013). Contrary to earnings 
management strategies conducted within GAAP, accounting fraud commitment entails 
serious economic and legal costs (see e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Karpoff et al. 2008a, 
2008b) and thus may cause variations in firms’ misreporting patterns that are known 
to us.  
Therefore, a much more comprehensive approach would explicitly take into account 
the potential reactions of equity holders to the risk effect of accounting fraud. If 
financial statement reporters made rational decisions in consideration of the net
benefits of accounting fraud commitment, the impact of equity incentives on 
accounting fraud propensity would not be simply linear or unidirectional as prior 
studies listed above inherently assumed. Specifically, it is not conceivable that firms 
would have a continuously increasing accounting fraud propensity at higher levels of 
CEOs’ equity incentives, since excessive ill-gotten gains acquired from equity 
holdings not only increase the reward from accounting fraud schemes but also the risk 
2 In this thesis, equity incentives refer to both stock options and stocks as in Armstrong et al. (2010). 
3of detection by the SEC or incurring critical legal costs once detected. Similarly, 
controlling shareholders with substantial cash investment in their business groups may 
not be strongly incentivised to violate GAAP, even though they may be shrewd enough 
to manage earnings aggressively within GAAP (e.g., Kim and Yi 2006). 
In this vein, CEOs’ excessive equity incentives in the U.S. context and controlling 
shareholders’ ownership structure in the non-U.S. context provide ideal settings to test 
whether CEOs and controlling shareholders react to the risk effect of accounting fraud. 
In both settings, I expect that CEOs and controlling shareholders would reverse their 
misreporting patterns responding to the increased risk that considerable equity 
incentives may create in the context of accounting fraud.  
In the U.S. context, I first investigate whether CEOs change their misreporting 
behaviours at higher levels of equity incentives, where they may begin to consider the 
serious disadvantages of incentives. Excessive equity incentives inevitably increase 
the magnitude of CEOs’ ill-gotten gains (see also Thevenot 2012) and this then 
becomes a main consideration when the SEC decides on the level of sanctions. In the 
non-U.S. accounting fraud context, I further examine the extent to which controlling 
shareholders’ control-ownership wedge 3  interacts with ownership concentration, 
which inevitably increases their cash investment in business groups, and with the 
additional imposition of government regulation on Korean business groups called 
chaebols. The Korean institutional background provides a unique set of conditions in 
which to test this research question, in that chaebols are usually controlled by their 
individual ultimate owners and are regulated by government rules the like of which 
rarely exist in other jurisdictions.  
3 The divergence between voting rights and actual cash investment in shares.  
4To answer these research questions, it is a critical prerequisite to adopt a reliable 
accounting fraud database that is more likely to represent accounting irregularities. 
Crucially, it would not be relevant to investigate motivational determinants of 
accounting fraud using samples of financial misreporting resulting from simple errors. 
Among alternatives, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) have 
been most widely adopted by prior studies to capture the intentional nature of 
accounting fraud (see Dechow et al. 2010). In particular, Dechow et al. (1996) 
explicitly assume that the SEC is “on average” correctly identifying “intentional” 
accounting fraud cases. They argue that, due to the prudent selection process of the 
SEC, AAERs are quite homogeneous in their intentional properties. Subsequent 
studies have also relied on the assumption that AAERs are an objective (Beasley et al. 
2000), less biased (Erickson et al. 2006), reliable (Dechow et al. 2011) and clean 
(Erickson et al. 2004) proxy, whose Type I error may be lower than other databases 
(Dechow et al. 2011; Davidson 2011). 
However, the reliability of AAERs is vigorously challenged by a recent study by 
Karpoff et al. (2017). Cautioning researchers as to the choices of alternative financial 
misreporting databases, the authors raise a serious concern by demonstrating that 
AAERs capture only a narrow and limited selection of misreporting cases. In fact, as 
a constrained agency in terms of its staffing, regional offices, and budgets, the SEC 
inevitably targets only a proportion of misreporting cases, even when they have been 
identified by other misreporting detectors (e.g., capital market investors). AAERs 
cover only 5-12 percent of its alternative databases analysed in this thesis.  
Moreover, contrary to the widely-accepted research practice of adopting AAERs as 
a main proxy for accounting fraud, there has been a long-standing debate on whether 
government (i.e., the SEC) is indeed a superior accounting fraud detector as far as 
5market investors themselves are concerned (see also Shleifer 2005). Since capital 
market investors have equally strong motivations as the SEC to identify material 
accounting fraud cases for their own damage compensation, we cannot ex ante
guarantee that AAERs are more composed of accounting irregularities than securities 
class action lawsuits.  
Unfortunately, however, most prior studies have provided only fragmented evidence 
on the characteristics of financial misreporting databases (e.g., Files 2012; Correia 
2014), and only recently do a few papers explicitly focus on this issue (e.g., Choi and 
Pritchard 2016; Karpoff et al. 2017). However, prior studies have rarely investigated 
whether researchers may reliably employ AAERs to explore financial statement 
reporters’ intentional motivation to misreport. Therefore, I investigate whether AAERs 
indeed constitute a relatively reliable accounting fraud database, by comparing their 
characteristics with those of securities class action lawsuits and restatements from 
these perspectives: financial reporting quality, financing needs, and market impacts of 
financial misreporting cases. These three criteria are main concerns of accounting 
research. The analysis would also provide valuable insights into the SEC’s ability to 
detect accounting irregularities compared to capital market investors.  
1.2. Review of literature  
Early studies exploring determinants of accounting fraud are characterised by two 
distinct focuses of research: firms’ motives and managerial incentives (see Dechow et 
al. 2010). Dechow et al. (1996) is probably the first study that focuses on the incentive 
mechanisms by which firms are motivated to commit accounting fraud4. Specifically, 
4 Prior to Dechow et al. (1996), Feroz et al. (1991) find that the market reacts negatively to accounting 
fraud releases by the SEC and Beasley (1996) shows that fraud firms have significantly higher 
percentages of outside directors than non-fraud firms.  
6they find that firms’ financing needs and desire to avoid debt covenant violations are 
positively associated with accounting fraud probability. They also identify the 
moderating role of internal governance (e.g., outsiders on the board) on the relation 
between firms’ financing needs and accounting fraud propensity.  
An alternative perspective is adopted by Beneish (1999) who shows that managers 
in accounting fraud firms are more likely to be involved in rent-seeking activities 
regarding their personal equity incentives (see also Summers and Sweeney 1998): 
managers sell stocks and exercise options/warrants during manipulation periods more 
than managers in non-fraud firms do in the same periods. Contrary to Dechow et al. 
(1996), the author does not find that external financing needs significantly motivate 
managers to commit accounting fraud5. This study shifts the focus of the literature 
from firms’ motives to managerial equity incentives and sets in motion a series of 
succeeding studies (e.g., Erickson et al. 2006; Armstrong et al. 2013).  
The literature on managerial equity incentives is further divided into two strands. 
On the one hand, ever since the seminal work of Sanders (2001)6 , a considerable 
volume of studies has established that stock options and stocks have distinct impacts 
on firms’ financial misreporting behaviours including accounting fraud7. Specifically, 
based mainly on the different payoff structures of options and stocks (i.e., convex and 
linear, respectively), these studies have reported that stock options increase the 
likelihood of restatement (e.g., Efendi et al. 2007), litigation regarding financial 
misreporting (e.g., Denis et al. 2006), and the combination of SEC enforcement actions 
5 However, using more comprehensive samples, Dechow et al. (2011) later affirm their earlier findings 
(see also Dechow et al. 2010). 
6 The author reports diametrically opposite impacts of stock options and stock ownership on CEOs’ 
acquisition and divestiture decisions.  
7 Financial misreporting is composed of accounting irregularities (e.g., accounting fraud) and errors 
(e.g., restatements resulting from clerical errors) (see Hennes et al. 2008).    
7and litigation (e.g., Khanna et al. 2015), whereas stocks decrease or do not have a 
significant impact on financial misreporting (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 
2007; Zhang et al. 2008). Conversely, based on an opposing assumption that options 
and stocks have congruent effects, other studies have produced rather equivocal results 
on the relation between managerial equity incentives (i.e., the combination of options 
and stocks) and the propensity for filing AAERs by the SEC: no association (Erickson 
et al. 2006; Armstrong et al. 2010; Schrand and Zechman 2012) or positive association 
(Johnson et al. 2009; Feng et al. 2011). 
In Asian and European countries, another agency conflict between controlling and 
minor shareholders is more acute than in the U.S. context (Bebchuk and Weisbach 
2010). Using pyramiding and cross-holding of shares within a business group, 
controlling shareholders in these regions usually exercise more voting rights than their 
actual cash investments, whose divergence is called control-ownership wedge (see e.g., 
Lin et al. 2011). Based on its opportunistic nature8, Kim and Yi (2006) and Gopalan 
and Jayaraman (Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012) argue that firms with a deeper wedge 
structure may produce a lower quality of earnings measured by discretionary accruals. 
In this case, “opportunism by controlling shareholders” matters more than 
“opportunism by executives” (Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010). 
In sum, extant studies exploring the relations between accounting fraud propensity 
and equity incentives of managers and controlling shareholders have largely focused 
on linear and unidirectional associations, presumably due to their lack of consideration 
of the cost effects of accounting fraud schemes. By shifting the focus to excessive 
equity holdings where the cost effect would be more prevalent, my thesis attempts to 
8 Control-ownership wedge provides an ideal setting for controlling shareholders to expropriate outside 
investors (see e.g., Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012). 
8provide more dynamic and balanced predictions on the equity holders’ misreporting 
behaviours.   
1.3. Outline of research design 
My three empirical studies largely stand upon a common agency theory: incentive 
misalignment between managers and shareholders is one of the key mechanisms of 
accounting fraud commitment (see Smith 1776; Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Even though equity incentives were originally known to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders, they often induce managers to produce a lower 
quality of earnings in favour of their self-interest (see also Chen and Steiner 1999). 
Accounting-based contracts such as stock options, for example, motivate CEOs to 
exploit discretions within GAAP and, in rarer cases, to fraudulently misreport 
(Warfield et al. 1995; Burns and Kedia 2006). In particular, stock options fail to 
perfectly replicate stock ownership as an instrument for aligning the diverged interests 
of CEOs and outside shareholders due to their missing voting rights.  
    In a similar vein, I rely on the positive accounting theory (PAT) (see Ball and Brown 
2014) to explain managers’ opportunistic misreporting behaviours. Specifically, 
according to the bonus plan hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1990), managers may 
opportunistically misreport to benefit themselves instead of maximising firms’ 
benefits. The fundamental assumption of PAT is that managers are rational reporters 
(see Scott 2015). This assumption is important because, to maximise their own self-
interest (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1990), they would consider not only the reward 
effect but also the cost side of accounting fraud commitment, which is the focus of my 
research questions. Thus, I expect that, in the context of accounting fraud, the costs of 
financial misreporting may ironically curb accounting fraud incidences because 
9managers may reduce their opportunistic behaviours while pursing the maximisation 
of their self-interest. This expectation is tested by employing equity incentive data 
from the U.S. and Korea and would contribute to our understanding of the incentives 
of CEOs and controlling shareholders to commit accounting fraud.  
To accommodate unique characteristics of accounting fraud samples, I establish 
four research designs. First, due to the non-random characteristics of accounting fraud 
cases (see Palepu 1986), I mainly adopt the choice-based method (Manski and Lerman 
1977; Cosslett 1981; Maddala 1991), by which fraud firms are paired with an 
approximately equal number of non-fraud firms in the sample based on predetermined 
matching criteria (e.g., propensity-score). In Chapter 2, however, I do not employ 
matched samples because its focus is on the comparison of different financial 
misreporting databases, where potential endogeneity issues are less critical, and the 
adoption of matching methods is not feasible 9 . Second, to capture accounting 
irregularities rather than errors, I analyse AAERs as a main proxy for accounting fraud. 
However, to mitigate potential sampling bias and provide more holistic view on my 
findings, I present additional analysis results of alternative proxies such as securities 
class action lawsuits and restatements if needed and able to do so. Third, due to the 
binary characteristics of accounting fraud cases, I employ probit and/or the simple 
hazard models (Shumway 2001) after controlling for covariates that major prior 
studies have suggested (e.g., Dechow et al. 2011). The adoption of alternative models 
with different assumptions, however, does not alter my analysis results. Finally, I adopt 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the designation of Korean chaebols
as two external shocks respectively to equity incentives of CEOs and controlling 
shareholders in the context of accounting fraud. This identification strategy provides 
9 In Chapter 2, I compare AAERs not with non-AAERs but with other misreporting databases.  
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ideal settings to exploit exogenous shocks to test how equity holders react to the 
enhanced risk of financial misreporting.  
1.4. Main findings 
Using comprehensive accounting fraud databases, I provide three main empirical 
findings. First, using both unmatched and matched accounting fraud samples from the 
U.S., I find that, contrary to misreporting patterns at average equity incentives, CEOs’ 
option delta is negatively associated with accounting fraud propensity whereas their 
stock ownership is positively related to it at respectively higher levels. Further 
analyses indicate that the drastically reversing trends and their opposing directions can 
be explained by CEOs’ distinct risk tolerance as two equity holders: CEOs as option 
holders are concerned about the increased risk whereas owner-CEOs underestimate it 
presumably due to the controlling power attached to stocks. I also document that the 
changes in accounting fraud decisions do not seem to be strongly associated with the 
decreasing marginal utility of option holdings. The findings are not susceptible to 
additional controls of CEO overconfidence and competence. Overall, the results 
suggest that CEOs’ excessive equity incentives engender drastic changes in their 
misreporting behaviours depending on how they perceive the risk of committing 
accounting fraud.  
Second, using matched samples from Korea, I find that control-ownership wedge is 
positively associated with firms’ accounting fraud propensity, but business group 
affiliation is not. In particular, I report that chaebol affiliated firms are less likely to 
commit accounting fraud. Further analyses suggest that the distinct effects of business 
groups and chaebols from those of control-ownership wedge can be explained by 
controlling shareholders’ substantial cash flow rights in business groups, and the 
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tightened levels of monitoring over their expropriation in chaebols. I also document 
that the variations in firms’ misreporting behaviours do not seem to be strongly 
associated with the political influence of large business groups. Overall, the findings 
suggest that the detrimental effect of control-ownership wedge on firms’ accounting 
fraud decisions is countered by the increased costs of expropriation in business groups 
in general, and chaebols, in particular.  
Finally, by comparing the characteristics of AAERs with those of securities class 
action lawsuits and restatements from the U.S., I find that AAERs cover cases that are 
more likely to represent material accounting irregularities, which are characterised by 
aggressive adoption of accruals, strong financing needs, and significant market impact 
of misreporting cases. Again, these findings cannot be ex ante anticipated because the 
SEC’s declared aim to detect material accounting irregularities (see GAO 2002) does 
not necessarily guarantee its effective detection of those cases, and its alternative 
financial misreporting detectors such as capital market investors also have an equally 
strong motivation to detect egregious accounting fraud cases for their own damage 
compensation (see also Shleifer 2005). Further analyses indicate that the 
characteristics of AAERs can be explained by the SEC’s approaches in utilizing 
constrained resources, in addition to AAERs’ inherently egregious nature in that they 
involve accountants’ collusion or serious defects in the financial auditing process. I 
specifically find that high-risk and systematically important firms are associated with 
a higher propensity for detection by the SEC, and states with higher firm population 
tend to have SEC regional offices. Through this optimisation, the SEC may mitigate 
inefficiencies inherent in accounting fraud investigation processes and address the 
potential geographic bias, which suggests that 11 regional offices are not sufficient to 
regulate all U.S. firms. Overall, the findings support the relative reliability of AAERs 
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as an accounting fraud database and strengthen the general robustness of the 
arguments of this thesis.   
Based on the consistent results of my analyses, I interpret the findings to imply that 
CEOs and controlling shareholders actively react to the risk effect of accounting fraud 
commitment.    
1.5. Contributions 
This thesis makes distinct contributions to the existing literature. First, Chapter 2 
builds on research investigating characteristics of financial misreporting databases 
(e.g., Hennes et al. 2008; Schrand and Zechman 2012; Choi and Pritchard 2016). This 
is one of the limited studies explicitly investigating heterogeneities of financial 
misreporting databases including accounting fraud. Contrary to prior studies which 
have focused on information asymmetry (Choi and Pritchard 2016) or coverage 
(Karpoff et al. 2017) of financial misreporting cases in different databases, I compare 
them from the perspectives of financial reporting quality (e.g., discretionary accruals) 
and financing needs (e.g., debt issuance), which are main concerns of accounting 
research. In particular, my research contradicts Karpoff et al. (2017)’s recent finding 
that each financial misreporting database captures only a narrow and limited selection 
of cases, by contending that, despite the coverage issue, AAERs still constitute a 
relatively reliable accounting fraud database that is more likely to represent material 
accounting irregularities (see also Dechow et al. 2010). The findings should be of 
interest to researchers who use AAERs to proxy for accounting fraud and practitioners 
who are interested in heterogeneities of financial misreporting databases. 
  Second, Chapter 3 contributes to the literature exploring the impacts of options and 
stocks on financial misreporting propensity (e.g., Denis et al. 2006; Efendi et al. 2007; 
13
Khanna et al. 2015). Based largely on their different payoff structures, these studies 
have reported that options and stocks have distinct linear impacts on CEOs’ 
acquisition and divestiture decisions (Sanders 2001), market reactions to firms’ initial 
public offerings (Certo et al. 2003), and financial misreporting (e.g., Burns and Kedia 
2006; Efendi et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2008; Peng and Röell 2008). This study extends 
the literature by demonstrating that, in the context of accounting fraud, CEOs’ 
misreporting patterns at normal incentive levels are ultimately reversed at higher 
levels, presumably due to their disparate tolerance as two types of equity holders. A 
considerable volume of studies has already reported the non-linearity of equity 
incentives with various research focuses such as firm-value (e.g., Morck et al. 1988) 
and firm-performance (e.g., Hanlon et al. 2003). However, to my best knowledge, this 
is the first study to show the contrasting non-linear impacts of both stocks and options 
simultaneously, and to highlight that, in the context of accounting fraud, the non-
linearity is driven by the increasing risk effect of accounting fraud commitment rather 
than the decreasing reward effect of equity incentives. The findings should be of 
interest to accounting regulators who need to focus on those with a high risk of 
becoming offenders around accounting fraud: CEOs with average option incentives or 
excessive stock incentives are more likely to misreport.  
Finally, Chapter 4 adds to the literature exploring the impacts of business group and 
chaebol affiliations on firms’ financial reporting quality. While prior studies have 
shown congruent effects of control-ownership wedge, business groups, and chaebols
using relatively indirect proxies for financial reporting quality such as discretionary 
accruals (e.g., Fan and Wong 2002; Kim and Yi 2006; Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012), 
this study extends the literature by providing new evidence that the detrimental effect 
of control-ownership wedge is countered by the existence of potential exposure to 
economic and legal cost considerations inherent to accounting fraud. This study is the 
first to document the distinct impacts of control-ownership wedge and business 
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group/chaebol affiliation on accounting fraud propensity. My research also provides 
separate analyses of unregulated business groups and regulated chaebols by Korean 
government rules and reports their incremental impacts on firms’ accounting fraud 
propensity. In particular, the findings validate the role of government regulation in 
curbing firms’ fraudulent misreporting and provide valuable insights into the enduring 
popularity of large business groups as investment targets, despite the long-held 
concerns over their aggressiveness in earnings management (e.g., Kim and Yi 2006). 
1.6. Thesis structure 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 examines the reliability 
of AAERs as an accounting fraud database. Chapter 3 examines the relation between 
CEOs’ excessive equity incentives and accounting fraud propensity in the U.S. setting 
and Chapter 4 investigates the impacts of business group and chaebol affiliations on 
accounting fraud propensity in Korean context. Section 5 concludes by summarising 




The Reliability of Accounting Fraud Databases 
2.1. Introduction  
The SEC is a federal agency equipped with the legal authority and expertise to 
investigate accounting fraud cases. Based on its credibility, its regulatory outcomes, 
or AAERs, have been widely adopted by researchers as one of the major accounting 
fraud databases (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Davidson et al. 2015). However, the 
reliability of AAERs is vigorously challenged by Karpoff et al. (2017), who show that 
AAERs and other financial misreporting databases capture only a narrow and limited 
selection of misreporting cases and, thus, that the choice of different databases may 
produce disparate analysis results. In fact, the SEC’s resource constraints (e.g., staffing, 
offices, and budgets) have consistently raised concerns over the reliability of AAERs 
(see e.g., Richardson et al. 2002). As a constrained agency, the SEC inevitably targets 
only a proportion of misreporting cases, even when they have been identified by its 
alternative misreporting detectors (e.g., capital market investors and firms’ 
managers)10. Moreover, the long-standing debate over whether government is better 
at detecting material accounting irregularities than market investors (see also Shleifer 
2005) seriously questions the current research practice to adopt AAERs as a main 
proxy for accounting fraud. Since capital market investors have equally strong 
motivation as the SEC to identify material accounting fraud cases for their own 
10 AAERs cover only 5-12 percent of its alternative financial misreporting databases analysed in this 
study. 
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damage compensation, we cannot ex ante guarantee that AAERs are more likely to be 
composed of accounting irregularities than securities class action lawsuits. Therefore, 
this study seeks to provide empirical evidence responding to these doubts on the 
reliability of AAERs as an accounting fraud proxy.   
To do this, I compare the characteristics of AAERs with those of their alternative 
financial misreporting databases, i.e., securities class action lawsuits (SCALs) and 
restatements compiled by Audit Analytics (AA). Specifically, I test whether, compared 
to SCALs and AA, AAERs are composed of firms that are more likely to represent 
material accounting irregularities, which are a main focus of accounting studies (see 
Hennes et al. 2008). Despite their own biases11 , SCALs and AA constitute ideal 
benchmarks for the comparative analyses in terms of their significance in market 
impact (see Dechow et al. 2010) and a wider coverage of misreporting cases (Scholz 
2008, 2014) respectively.  
As characteristics of material accounting irregularities, I adopt financial reporting 
quality prior to the incidence of financial misreporting (see Hope et al. 2013; Ettredge 
et al. 2010) and firms’ financing needs during manipulation periods (see Dechow et al. 
2011), as well as the ultimate market impact of the accounting fraud cases (see Karpoff 
et al. 2008a). These are main concerns of accounting research. In particular, I adopt 
eight different types of accruals measures (e.g., the size, reliability, or estimation errors 
of accruals) to mitigate the potential bias resulting from the subjective nature of 
intentionality included in the definition of accounting irregularities12 (see also Leuz 
11 Market investors tend to file suits for cases whose potential damage compensation is expected to 
exceed their legal costs. They are usually the cases that have caused significant losses in stock markets 
(see Dechow et al. 2010). On the other hand, firms’ managers weigh the costs of their admittance and 
concealment of financial misreporting once it is revealed by either internal control or outside auditors. 
Thus, cases that are trivial, or material but less likely to be detected, may be excluded from the AA 
sample.  
12 From Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82 issued in 1997, AICPA distinguishes intentional 
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and Wysocki 2016). 
Inherently, AAERs are likely to represent egregious accounting fraud cases in that 
they involve accountants’ collusion or serious defects in the financial auditing process 
(see Dechow et al. 2011). To provide additional explanations for the reliability of 
AAERs, I investigate how the SEC utilises its constrained resources through its 
accounting fraud detection process. By adopting the bivariate probit regression model 
(see Wang 2013), which combines an accounting fraud commitment model for firms 
and an accounting fraud detection model for the SEC, I examine which target firms 
the SEC prioritises through its accounting fraud investigation process. Using a simple 
office allocation model, I further test which factors the SEC considered more seriously 
through its office reorganisation process in 2007. These analyses help validate the 
SEC’s ability to deal with its resource constraints. 
Using comprehensive samples covering three financial misreporting databases for 
the fiscal years 1992-2012, I provide consistent evidence supporting the relative 
reliability of AAERs as an accounting fraud database. To begin, I find that, compared 
to SCALs and/or AA, AAERs are indeed composed of firms that are more likely to 
represent material accounting irregularities, which are characterised by aggressive 
adoption of accruals, strong financing needs, and significant market impact of 
misreporting cases. These findings imply that, as prior studies have correctly assumed 
(e.g., Dechow et al. 1996), AAERs effectively cover egregious accounting fraud cases 
rather than simple errors. These results also provide valuable insights into the long-
standing debate on whether government is better at detecting accounting irregularities 
and unintentional financial misreporting using the terms “fraud” and “errors”, instead of irregularities 
and errors. However, to maintain consistency with prior studies (e.g., Hennes et al. 2008) and to avoid 
confusion with a widely accepted usage of accounting fraud (e.g., Beasley 1996; Crutchley et al. 2007; 
Erickson et al. 2006; Khanna et al. 2015; Gao et al. 2017), I adopt accounting irregularities and errors 
to represent intentional and unintentional financial misreporting respectively.  
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than markets themselves, which have equivalently strong motivation to do so for their 
own damage compensation.  
I further find that firms without unqualified audit opinion or young growth firms 
(see Beneish 1999), whose likelihood of misreporting is higher than other firms, are 
associated with a higher propensity for detection by the SEC. In addition, firms with 
large asset sizes or Fortune 500 firms, whose impact on the economy would be more 
significant once accounting fraud is committed, are also more frequently detected by 
the SEC. These investigation targets are high-risk and systematically important firms 
that may increase the SEC’s chances of detecting material accounting irregularities 
with its limited resources (e.g., budgets). These findings indicate that the SEC may 
indeed have the ability to mitigate potential inefficiencies inherent in its accounting 
fraud detection process.  
I also find that states with higher firm population and larger firms tend to have 
regional offices13 of the SEC. In fact, in 2007, the SEC elevated six district offices to 
regional offices, most of which were in states with higher firm population and with 
larger firms. If SEC enforcement were indeed less effective where it is not “local” 
(Kedia and Rajgopal 2011), it would be a reasonable decision for the SEC to deploy 
its major offices in this way. The potential geographic bias then might apply mainly in 
states where firms are less populated and relatively small firms are located. This 
finding provides evidence suggesting that the SEC effectively mitigate the potential 
geographic bias by optimising its utilisation of limited regional offices.  
Finally, two additional analyses provide supporting evidence that the SEC’s focused 
investigation targets and office reorganisation improve the reliability of AAERs. For 
13 Until 2007, the SEC had a three-tier hierarchy structure of offices consisting of its headquarters, 
regional offices, and district offices in order. Offices in upper tiers have more authority in administering 
the SEC program.  
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instance, I find that the SEC’s targeted firms are associated with lower financial 
reporting quality and greater financing needs. I further find that AAER firms in the 
states where the reorganisation occurred have higher levels of discretionary accruals 
than AAER firms in other states. These results imply that the strategic utilisation of 
constrained resources may enable the SEC to effectively prioritise material accounting 
irregularities over simple errors.  
Overall, these findings together suggest that, despite evidently partial coverage of 
misreporting cases, AAERs are a reliable database broadly representing material 
accounting irregularities, and the relative reliability of AAERs can be at least partly 
explained by the SEC’s approaches in utilising constrained resources.  
The main contributions of this research are as follows. To begin, this is one of the 
limited studies explicitly investigating heterogeneities of financial misreporting 
databases including accounting fraud14. Most prior studies have provided fragmented 
evidence and, only recently, a few papers explicitly focus on this issue. First, studies 
have revealed some characteristics of different misreporting databases incidental to 
their main research focuses. For example, while investigating the political bias of SEC 
enforcement, Correia (2014) shows that restatement firms with higher accruals are 
more likely to be sanctioned by the SEC, implying that SEC enforcement cases may 
have higher levels of accruals than average restatement cases. In her study 
investigating the SEC leniency program, Files (2012) further reports that securities 
class action lawsuits filed against restatement cases have a positive association with 
14 Due to the lack of thorough analyses on this issue, research practices of the accounting fraud literature 
are divided: some studies aggregate different misreporting proxies in an effort to decrease Type II error 
(e.g., Dyck et al. 2013; Khanna et al. 2015), others have analysed them separately and found similar 
and/or different empirical findings in respective research contexts (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010; Bentley 
et al. 2013; Davidson et al. 2015; Cao et al. 2015).  
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SEC enforcement, implying that SEC enforcement cases may have more similar 
characteristics to lawsuits than to restatements.  
Second, more recent attention has been paid to the explicit comparison between 
different misreporting databases. Choi and Pritchard (2016), for example, directly 
compare AAERs with securities class action lawsuits using information asymmetry 
measures (e.g., changes in earnings response coefficients) and argue that the market 
perceives greater information asymmetry for lawsuits than AAERs. Most recently, 
Karpoff et al. (2017) investigate the scopes of different financial misreporting 
databases and argue that each misreporting database captures only a narrow and 
limited selection of misreporting cases. They additionally provide some preliminary 
analysis results of average changes in six firm characteristics (e.g., working capital 
accruals and ROA) between prior to misreporting year (t-1) and misreporting year (t), 
and argue that analyses using different databases may produce disparate results.  
This study is different to these preceding examples in that I compare misreporting 
databases from the perspective of their reliability as accounting fraud databases using 
major accounting irregularity proxies (e.g., accruals and financing needs), which are 
main concerns of accounting research. In particular, this study complements Karpoff 
et al. (2017)’s recent finding by showing that, despite the partial coverage issue that 
they raised, AAERs still constitute a relatively reliable accounting fraud database. By 
mainly focusing on the comparison of AAERs and SCAL, the results further provide 
a valuable insight into the long-held debate on whether government (i.e., the SEC) is 
better at identifying accounting irregularities than markets themselves (i.e., investors) 
(see also Shleifer 2005). Again, since capital market investors have similarly strong 
motivation to the SEC as an accounting fraud detector, we cannot ex ante guarantee 
that AAERs will be more composed of accounting irregularities than SCAL.   
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This study further contributes to the literature exploring SEC enforcement and its 
potential biases (see also Leuz and Wysocki 2016). Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) 
document that SEC enforcement is geographically biased due to its resource 
constraints, and Correia (2014) argues that the SEC is captured by firms’ political 
influence. On the contrary, Files (2012) and Kedia et al. (2015) show that the SEC’ 
leniency program and “revolving door” for trial lawyers do not cause serious bias to 
SEC enforcement actions. More recently, Heese et al. (2017) contradicts Correia (2014) 
by reporting that firms’ political connections instead increase the SEC’s comment-
letter reviews. This study particularly extends Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) by 
demonstrating that the SEC has the ability to mitigate potential geograpghic bias by 
locating its regional offices mainly where larger firms are more populated. Contrary 
to Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), I contend that the geographic bias does not seriously 
matter since it is prevalent mainly for smaller firms in states where firms are less 
populated.    
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 summarises prior 
research. Sections 2.3 discusses relevant theories and hypotheses. Section 2.4 
describes data and research design. Sections 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 provide empirical results, 
a battery of additional analyses and robustness checks respectively. Section 2.8 
concludes. 
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2.2. Review of related literature 
2.2.1. SEC enforcement15
This study examines the reliability of AAERs as an accounting fraud database. The 
efficacy of SEC enforcement is one of the main dimensions that may affect the 
characteristics of AAERs. From the perspective of the economics of government 
regulation, a number of studies have reported that the SEC’s regulatory process is 
biased toward the inclusion of certain target firms. For instance, Kedia and Rajgopal 
(2011) find that the SEC has a geographic bias. Using distance measures between firms’ 
headquarters and SEC offices, they show that SEC enforcement is not effective in 
deterring financial misreporting for firms located far from SEC offices. Maguire (2009) 
further finds that, among foreign registrants, the SEC focuses on firms that have more 
significant effects on U.S. markets. In particular, firms from countries whose firms are 
registered in the U.S. at a higher rate than other countries are more likely to be 
sanctioned by the SEC. Other studies show that SEC enforcement is affected by the 
political influence of its regulated firms. Using Political Action Committee (PAC) data, 
Correia (2014) reports that firms that contribute more funds to politicians are less 
frequently sanctioned by the SEC. In a similar vein, Blackburne (2014) finds that firms’ 
political contributions are likely to decrease the SEC’s budget allocation for staffs 
regulating those firms, and Yu and Yu (2011) also find that, among private civil 
lawsuits, lobbying firms are less likely to be detected by the SEC. More recently, 
Heese (2015) documents that the SEC is less likely to file cases for firms that have 
15 I do not review literature that investigates the effectiveness of specific enactments such as Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 133 and No. 158 (e.g., Zhang 2009; Choi et al. 2014), or 
U.S. insider trading laws (e.g., Guercio et al. 2017), because they do not directly relate to the SEC’s 
enforcement activities that consume its constrained resources.  
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more employees, i.e. potential voters, and, particularly in presidential election years, 
the SEC is less likely to detect fraud cases in “politically important states”. 
Conversely, there is a strand of literature that explores the efficacy of the SEC’s 
regulation. Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) themselves, for example, report that past-year 
sanctions by the SEC in a given county are likely to decrease the restatement 
propensity of firms in that county in subsequent years. This finding implies that SEC 
enforcement is effective in deterring financial misreporting at least when firms have 
regulation experience in their regions. Blackburne (2014) also documents that the 
SEC’s increased oversight, measured by the budget per regulated firm allocated to 
each office in the Division of Corporate Finance16, is likely to decrease firms’ accruals 
management and restatements. In particular, Baugh et al. (2017) and Bozanic et al. 
(2017) find that the SEC’s 10-K review process tends to improve firms’ financial 
reporting quality as measured by follow-up restatements and their disclosure quality 
(proxied by a qualitative composite measure) respectively.  
On the other hand, Files (2012) provides an explanation for the ambiguity in the 
prior literature by showing that the SEC’s leniency program may not cause serious 
bias in the coverage of SEC enforcement. Firms that cooperated with SEC 
investigation are in fact more often sanctioned by the SEC; they are instead rewarded 
by decreased monetary penalties. Similarly, Kedia et al. (2015) show that the 
“revolving door” for trial lawyers in the SEC does not cause serious bias to SEC 
enforcement actions, and Heese et al. (2017) also document that firms’ political 
connections rather increase the SEC’s comment-letter reviews. These findings 
together suggest that, despite potential biases in SEC enforcement, the SEC effectively 
mitigates their effects. 
16 The Division of Corporate Finance of the SEC is in charge of reviewing firms’ financial statements.  
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2.2.2. Financial misreporting firms 
Ever since Dechow et al. (1996), extensive studies have explored the characteristics 
of financial misreporting firms. In particular, a large body of literature has provided 
strong empirical evidence that accruals are positively associated with firms of all 
financial misreporting types (see Jones et al. 2008). For example, Perols and Lougee 
(2011), Chalmers et al. (2012) and Ettredge et al. (2010) show that high levels of 
accruals in prior years are likely to lead to incidences of AAERs, securities class action 
lawsuits and restatements in succeeding years. Between misreporting types, slight 
differences are observed. While AAERs are most widely analysed in the context of 
accruals management, private civil lawsuits and restatements are relatively less 
researched. A plausible reason is that the effects of accruals on private civil lawsuit 
and restatement propensities would be less substantial than those of AAERs. In fact, 
Jones et al. (2008) show that, in their restatement sample (25 firm-years), only Dechow 
and Dichev (2002)’s accrual estimation errors have statistically significant 
associations with restatements, while a wider range of accruals (10 types) have 
statistically pronounced associations with AAERs. Ettredge et al. (2010) and Hayes 
(2014) further argue that more intentional restatement cases are likely to have higher 
levels of accruals than simple error restatements.  
A substantial literature has further documented that firms tend to misreport to attract 
external financing at low costs (Dechow et al. 2010). Dechow et al. (1996), McTier 
and Wald (2011) and Richardson et al. (2002) all show that misreporting firms largely 
have higher levels of both issuance of stocks/bonds and capital expenditure across all 
misreporting types. However, the details of analyses differ depending on the samples 
adopted by each study. While Dechow et al. (1996) find that AAER firms have higher 
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levels of financing needs using data between 1978 and 1990, Beneish (1999), using 
data between 1987 and 1993, does not find any statistically significant effects of firms’ 
financing needs on AAERs. However, using a more comprehensive sample of AAERs 
between 1971 and 2003, Dechow et al. (2011) again show that AAER firms have 
higher levels of actual issuance of both stocks and bonds (see Dechow et al. 2010). On 
the other hand, they do not find any difference in the levels of capital expenditure 
between AAER and non-AAER firms. These findings imply that the funds raised in 
AAER firms may not be intended for use in long-term investments. 
2.3. Theory and hypothesis development 
2.3.1. The economics of regulation 
The economics of government regulation is broadly divided into two strands of 
theories (see also Blackburne 2014). To begin, the no-effect hypothesis (see Jordan 
1972) suggests that the SEC might not be an effective accounting fraud detector. Two 
factors support this view. A limited budget is a crucial factor that may decrease the 
regulatory efficacy of the SEC (see Dechow et al. 2010; Richardson et al. 2002). Given 
this budget constraint, the SEC may target firms for which it is likely to file cases 
successfully. Thus, financial misreporting cases that are a material violation of GAAP 
but whose chances of prosecution are likely to be low may be dropped during the 
investigation process. The capture theory further suggests that the SEC is a “self-
interested utility maximiser” (Blackburne 2014). Becker (1983) articulates that, due 
to their self-interested nature, government regulations serve to maximise the “welfare 
of more influential pressure groups” rather than that of the general public (see also 
e.g., Correia 2014; Heese 2015).  
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On the contrary, the optimal intervention hypothesis (see Joskow and Rose 1989; 
Posner 1974) suggests that the SEC conducts its role as an accounting fraud detector 
effectively by properly addressing potential biases resulting from its constrained 
resources. This view is based on the public interest theory stating that government is 
both “benign” and “capable” of regulating firms (Shleifer 2005). The two potential 
properties are formed institutionally. First, the SEC is forced to be in good faith by the 
tight control of Congress and the media. Its budget, operation, and regulatory 
outcomes are all subject to their monitoring (see The SEC 2016). Second, the SEC’s 
capability as an accounting regulator is supported by its organisational and legal 
institutions. The SEC is staffed with skilled professionals and endowed with due 
authority to conduct its regulatory roles17.  
2.3.2. The reliability of AAERs 
By design, AAER firms are likely to be egregious cases in that they potentially involve 
critical defects in the financial auditing process or accountants’ collusion. AAERs 
were originally a secondary designation for enforcement cases involving mostly
accountants (see Dechow et al. 2011; Karpoff et al. 2017). Moreover, given the optimal 
intervention hypothesis, it would be also an obvious expectation that AAERs, the 
regulatory outcomes of the SEC, may effectively include intentional and egregious 
17 The Enforcement Division of the SEC is composed of skilled accountants and attorneys with at least 
two to five years of prior experience (See https://www.sec.gov/enforce/Article/enforce-about.html), and 
is supported by other divisions in the SEC’s headquarters in Washington DC and 11 regional offices 
staffed with 4,554 full-time employees as of 2016. The Corporate Finance Division, in particular, 
supports the Enforcement Division by reviewing the financial statements of firms (Dechow et al. 2011). 
Moreover, the SEC’s legal rights to investigate cases and collect official evidence from firms and 
witnesses (e.g., subpoenas) compensate its constraints and differentiate it from other fraud detection 
channels (Bremser et al. 1991; The SEC 2005).
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misreporting cases. Material accounting irregularities may have three main attributes 
that distinguish them from simple errors or subtle cases.  
First, accounting irregularity firms would have lower levels of financial reporting 
quality prior to the incidence of financial misreporting. Frequent and high levels of 
accruals are usually considered to represent managers’ opportunistic intent to 
misreport because accruals, in and of themselves, involve managerial discretion (see 
Richardson et al. 2006; Ettredge et al. 2010). The mechanisms by which accruals lead 
to accounting irregularities are twofold. Accruals are directly used to misreport during 
the manipulation period (Dechow et al. 2011; Jones et al. 2008), and the reversal 
mechanics of accruals over time cause financial misreporting by decreasing the 
capacity of firms to manage their earnings within legitimate boundaries (see Dechow 
et al. 1996; Beneish 1997; Ettredge et al. 2010; Dechow et al. 2012). In this chapter, I 
focus on the effects of prior-year adoption of accruals on future financial misreporting 
(see Perols and Lougee 2011; Ettredge et al. 2010). If current-year financial 
misreporting were intentional, accounting irregularity firms would have adopted 
abnormal levels of accruals compared with error or subtle misreporting cases.  
Additionally, accrual reliability measured by respective components of accruals can 
also be used as a proxy for the intentionality of financial misreporting (see Richardson 
et al. 2005; Richardson et al. 2006). For example, while working capital is frequently 
used to manage earnings for its ease of manipulation (Ettredge et al. 2010), non-current 
operating assets are known to be relatively difficult to manage18 since the depreciation 
mechanism is rather transparent (Barton and Simko 2002; Dechow et al. 2011). In 
particular, the increase in less reliable current working capital accruals is a signal of 
18 According to Richardson et al. (2005), however, fixed assets also could be adopted as an aggressive 
earnings management strategy, as in WorldCom’s case by capitalising PP&E.  
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intentional income-increasing activities (Richardson et al. 2005). Given these 
considerations, I hypothesise that, compared to SCAL and AA firms, AAER firms 
would have higher levels of accruals and lower levels of accrual reliability. Thus, the 
first two hypotheses of this study are as below.   
H1: AAERs are likely to be composed of firms that have adopted accruals than 
SCALs and AA.  
Second, accounting irregularity firms would have greater financing needs because 
firms tend to misreport to attract external financing at low costs (Dechow et al. 2010). 
Financial ratios are a key consideration of lenders through their credit screening 
process (see Dimitras et al. 1996). Despite some limitations19, financial ratios have 
been considered to be critical in addressing information asymmetry between creditors 
and debtors due to their strong predictive power regarding business failures and 
simplicity (see Emel et al. 2003). Among various financial factors, firms’ profitability 
and liquidity are two main considerations that credit screening models have commonly 
adopted (Courtis 1978). In this vein, firms with more opportunistic intentions around 
financial misreporting are likely to have greater financing needs.  
H2: AAERs are likely to be composed of firms that have stronger financing 
needs than SCALs and AA.  
19 The predictive power of financial ratios is affected by non-financial attributes of firms such as 
managerial and industry characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and firms’ financial misreporting 
(Emel et al. 2003).  
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Third, material financial misreporting cases would have a more significant impact 
on stock markets once disputed misreporting is revealed to the public. Accounting 
fraud firms are known to experience a drastic drop in stock returns (approximately 10 
percent) after their financial misreporting is revealed to the public by the media or the 
SEC (Feroz et al. 1991; Dechow et al. 1996; Karpoff et al. 2008a). The impact of fraud 
announcement on stock returns is mainly caused by the disparity between investors’ 
outdated perception of firm value constructed by misreported earnings and their more 
accurate one adjusted by the new information regarding potential misreporting (see 
e.g., Fama et al. 1969). In this study, the market impact of financial misreporting is 
measured by observing whether securities class action lawsuits are filed and ultimately 
settled for misreporting firms (see Hennes et al. 2008)20. Given that securities class 
action lawsuits are filed based on the actual losses incurred to plaintiffs and their 
reasonable conclusions on defendant firms’ scienter (Ramphal 2007; Poser 2008), 
firms with material financial misreporting are ultimately more likely to be sued by 
market investors. Therefore, the initiation and settlement of private civil lawsuits 
implies that firms’ financial misreporting caused significant impact to stock markets.   
H3: AAERs are likely to be composed of firms for which securities class action 
lawsuits are filed more than for AA firms.  
20 I do not adopt stock returns data because changes in stock returns on the official release dates of three 
misreporting types cannot be directly compared due to potential endogeneity issues. For example, they 
are released by detectors with different credibility, and disputed misreporting cases are under distinct 
levels of investigation. In particular, the courts’ discovery process begins only after class action civil 
lawsuits are initiated, whereas the SEC have already investigated AAERs for 2-3 years.  
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2.3.3. Fraud detection process and office reorganisation decisions 
To effectively cover material accounting irregularities in AAERs with its constrained 
resources, the SEC can be expected to utilise these resources in a strategic way. For 
instance, the SEC may narrow down targets through its accounting fraud investigation 
process to reduce potential inefficiencies in the process (see also Bremser et al. 1991). 
First, if the SEC cannot investigate all disputed misreporting thoroughly, it would be 
an inevitable and reasonable strategy for the SEC to investigate high-risk firms, whose 
likelihood of misreporting is higher than other firms. Indeed, the SEC is known to 
target, for example, young growth firms because they likely have stronger motivation 
to misreport due to their potentially higher levels of financing needs (Beneish 1999). 
Second, it would also be an optimal decision for the SEC to investigate systematically 
important firms, whose impact to the public would be greater once accounting fraud 
is committed. For one thing, the SEC is known to target for sanctions firms with higher 
visibility such as Fortune 500 firms (Correia 2014).  
Finally, as additional evidence of the SEC’s strategic utilisation of its constrained 
resources, the SEC may allocate its regional offices so that it can mitigate the potential 
geographic bias and facilitate the detection of material accounting irregularities. 
According to Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), firms are more likely to commit accounting 
fraud when they are located far from SEC offices because they believe that the 
resource-constrained SEC may not easily detect misreporting in their regions. They 
empirically demonstrate that firms’ spatial distance from the SEC is positively 
associated with their misreporting deviations 21  (or fraud rates). However, if the 
21 The difference between a county’s share of restatements from total number of restatements and its 
share of firms from total number of firms.  
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optimal intervention hypothesis holds, the SEC may have instituted remedies to 
mitigate this potential bias. 
Based on the review of its enforcement program, the SEC has reorganised the 
structure of its offices - headquarters, regional offices, and district offices - by adding 
or closing offices, and changing their levels in the three-tier hierarchy22. However, the 
specific mechanism through which the SEC’s office decisions are made has been a 
black box to the public. During the sample period of this study (1992-2012), there was 
one closure, of the Seattle district office (WA) in 1994, and two changes in office levels 
between regional offices and district offices in 1993 and 2007. Due to data availability, 
the only testable office reorganisation is the first elevation of six district offices to the 
upper tier of regional offices (major offices) in 2007 following the last change in 1993 
(see also Kedia and Rajgopal 2011). A plausible strategy for the constrained SEC 
would have been to deploy its regional offices in states where regulatory demand is 
higher, or where regulated firms are more populated. Through this optimisation, the 
SEC may mitigate the geographic bias so that it is mainly observed in states where 
firms are relatively less populated. Taken together, the final hypotheses of this study 
are as below.  
H4: The SEC is likely to have instituted remedies to address its resource 
constraints by (for example): 
22 Regional offices report directly to SEC headquarters, and district offices assist regional offices in 
administering SEC programs (see 17 CFR 200.11 and §200.27 2007).   
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H4a: having focused investigation targets, whose likelihood of misreporting is 
higher or whose market impact would be more significant once accounting fraud 
is committed. 
H4b: allocating its regional offices in states with higher firm population. 
2.4. Data and research design 
2.4.1. Data and sample selection 
The sample selection process is summarised in Table 2.1. The base sample is chosen 
from the Compustat database, resulting in 179,929 firm-years from 1992 to 2012 after 
excluding financial firms 23  and firms without 10 year-industry observations. The 
minimum requirement of 10 observations is set in order to obtain sufficient data to 
estimate accrual measures as in Jones et al. (2008). Three different types of fraud 
database are then merged with the base sample. The merged fraud observations are 
1,237 for AAERs compiled by the Center for Financial Reporting and Management 
(CFRM) (Dechow et al. 2011); 1,488 for SCALs collected from Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse established by the Stanford Law School; and 14,499 for AA 
complied by Audit Analytics. Dismissed or ongoing SCAL cases are deleted to 
mitigate the risk of analysing frivolous lawsuits (see Donelson et al. 2013), and SCAL 
cases that are not relevant to financial misreporting or disclosure issues are also not 
included in the sample. 
The sample starts from 1992, which is the common first misreporting year of the 
three databases. The terminal year 2012 is determined so that each misreporting 
23 I exclude financial firms because their main accruals type (i.e., loan loss provision) is different from 
that of manufacturing firms.  
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detection channel would have had enough time to detect cases. However, I also analyse 
a sub-sample for the years 2000-2012 for all three categories of misreporting case in 
order to have a sufficient number of samples (see Panel B in Table 2.1). The analysis 
results do not differ by the sampling periods.  
SCALs and AA in this chapter are financial misreporting cases that are exclusively
detected by market investors and firms’ managers respectively (Figure 2.1). This 
process ensures that we do not compare AAERs with themselves if they belong to 
more than one misreporting category simultaneously, and provides the chance to 
contrast the characteristics of AAERs with misreporting cases that are not included in 
AAERs. AAERs, SCALs, and AA commonly include non-misreporting firm-years for 
each misreporting firm. On the other hand, the duplications among different databases 
are analysed separately to test whether the analyses of this study are consistent with 
those of prior studies. Since prior research largely aimed to analyse accounting 
irregularities from their original samples by choosing cases that are closer to AAERs 
in nature (see e.g., Hennes et al. 2008; Hayes 2014), I expect that the duplications 
would show similar analysis results to those of AAERs.  
2.4.2. Financial misreporting databases 
AAERs have generally been considered to be an appropriate sample for analysing 
intentional violations of GAAP (Dechow et al. 2011). AAERs are the result of the 
SEC’s official investigation process, which is supported by due organisational and 
legal institutions, and the standardised enforcement process of the SEC tends to ensure 
homogeneous misreporting cases (e.g., types of GAAP violations and their 
intentionality). However, its enforcement process is potentially biased due to its 
constrained resources. Considering its costly investigation process, the SEC is likely 
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to focus on more overt cases when instituting regulatory processes (Dechow et al. 1996; 
Richardson et al. 2002). Potential interference from external influential groups 
including regulated firms themselves is another concern regarding this database (see 
Becker 1983; Correia 2014).  
SCALs include most misreporting cases that generated critical damages for market 
investors. These cases are chosen by investors themselves in consideration of the 
potential monetary compensation and costs of suits. As with the definition of 
accounting fraud (SAS No. 99), SCALs also assume the scienter of accused firms 
(Ramphal 2007; Poser 2008). However, SCALs are distinguished from AAERs in that 
private civil lawsuits are only instituted when plaintiffs suffered significant losses 
regarding their purchases and sales of securities; material accounting irregularities that 
did not cause significant losses to investors are thus not included in this sample. The 
possibility that investors may file suits to extract funds from the legal process without 
sufficient grounds to prove the scienter of accused firms is a major concern of this 
sample. In fact, the majority of SCAL cases are settled based on firms’ insurance 
policies before courts even initiate their due discovery process (see Khanna et al. 2015). 
Thus, despite the enactment of the Public Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 
in 1995, frivolous lawsuits are still a potential bias in this sample. To mitigate this 
concern, dismissed cases are usually excluded from analyses (see Alexander 1991; 
Wang et al. 2010; Donelson et al. 2013). 
Finally, AA includes “nearly” all restatement cases filed with the SEC since 2000, 
except some cases resulting from adopting new accounting standards (see Scholz 2008, 
2014). Restatement decisions are made by managers after weighing the costs of 
concealment and admission. Since restatement does not consider the intentionality of 
misreporting, it includes virtually all GAAP violations screened by managers based 
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on their own cost-benefit analyses. Large sample size is one of the main benefits of 
this database. However, the large sample size inevitably entails a potential bias. In 
contrast to AAERs and SCALs, which mainly target intentional misreporting cases, 
AA includes both accounting irregularities and simple errors (Hennes et al. 2008). 
Since these potential heterogeneities may decrease the power of empirical analyses, 
studies have paid attention to the sample selection issue of restatement databases (see 
Dechow et al. 2011)24. 
2.4.3. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the total Compustat observations and each misreporting 
category are reported in Table 2.2. t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) results in 
Columns between (1) and (6) reveal that misreporting firms are larger in asset size and 
listed more frequently on major stock markets than the average Compustat 
observations. Among the three categories, AAER and SCAL firms show such size and 
market characteristics more strongly. Reflecting SCALs’ composition of securities 
suits, SCAL firms are listed more on major stock markets than other two misreporting 
types. Furthermore, AAER and SCAL firms also show higher levels of total accruals 
(RSST) and Actual issuance, implying that these firms are likely to have higher levels 
of motivation to misreport.  
Contrary to AAER and SCAL samples, AA firms show rather lower levels of RSST
than the Compustat population. The heterogeneities among different fraud categories 
are explored in more detail using multivariate analyses in the following sections. The 
24 In contrast to Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) and Correia (2014), I do not adopt Karpoff et al. (2017)’s 
hand-collected securities enforcement data because the research focus of this study specifically 
concerns the reliability of AAERs as an accounting fraud database.  
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characteristics of AAER firms are largely consistent with those found in Dechow et al. 
(2011). 
2.4.4. Accounting fraud model 
To maintain consistency with prior literature, I adopt the accounting fraud model 
proposed by Dechow et al. (2011). This model assumes that accounting fraud firms 
misreport to improve their earnings (ROA (change)) and to finance stocks and bonds 
at low costs (Actual issuance). It further assumes that accounting fraud firms are likely 
to utilise RSST, accounts receivable (Receivables (change)), soft assets (Soft assets), 
and even cash sales (Cash sales (change)) as earnings management strategies. To 
accommodate the optimistic prospects of accounting fraud firms, it further 
incorporates the rates of inventory increase (Inventory (change)). As in Eq. (2.1), the 
base model is then extended by incorporating additional controls such as Ln(Assets), 
Leverage, Stock market, and year and industry fixed effects adopted in major literature 
(e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Khanna et al. 2015). Ln(Assets) and Stock market are 
adopted since large and listed firms are more likely to be tightly monitored by market 
participants (Hope et al. 2013), and it is thus more difficult for these firms to misreport. 
On the other hand, firms’ listing status may be associated with firms’ opportunistic 
motivation to finance from stock markets (McTier and Wald 2011). Leverage also has 
rather ambiguous implications. While high leveraged firms are more likely to be 
tightly bounded by creditors (Lee 2011), they also may have greater motivation to 
misreport to avoid debt covenant violations (Dechow et al. 1996).  
Following Dechow et al. (2011), I adopt RSST as a main financial reporting quality 
measure. In addition to current working capital accruals, RSST includes non-current 
operating and financial accruals (Richardson et al. 2005). After testing various types 
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of accruals, Dechow et al. (2011) find that RSST is better at predicting accounting 
fraud propensity. To avoid arbitrariness, however, I additionally estimate Eq. (2.1) 
using a wide range of alternative proxies for financial reporting quality (e.g., working 
capital accruals, components of accruals and discretionary accruals). To capture their 
accumulated reversal effects, accrual measures are mainly tested after aggregating 
three years of accruals (see e.g., Ettredge et al. 2010; Perols and Lougee 2011). 
Contemporaneous and lagged accruals, however, produce largely similar results. In 
addition, Eq. (2.1) incorporates Actual issuance to provide additional evidence that 
AAERs are composed of accounting irregularity firms whose financing needs are 
higher during the manipulation period (Dechow et al. 2011). The details of financial 
reporting quality and financing needs measures are explained in Appendix 2.A.  
In particular, to capture the changing accounting fraud risk by time, I use the simple 
hazard model suggested by Shumway (2001) and employed by Davidson et al. (2015) 
in accounting fraud literature. According to Shumway (2001), the simple hazard model 
is estimated using a discrete-time logit program. Contrary to conventional binary 
models that use only single-point data for estimation (e.g., a year before the incidence 
of accounting fraud), the simple hazard model utilises all available data before the 
incidence of fraud and, therefore, considers the fact that the accounting fraud risk of a 
firm varies with time, conditional on the time spent without committing fraud.  
Ln[Ft / (1–Ft)] = α0 + α1Financial Reporting Quality
+ α2Actual issuancet + α3Receivables (change)t-1  
+ α4 Inventory (change)t-1 + α5Soft assets (change)t-1
+ α6Cash sales (change)t-1 + α7ROA (change)t-1 + α8Ln(Assetst-1)
+ α9Leveraget-1 + α10Stock markett-1 + ∑αYear dummy  
+ ∑αIndustry dummy + ∑αDuration dummy + εt ......................... (2.1)
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Where:  
Ft / (1 – Ft) = the probability of fraud commitment at time t conditional on non-
fraud incidence to t.  
2.5. Main findings 
2.5.1. Univariate and graphical analyses 
The pairwise correlation analyses in Table 2.3 show that, compared to SCALs, AA, 
and the total Compustat population, AAER firms are associated with higher levels of 
both RSST25 prior to the incidence of each misreporting type and Actual issuance26
during manipulation periods (Columns (1)-(3)). Since accruals have reversal effects 
on firms’ financial misreporting (Lee et al. 1999), an insignificant contemporaneous 
difference in RSST between AAER and SCAL firms (Column (1)) does not necessarily 
mean that AAER firms are not actively involved in accruals management. On the 
contrary, a string of consecutive positive signs of RSST in the comparative analyses 
implies that AAERs are composed of firms that managed accruals more aggressively 
than the SCAL, AA, and Compustat populations. These findings provide preliminary 
evidence supporting H1.  
The univariate analyses, however, still do not provide conclusive evidence that 
AAERs are more likely to include accounting irregularities. The results may be biased 
due to potentially omitted variables or the SEC having failed to detect accounting fraud 
cases (see Wang 2013). We cannot clearly know what the proportion of undetected 
cases might be (see Dyck et al. 2013). The following subsections attempt to provide 
25 Correlation analyses of seven additional types of accruals show qualitatively the same results.  
26 The negative signs of Capital expenditure will be explained in following sections.  
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supporting and additional evidence for the reliability of AAERs as an accounting fraud 
database by investigating whether the univariate correlations are susceptible to the 
inclusion of additional controls, and whether the SEC’s potential bias may reduce the 
reliability of AAERs.  
Before conducting multivariate analyses, simple but intuitive graphical analysis 
results are presented in Figure 2.2. The first plot illustrates the comparative trends of 
discretionary accruals measured by PMJONES of three misreporting types. The trend 
of AAER firms is similar to those presented by Dechow et al. (1996) and Richardson 
et al. (2006). The discretionary accruals of AAER firms gradually increase over three 
years before the incidence of financial misreporting, and the increasing trends of 
discretionary accruals are then drastically reversed after the first misreporting year, 
implying that the reversal effects of accruals would create pressure leading to 
fraudulent misreporting (Dechow et al. 2012).  
Additionally, I overlay two trends of discretionary accruals of SCAL and AA firms.  
First, SCAL firms show a similar trend with that of AAER firms, but the magnitude 
of discretionary accruals is much smaller. AA firms, on the other hand, show different 
patterns in that not only are their discretionary accrual levels much smaller than those 
of both AAER and SCAL firms, but they also still show increasing patterns of 
discretionary accruals even after financial misreporting, implying that AA firms may 
have not fully consumed their capacity for accruals management at the time of 
misreporting. These distinct patterns also support H1 in suggesting again that AAERs 
are composed of firms whose financial reporting quality is relatively lower than those 
of SCALs and AA.  
The second plot of Figure 2.2 further provides an explanation for why prior studies 
have produced largely similar results on the association between discretionary accruals 
40
and three distinct types of misreporting categories (e.g., Perols and Lougee 2011; 
Chalmers et al. 2012; Ettredge et al. 2010), despite their potential heterogeneities. 
Differently from SCALs and AA, which exclude duplications with AAERs, AAER-
SCAL and AAER-AA firms in the graph are composed of duplications of AAERs with 
private civil lawsuit and restatement firms respectively. Notably, the trends of 
discretionary accruals in these three misreporting samples become broadly similar to 
each other. A likely explanation is that, through a careful sampling process, studies 
adopting private civil lawsuit and restatement cases have tended to analyse 
“accounting irregularities” and “aggressive accounting” that are closer in nature to 
AAERs (see Zhang et al. 2008; Hennes et al. 2008)27 . Taken together, the initial 
analyses provide preliminary evidence that lower levels of financial reporting quality 
are mainly characteristic of AAERs, rather than SCALs and AA.   
2.5.2. Financial reporting quality and financing needs 
To test whether the univariate analyses are susceptible to the inclusion of additional 
controls, I first conduct comparative analyses of AAERs with both SCAL and AA 
firms after controlling for variables that prior studies have commonly adopted in 
accounting fraud models (Eq. (2.1)). These analyses attempt to test whether AAERs 
are a reliable database for material accounting irregularities, despite their evidently 
partial coverage of misreporting cases. Table 2.4 consistently reports that, compared 
to SCALs and AA, AAER firms are associated with higher levels of six types of total 
and discretionary accruals (Columns (1)-(6) in Panel A and Columns (3)-(8) in Panel 
B) and lower accruals reliability (Columns (1)-(2) in Panel B) prior to the incidence 
27 See also Efendi et al. (2007), Harris and Bromiley (2007), and Scholz (2008). Specifically, O'Connor 
et al. (2006) analyse restatement cases that were investigated by regulatory agencies to exclude 
unintentional restatements.  
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of accounting fraud. These results are consistent with H1. Columns (1)-(8) in Panel A 
and Panel B further report that AAER firms have financing needs that are similar to 
those of SCAL firms but stronger than those of AA firms during the manipulation 
period. These findings support H2.  
As other symptoms of lower financial reporting quality, I find two additional 
heterogeneities in firm characteristics among three misreporting types. AAER firms 
show higher levels of Receivables (change) than AA firms, and higher levels of Soft 
assets than both SCAL and AA firms. These findings also provide supporting evidence 
that AAER firms are more likely to manage their earnings aggressively than firms in 
other categories. Accounts receivable is, for example, directly adopted by firms that 
manage earnings through “trade-loading” and “premature revenue recognition” 
(Richardson et al. 2005). Similarly, firms are more easily able to manage their earnings 
by changing assumptions and forecasts on Soft assets like accounts receivable and 
inventory than property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) (see Dechow et al. 2011; Barton 
and Simko 2002). 
The only exception to the trend of lower levels of financial reporting quality in 
AAER firms is the estimation outcome when adopting Dechow and Dichev (2002)’s 
analysis of accrual estimation errors (SDD) 28 . Columns (7) and (8) in Panel A 
demonstrate that AAER firms merely show similar levels of SDD to both SCAL and 
AA firms. A plausible reason for this exception is that, contrary to other types of 
accruals, SDD is estimated from the relation between working capital accruals and 
cash flow from operation (CFO) of lagged (t-1), contemporaneous (t), and lead (t+1) 
points of time (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Therefore, the relatively lower SDD of 
28 This finding is consistent with Jones et al. (2008), who show that restatements have an association 
with only SDD among accrual types.  
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AAER firms may result from their cash flow levels. Based on the assumption that cash 
flows are not strongly affected by firms’ earnings management (Burgstahler et al. 
2006), Dechow and Dichev (2002) suggest that the mismatch between cash flows and 
accruals represents a lower quality of accruals. However, if firms manage both 
accruals and cash flows simultaneously to mask their financial conditions, SDD may 
overestimate the accrual quality of more opportunistic firms. In fact, the analysis 
results of CFO of three misreporting types reveal that AAER firms are more likely to 
have high levels not only of accruals but also cash flows than SCAL and AA firms 
(Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.5). These findings are consistent with those of Dechow 
et al. (2011), who show that AAER firms have an increasing trend of both accruals 
and cash sales. Taken together, the relatively lower levels of SDD also support the 
opportunistic nature of AAER firms.  
2.5.3. Market impact 
To test whether AAERs are composed of firms that caused more significant market 
impact than SCALs and AA, I further examine whether more securities class action 
lawsuits (Lawsuits) are initiated and ultimately settled for AAERs than for AA firms. 
Given that a comparison of stock returns on release dates of different types of 
misreporting is not feasible (see footnote 20), the filing of lawsuits provides an ideal 
alternative. Since private civil lawsuits are filed based on the size of actual losses 
incurred to market investors, they capture the market impact of misreporting (see also 
Hennes et al. 2008). AA firms are adopted as a benchmark for the comparison since 
non-misreporting firms are not likely to be subject to future litigation. To address the 
mismatch in misreporting periods between AAERs and securities class action 
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lawsuits29, Lawsuits is constructed by observing whether misreporting years of private 
civil lawsuits fall within two years before and after (Column (1) in Table 2.6), or within 
two years after the misreporting years of AAERs (Column (2)).  
Table 2.6 reports that AAER firms are associated with a higher propensity to incur 
the ultimate filing of private civil lawsuits than AA firms, implying that AAER firms 
caused more serious losses to capital market investors than AA firms. To put it 
differently, AAERs tend not to include misreporting cases whose market impact is less 
likely to be significant, even when firms admit misreporting in their financial 
statements. The results confirm H3.  
2.5.4. Enforcement bias and AAERs 
As an additional analysis, I test whether the SEC’s potential regulatory biases affect 
the reliability of AAERs as an appropriate accounting fraud proxy. Despite the 
advantage in being able to compare AAERs with more focused samples, the analyses 
so far did not explicitly consider the potential biases inherent in the SEC’s enforcement 
process. To do this, I estimate Eq. (2.1) after controlling for factors that may relate to 
its detection process. Seven variables are selected from major prior literature that 
explores the SEC’s enforcement process (e.g., Correia 2014; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011; 
Wang 2013). As a benchmark sample, however, I adopt the whole Compustat 
population in this analysis because the different detection processes of two 
misreporting detectors cannot be considered simultaneously.  
First, four detection variables are chosen from the factors that the SEC may consider 
through its detection process. Audit opinion and Unexpected performance (Wang 2013) 
29 The misreporting periods stated in AAERs and securities class action lawsuits do not always exactly 
match, because the two fraud detection channels may have different judgements on the same 
misreporting cases.   
44
usually trigger SEC investigation, and the SEC is also known to focus on firms with 
higher visibility such as Fortune 500 (Correia 2014) and young growth firms (Ln(Firm 
age) (Beneish 1999). Second, as explained earlier, three representative SEC 
enforcement biases - Ln(Distance), Political contribution, and Ln(Employee) - are also 
adopted to address the potential bias of undetected fraud cases. Column (1) in Table 
2.7 reports that AAERs cover cases that are more likely to represent accounting 
irregularities even after the inclusion of potential bias variables in Eq. (2.1), again 
supporting the reliability of AAERs.   
Differently from Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), the coefficient of Ln(Distance) is 
negative and not significant in Column (1). Negative or insignificant coefficients are 
also found in Correia (2014) and Heese (2015). The difference results from two main 
factors. First, Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) adopt U.S. county as a unit of analysis, 
whereas subsequent studies including this one conduct their analyses from a firm’s 
perspective. Second, while I adopt AAERs as a financial misreporting proxy, Kedia 
and Rajgopal (2011) use the Government Accountability Office (GAO)’s restatements. 
Additionally, this measure standardises the number of income-decreasing restatements 
by the number of firms in each county. As will be explained later, the results become 
similar to those of Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) when I adopt U.S. states as a unit of 
analysis and AAER deviation 30  as a measure of financial misreporting. The 
implications of the different research design will be explained in the following 
subsections31.  
30 The difference between a state’s share of AAERs from total AAERs and its share of firms from total 
Compustat firms. 
31 Contrary to Correia (2014), Political contribution shows a positive but insignificant coefficient. The 
difference may result from different sources and periods of samples between Correia (2014) and this 
study. Another recent study by Heese (2015), who also adopts CFRM samples, shows a positive and 
insignificant coefficient of this variable in his accounting fraud model.  
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I next test whether the results are robust regarding accounting fraud cases which 
have potentially gone undetected due to the SEC’s possible enforcement bias. In this 
analysis, the enforcement bias is assumed to affect the probability of our observing 
AAERs through the detection process of the SEC rather than through the fraud 
commitment process of firms (see Wang 2013). To test this alternative explanation, I 
adopt a bivariate probit model proposed by Poirier (1980) and adopted by Chen et al. 
(2006), Wang (2013), and Khanna et al. (2015) for accounting fraud research. The 
bivariate probit model accommodates the dual processes of accounting fraud 
commitment and detection by combining an accounting fraud model (Eq. (2.1)) with 
an accounting fraud detection model (Eq. (2.2)).  
Following Wang (2013), I do not include benefits from accounting fraud (e.g., 
accruals, financing needs, ROA and leverage) in the fraud detection model, because 
they are main factors that cause firms to commit accounting fraud. Instead, I include 
the above seven factors that may affect the SEC’s detection process in the accounting 
fraud detection model. Additionally, I replace year dummies in the fraud model with 
the SEC’s average annual budgets per regulated firm (Ln(SEC budget) since they 
directly constrain the SEC’s enforcement coverage. The substitution of year dummies 
with Ln(SEC budget), however, does not alter the test results qualitatively. Taken 
together, the probability of our observing an accounting fraud case is determined by 
the interaction of the accounting fraud commitment (Eq. (2.1)) and accounting fraud 
detection (Eq. (2.2)) models, as in Eq. (2.3)32. The probability of our observing AAERs 
32 In Eq. (2.3), Eq. (2.1) is modified in the bivariate probit model by estimating it with a probit model 
as Eq. (2.2) rather than a discrete-time logit program. It is also instructive to note that Eq. (2.2) includes 
Ln(Firm age), whereas Eq. (2.1) does not. Reasons for the model specifications are twofold. First, Eq. 
(2.1) is directly adopted from Dechow et al. (2011)’s simple accounting fraud model, which does not 
incorporate Ln(Firm age). Second, the bivariate probit model incorporating Ln(Firm age) in Eq. (2.1) 
does not converge (for the convergence issue of maximum likelihood methods, see Agresti and Kateri 
(2011)). However, the unconverged result after running for 1,000 iterations is not qualitatively different 
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is one if a firm commits accounting fraud and it is detected by the SEC, whereas the 
probability is zero if either a firm does not commit accounting fraud or a firm commits 
accounting fraud but the SEC does not detect it (see Wang 2013). 
Pr(Detectiont) = β0 + β1Audit opiniont + β2Fortunet + β3Ln(Firm age)
+ β4Unexpected performancet+1 + β5Ln(Distance)
+ β6 Political contributiont + β7Ln(Employeet) + β8Ln(Assetst-1)
                          + β9Stock markett-1 + β10Ln(SEC budgett) + ∑ βIndustry dummy
+ εt ................................................................................................ (2.2)
Pr (Observing AAERs) = Fraud commitment × Detection ................................ (2.3) 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2.7 affirm that AAER firms are still associated with 
lower levels of financial reporting quality and higher levels of financing needs, even 
after controlling for the seven detection factors as a separate process of accounting 
fraud detection. Columns (4) and (5) further estimate the bivariate probit model with 
an alternative assumption that accounting firms’ distance from the SEC offices and 
political contributions may affect not only the SEC’s fraud detection process but also 
firms’ fraud commitment processes. For example, firms that are located far from the 
SEC may be more tempted to commit accounting fraud since they may believe that 
the SEC’s regulatory coverage will not reach their areas (see Kedia and Rajgopal 
2011). This alternative assumption also supports the arguments of this study that, 
despite the potential enforcement biases of the SEC, AAERs effectively cover 
financial misreporting cases that are more likely to represent accounting irregularities.  
from Table 2.7. 
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2.5.5. Strategic utilisation of constrained resources 
To provide a rationale for the reliability of AAERs as an accounting fraud database, I 
first test which target firms the SEC is more likely to focus on through its accounting 
fraud investigation process, assuming that it will attempt to mitigate inefficiencies 
inherent in the process. Columns (3) and (5) in Table 2.7 reveal four main 
characteristics of the firms that the SEC is likely to prioritise as investigation targets. 
First, firms without unqualified opinion (Audit opinion) are associated with higher 
detection propensity by the SEC. Second, as Beneish (1999) pointed out, the SEC 
tends to select more accounting fraud cases from the pool of young growth firms 
(Ln(Firm age)). They are usually involved in initial public offering (IPO) processes or 
are financially-troubled firms that have a stronger incentive to misreport. Finally, firms 
with higher visibility such as Fortune 500 (Fortune 500) and larger firms in asset size 
(Ln(Assets)) are positively associated with the likelihood of accounting fraud detection 
(Correia 2014). These findings together support H4a: presumably to attain its goal as 
an accounting fraud detector with limited resources, the SEC is more likely to select 
focused investigation targets of high-risk and systematically important firms. This 
optimisation may decrease potential inefficiencies in the fraud investigation process.   
Additionally, Figure 2.3 provides specific evidence for the SEC’s ability to mitigate 
the potential geographic bias. The darker colours of each state represent higher 
quintiles of AAER deviation (or fraud rate), the numbers of AAERs and firms33, and 
the total assets of firms. In addition, the red and yellow dots are the locations of SEC 
headquarters and regional offices that were designated before 1993 and elevated in 
33 I adopt Compustat population as a proxy for the SEC’s regulated firms. Even though they may not 
perfectly match each other (see Leuz et al. 2008), Compustat provides the widest range of firms that we 
can access.  
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2007 respectively. As a result, there was no change in major offices during 1993-2007. 
Each variable except AAER deviation is the total sum in each state for the years 1993-
2007. 
Consistent with Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), the map in the upper-left corner shows 
that AAER deviation is high in many states where the SEC’s major offices are not 
located, supporting their geographic bias hypothesis. Given that firms may believe that 
SEC monitoring would be weaker in states where its offices do not exist, but also given 
that the SEC cannot be everywhere, it is reasonable for the SEC to deploy its major 
offices where firms are more crowded and more economically-important firms are 
located. If the SEC allocates its offices this way, the potential geographic bias would 
be prevalent mainly where regulatory demand is relatively low. In fact, the SEC’s 
major offices are largely located in states where Compustat firms are more populated 
and where firms’ total asset sizes are bigger (two maps in the lower side of Figure 2.3). 
Specifically, of six newly elevated regional offices, all except one in Salt Lake (UT) 
were located in states whose numbers of firms, AAERs, and the total assets of firms 
belong to the highest quintiles. These findings provide preliminary evidence 
suggesting that the SEC seeks to mitigate its potential geographic bias by deploying 
its constrained regional offices where regulatory demand is higher (H4b).  
To further identify which factors the SEC prioritises through its office 
reorganisation process, I construct a simple SEC office allocation model (Eq. (2.4)). 
The model is analysed using a unit of U.S. states since the SEC’s office allocation 
decisions are made by states. In fact, 11 regional offices including the headquarters in 
Washington D.C. are located in separate states as of the end of 2016, except California. 
The model includes five factors that the SEC may consider while making its office 
decisions, and that have strong univariate correlations with the SEC’s office locations. 
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First, Ln(Number of AAERs) and Ln(Number of firms) are two main factors that may 
affect the SEC’s office decisions since they directly relate to the SEC’s regulatory 
purpose. Second, Ln(Number of Fortune 500), Ln(Major market), and Ln(Risky 
industry) are additional factors that the SEC may consider regarding the market impact 
and higher chances of accounting fraud commitment. Consistent with the graphical 
analyses, SEC offices are SEC headquarters and regional offices.  
To consider the nature of the SEC’s office allocation decisions34, these variables are 
aggregated for the fiscal years 1993-200735, resulting in state observations reduced to 
53 after excluding American Samoa (AS), Guam (GU), and Northern Marianas (MP), 
which do not have sufficient data. Similarly, I do not scale the number of AAERs by 
the number of firms because, as a federal agency, the SEC is expected to consider the 
total numbers of misreporting and regulated firms rather than an average fraud rate. If 
the SEC deployed its offices based on the average fraud rate of each state, a state with 
an extremely high fraud rate but with only a small number of regulated firms would 
have one of the SEC’s limited offices. The unscaled Ln(Number of AAERs) and 
Ln(Number of firms) are also better at highlighting their incremental effects on the 
SEC’s office allocation decisions. In addition to the main variables, I control for firm 
characteristics in each state (Average asset size and Average Employee) and state 
characteristics (e.g., Ln(Population)). Consistent with Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), 
firms’ accounting ratios are the average of all firms in each state.  
34 As explained earlier, the SEC’s office reorganisation decisions are not made frequently.  
35 For the same reason explained above, I exclude observations in 1992 and after 2007. However, this 
sample attrition does not change the results.  
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Pr(SEC offices) = γ0 + γ1Ln(Number of AAERs) + γ2Ln(Number of firms) 
+ γ3Ln(Number of Fortune 500) + γ4 Ln(Major market)
                            + γ5Ln(Risky industry) + γ6Average asset size 
+ γ7Average employee + γ8Ln(Land area2000) + γ9Ln(Population2000)
                            + γ10Ln(Housing units2000) + εt ................................................... (2.4)
Column (1) in Table 2.8 first reports that Ln(Number of AAERs) is highly correlated 
with SEC office locations without any control. However, its statistical significance 
disappears when I control for Ln(Number of firms) (Column (2)). Columns (3) and (4) 
further reveal that Ln(Number of firms) becomes statistically significant when I control 
for firm and state characteristics. These findings suggest that, among other factors, the 
SEC takes the number of firms as one of its main considerations, affirming H4b again. 
To mitigate potential reverse causality bias in that the existence of SEC offices may 
affect firms’ misreporting behaviours, Columns (5) and (6) estimate Eq. (2.4) after 
excluding five states that had their regional offices before 2007. This exclusion largely 
does not change the results36 (Column (6)). The results support the view that the SEC 
is likely to mitigate its geographic bias by mainly allocating its regional offices in 
states with higher firm population.  
2.6. Additional analyses 
2.6.1. Investigation targets and AAERs 
To test whether the focused investigation targets indeed help the SEC prioritise 
accounting irregularities over simple errors, I compare the characteristics of targeted 
36 Due to limited observations, I estimate a reduced version of Eq. (2.3) incorporating only Ln(Number 
of AAERs) and Ln(Number of firms). The full model of Eq. (2.3) does not converge (see also Allison 
2008).  
51
firms and non-target firms using the Compustat population. t-test and WRS results in 
Columns (7) and (8) in Panel A of Table 2.9 reveal that the targeted firms (i.e., Audit 
opinion, Ln(Firm age), and Ln(Assets) are largely associated with higher levels of 
RSST and financing needs. Columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 2.9 further affirm 
that the characteristics of targeted firms remain valid even when we adopt multivariate 
analyses. The targeted firms are still associated with higher levels of accruals (e.g., 
Ln(Firm age) and Ln(Assets)) and financing needs (all targeted firms). These findings 
together suggest that the relative reliability of AAERs as an accounting fraud database 
could be explained by the SEC’s narrowing down the focus of its investigation. 
4.6.2. Office reorganisation and AAERs 
To test whether the SEC’s office reorganisation in 2007 also affected the 
characteristics of AAERs, I further adopt a different-in-difference (DID) setting. Panel 
A of Table 2.10 summarises the sample selection process for the DID analyses. To 
compare the characteristics of AAER firms in states where the SEC elevated district 
offices to regional offices (elevated states) with AAER firms in states where the SEC 
did not (unelevated states), I first exclude non-AAER firms (165,781 firm-years) from 
the Compustat population. States are then matched based on the ex ante probability of 
elevation to regional offices (pscore), which is calculated using Eq. (2.4), based on a 
nearest neighbour method. The estimation results are summarised in Column (4) in 
Table 2.8. I then remove AAER firms in Texas and California (4,663 firm-years), for 
which I could not find comparable unelevated states. These are two states that have 
the highest levels of pscore. As a result of this matching process, I am left with 1,270 
AAER firm-years from 1993 to 2012, which are composed of 683 and 587 firm-years 
in elevated and unelevated states respectively. Panel B of Table 2.10 affirms that the 
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matching process produces ideally balanced states, whose ex ante probability of 
elevation to regional offices is statistically similar but for whom the SEC’s actual 
elevation decisions were opposite. This matching process ensures that the SEC’s office 
reorganisation in 2007 was exogeneous (see Lechner 2011). 
Figure 2.4 graphically tests the parallel assumption of DID analysis (see Abadie 
2005). This assumption suggests that any change in accrual levels after 2007 results 
from the SEC’s new office decisions. Figure 2.4 affirms that AAER firms in both 
elevated and unelevated states have decreasing trends of accruals before 2007, 
implying that the trends of accruals would have been similar in the absence of the 
SEC’s office reorganisation.   
Finally, DID analysis results in Table 2.11 provide some supporting evidence for 
my argument that the SEC’s strategic reorganisation of major offices may have helped 
the SEC prioritise material accounting irregularities. Columns (1), (3), and (6) reveal 
that the coefficients of Elevation × Post are positive and significant when I adopt 
PMJONES and SDD as accruals measures, implying that, relative to AAER firms in 
unelevated states, AAER firms in elevated states are composed of firms that are more 
likely to represent accounting irregularities. Among eight different types of total and 
discretionary accruals, accrual types other than PMJONES and SDD do not produce 
statistically significant coefficients. However, given that SEC offices have potentially 
countervailing effects in deterring financial misreporting (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011) 
and improving the SEC’s ability to detect accounting irregularities, this marginal 
evidence is meaningful in that the positive and significant coefficients of Elevation × 
Post imply that the latter effect is stronger than the former.  
Additionally, AAER firms in elevated states have similar levels of accruals before
the office reorganisation in 2007 (coefficients of Elevation: not significant). The 
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adoption of accruals by AAER firms in unelevated states is largely decreasing through
the sample periods (coefficients of Post: negative), suggesting that the accruals of 
AAER firms in elevated states similarly would have decreased in the absence of the 
SEC’s office reorganisation.  
2.6.3. Absolute value of accruals  
To test whether the relatively low levels of accruals of SCAL and AA firms result from 
their intentional income-decreasing activities, I further test whether the absolute value 
of accruals37 has different patterns from those of signed accruals in the context of 
financial misreporting. If SCAL and AA firms report depreciated earnings 
intentionally, the absolute value of accruals would better represent firms’ financial 
reporting quality because negative accruals also result from their intentional 
misreporting. In contrast to the analyses of the signed accruals (Table 2.4), AAER 
firms do not show consistently higher levels of absolute value of accruals than both 
SCAL and AA firms (Table 2.12). This implies that SCAL and AA firms have a 
significant portion of negative accruals.  
However, these results do not necessarily mean that SCAL and AA firms decrease 
their earnings intentionally by producing negative accruals. Prior studies consider 
negative accruals as a sign of either conservative accounting (e.g., Richardson et al. 
2006; Lobo and Zhou 2010) or rather aggressive income-decreasing activities (e.g., 
Healy 1985; Gao and Shrieves 2002; Barton and Simko 2002; Kerstein and Rai 2007).  
Additional analyses eliminate these alternative hypotheses. First, Columns (3)-(6) 
37 While a majority of studies adopt signed (both positive and negative) accruals as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality (e.g., Dechow et al. 2011; Jones et al. 2008), several studies focus on the absolute 
values of accruals (e.g., Hope et al. 2013; Crutchley et al. 2007). Their rationale is largely that both 
negative and positive accruals imply earnings management either to report higher current earnings or 
to reserve earnings for future use (see Barton and Simko 2002). 
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in Table 2.13 report that, like AAERs (Columns (1) and (2)), SCAL and/or AA firms 
also show increasing patterns of Receivable (change) and Cash sales when compared 
with the Compustat population. These findings imply that the negative accruals do not 
result from an income-decreasing motivation. If SCAL and AA firms were 
intentionally decreasing earnings by managing accruals, these firms should have 
decreasing trends of accounts receivable and/or cash sales. Second, further analyses 
reveal that both SCAL and AA firms do not have higher levels of Special items 
(change)38 and Write-downs that can be reversed in future years (see Moehrle 2002) 
(Table 2.14). If they had expected the effects of the cookie jar reserve, then they would 
have high levels of these accounts because they can be easily reversed in subsequent 
years at managers’ discretion (see Houmes and Skantz 2010). Finally, the consistently 
higher levels of PMJONES and PMJONES2 in Columns (5)-(6) in Panel A and Panel 
B of Table 2.4 confirm that my findings are not critically susceptible to the 
performance effects that potentially bias the estimation process of discretionary 
accruals39. Taken together, the negative accruals of SCAL and AA firms may result 
from their relatively less aggressive accruals manipulation.  
2.6.4. Capital expenditure 
This subsection provides an explanation for the relatively low levels of Capital 
expenditure of AAER firms compared with both SCAL and AA firms in the univariate 
analyses presented in Table 2.3 (Columns (1)-(3)). Further analyses reveal that the 
statistical significance of the negative coefficients of Capital expenditure disappears 
38 Special items include restructuring costs and write-downs that can be easily manipulated and reversed 
in future years (see Marquardt and Wiedman 2004). 
39 Additional controls of performance variables (e.g., ROA, Loss, and Small profits/losses) also do not 
affect the analysis results. 
55
in multivariate analyses of Eq. (2.1), meaning that AAER firms have similar levels of 
Capital expenditure to the other two fraud types (Table 2.15). These findings are 
largely consistent with Dechow et al. (2011).  
Three potential explanations exist regarding firms’ long-term investment decisions. 
First, firms with lower financial reporting quality usually do not have sufficient 
capacity to invest because they tend to have constrained liquidity conditions (Beatty 
et al. 2010). Second, from a different perspective, firms may have incentives to 
increase capital expenditure when they are involved in accounting fraud schemes. 
According to Wang (2006b), fraudulently misreporting managers may increase new 
investments intentionally because large investment may create “noise” that hinders 
outsiders from easily detecting their misreporting. From her perspective, lower levels 
of Capital expenditure thus may imply that firms’ misreporting is less intentional. 
Finally, reducing capital investments can also be interpreted as a real activities 
management strategy to window-dress firms’ cash flows (see Roychowdhury 2006). 
Postponing investment timing and/or cutting discretionary expenses are two 
representative cases of cash flow management. 
To sort out these alternative explanations, I examine the validity of each argument 
in the context of financial misreporting. First, the constrained liquidity hypothesis is 
excluded because AAER firms show consistently higher levels of both CFO and CFF 
as in Table 2.5 (Columns (3) and (4)). Second, the possibility that AAER firms invest 
less due to their weaker intentionality regarding financial misreporting is also 
excluded. The consistently lower levels of financial reporting quality and higher levels 
of Actual issuance (Table 2.4) imply that their financial misreporting is more likely to 
fall into the category of accounting irregularities (see Hennes et al. 2008). Finally, the 
higher levels of cash flows (Table 2.5) and lower levels of Abnormal discretionary 
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expenses of AAER firms (Table 2.16) than both SCAL and AA firms consistently 
support that AAER firms tend to manage their cash flows actively by reducing 
investing activities (CFI) and discretionary expenses40 . These findings imply that 
AAER firms seek not only to inflate earnings through accruals management but also 
to mask their liquidity conditions. Even though cash flows are considered to be 
relatively free of manipulation (Burgstahler et al. 2006), firms are known to actively 
manage their cash flows as an alternative to accruals management (e.g., 
Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012). Taken together, the relatively low levels of capital 
expenditure of AAER firms result not from lower levels of financing needs or a lesser 
intention to misreport, but from their active cash flow management.  
2.7. Robustness checks 
2.7.1. Contemporaneous analysis 
To test the reliability of the data analysed in this chapter, I first replicate the analysis 
results of Dechow et al. (2011), who estimate the contemporaneous association 
between accruals and AAERs. I adopt their accounting fraud model after replacing 
contemporaneous accruals with accumulated three-year accruals to capture their 
reversal effects over time. If the data of this study are valid, then I should be able to 
replicate similar analysis results to Dechow et al. (2011). Column (1) in Table 2.17 
reveals that, despite the differences in sample periods41 , all signs of coefficients 
estimated using the sample of this study are exactly the same as those of Dechow et 
40  However, I do not find that AAERs firms have greater involvement in other real activities 
manipulation (e.g., abnormal production costs) than SCAL and AA firms (Table 2.16).  
41 While the sample period of Dechow et al. (2011) is between 1971 and 2003, that of this study is 
between 1992 and 2012.  
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al. (2011) when I adopt the contemporaneous accruals in simple probit models. These 
findings affirm the reliability of the samples analysed in this chapter.  
On the other hand, Columns (2)-(4) report that the statistical significance of RSST
disappears once year and industry fixed effects are controlled for in the AAER sample, 
whereas the SCAL sample still shows positive and significant effects on lawsuit 
propensity (Column (5)). A plausible reason for these results is that AAER firms may 
cross into GAAP violations because they do not have enough capacity to manage their 
earnings within legitimate boundaries of accruals management (Ettredge et al. 2010).  
2.7.2. Duplications with AAERs  
To further test the validity of this study, I replicate the analysis results of prior studies 
that have produced largely homogeneous effects of accruals across different 
misreporting types. While this study has focused on the comparison of AAERs with 
both SCAL and AA firms that are exclusively detected by market investors and firms’ 
managers, prior studies have usually analysed fraud cases that are similar to AAERs 
in their nature. Hennes et al. (2008), for example, suggest several criteria for 
classifying accounting irregularities and errors from restatement samples. Two of their 
criteria are whether the references to restatement cases in Audit Analytics include 
words such as “fraud” or “irregularity”, or whether the restatements were investigated 
by the SEC or the DOJ. Zhang et al. (2008) also analyse the GAO’s restatement sample 
based on similar criteria: whether the cases are characterised by irregularities or 
aggressive accounting (see also Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007). The 
duplicated cases between AAERs and both securities class action lawsuits and 
restatements, thus, should have similar empirical results to those of AAERs and prior 
studies. Table 2.18 consistently reveals that, contrary to the exclusive samples, 
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duplicated fraud cases show homogeneously high levels of RSST, affirming the 
validity of this study again. These findings imply that lower levels of financial 
reporting quality are mainly characteristic of AAERs rather than SCAL and AA firms.  
2.7.3. Alternative specifications 
To test the sensitivity of the results of comparative analyses, I previously adopted eight 
different types of total and discretionary accruals (Table 2.4). The results were 
pronounced and consistent across seven accrual types except SDD. As explained 
earlier, the exception results from AAER firms’ active management of CFO. I further 
test whether the results are susceptible to an alternative financing variable: Net 
external financing needs, adopted by Wang (2006b). Differing from Actual issuance 
(Dechow et al. 2011), Net external financing needs is a continuous variable measuring 
firms’ financing activity in relation to both stocks and bonds. Table 2.19 affirms that 
the results do not change qualitatively even when a continuous financing variable is 
adopted, with only some exceptions depending on accrual types. Instead, the effects 
of actual financing of AAER firms become even stronger. In addition, the inclusion of 
Capital expenditure in Eq. (2.1) also did not alter the analysis results as in Table 2.15. 
Overall, the results are not susceptible to alternative specifications of both financial 
reporting quality and financing needs variables.   
2.7.4. Censoring and sampling biases 
This study may be exposed to the left censoring bias, given that I analyse fraud data 
since 1992 to include three different misreporting types simultaneously. However, 
firms certainly have misreporting and non-misreporting periods before 1992. To 
mitigate this potential bias, I already calculated the duration of non-misreporting 
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periods before misreporting events using the first Compustat date. Similarly, 
Shumway (2001) calculated the duration from the year when firms are listed on stock 
markets. For the firms that had prior experience of fraud before 1992, then I calculated 
the duration from the last prior fraud year. Except some exceptional firms that may 
have had misreporting experience before 1971, this definition of duration is expected 
to identify exactly the years when firms do not misreport before the misreporting event 
captured by the sample of this study.  
A second potential sampling bias is that AA mainly includes restatement cases that 
are filed with the SEC since 2000. In fact, the year-distribution of AA in Table 2.1 
shows that the observations before 2000 are much fewer than those after 2000. To 
address the sampling bias that may result from analysing potentially incomplete 
samples, I further estimate Eq. (2.1) using data between 2000 and 2012. Table 2.20 
confirms that the statistical significance of the main variables of interest become even 
stronger when analysing samples for the fiscal years 2000-2012. In the reduced sample, 
AAER firms show higher levels of financing needs than not only AA firms but also 
SCAL firms.  
2.7.5. Growth and efficiency 
I further test whether the analysis results of accruals are susceptible to the inclusion of 
firms’ sales growth rate (Sales growth) and asset turnover ratio (Asset efficiency). 
Richardson et al. (2006) show that firms with a high sales growth rate tend to have 
high accruals, whereas firms with a high asset turnover ratio tend to have low accruals. 
Therefore, the heterogeneities in three databases may result from their different levels 
of growth and efficiency. Analysis results reveal, however, that AAER firms still show 
lower levels of financial reporting quality than both SCAL and AA firms even after 
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these two potentially omitted variables are controlled for in Eq. (2.1) (Table 2.21). 
These results again affirm the lower levels of financial reporting quality of AAER 
firms.  
2.7.6. Static and dynamic hazard models 
To test the sensitivity of the analysis results to alternative models with different 
assumptions, I finally estimate Eq. (2.1) using both a static probit and dynamic hazard 
model (Cox and Oakes 1984). I mainly adopt the simple hazard model (see Shumway 
2001) to overcome two shortcomings inherent in static probit models: (i) the 
conventional model does not consider differing levels of misreporting risk which 
change depending on the duration before the incidence of misreporting; and (ii) data 
during the manipulation period are not accurate (Dechow et al. 2011). On the other 
hand, the dynamic hazard model has similar assumptions to the simple hazard model 
except that of distribution of duration. Table 2.22, however, reveals that these two 
alternative models largely produce similar results to those of a simple hazard model 
despite heterogeneities in the samples analysed and the assumptions adopted by 
different models. These tests strongly affirm that the results of this study are robust 
regarding assumptions that different models adopt.  
2.8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine whether AAERs constitute a reliable database for accounting 
fraud, despite their evidently partial coverage of misreporting cases and the resource 
constraints of the SEC. Using comparative analyses of three financial misreporting 
databases, I find that AAERs are composed of firms that are more likely to represent 
material accounting irregularities than SCAL and AA firms, which are exclusively
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identified by capital market investors and firms’ managers respectively. Further 
analyses indicate that the reliability of AAERs can be explained by the SEC’s strategic 
methods in utilising constrained resources, in addition to AAERs’ inherently egregious 
nature in that they involve accountants. Specifically, the SEC tends to focus more on 
high-risk and systematically important firms as enforcement targets, and to allocate 
regional offices mainly where firms are more populated. Through this optimisation, 
the SEC may mitigate inefficiencies inherent in its accounting fraud investigation 
process and address the potential geographic bias.  
As with most research of this type, the results should be interpreted with some 
caveats. First, the results should not be generalised to suggest that SEC enforcement 
is effective in general (e.g., in deterring accounting fraud incidences or illegal insider 
trading (see e.g., Guercio et al. 2017)). As Leuz and Wysocki (2016) and Chiras and 
Crea (2004) articulate, studies exploring the overall efficacy of government regulation 
are usually more susceptible to endogeneity issues like identification (e.g., 
simultaneous causality) and measurement. This study instead focuses specifically on 
the relative reliability of AAERs as an accounting fraud database as a result of the 
SEC’s enforcement actions. Second, the reliability of AAERs as an accounting fraud 
database should be interpreted in comparison with its benchmark samples. 
Unfortunately, we do not have a perfect benchmark that consists of all financial 
misreporting cases. However, the selection processes of the three misreporting 
detection channels at least ensure that a significant portion of egregious cases are not 
likely to be excluded from all three complementary samples. Finally, the reliability of 
AAERs does not necessarily mean that AAERs are superior to other databases. As 
explained earlier, securities class action lawsuits and restatements have their own 
advantages as financial misreporting databases. Moreover, studies adopting these 
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databases usually apply due sampling criteria to ensure they analyse material 
accounting irregularities rather than simple errors (see Zhang et al. 2008; Hennes et al. 
2008).  
With these caveats in mind, my findings support the relative reliability of AAERs 
as a proxy for material accounting irregularities (see also Dechow et al. 2010), and 
should be of interest to researchers who use AAERs to proxy for accounting fraud. 
Complementing Karpoff et al. (2017), the findings suggest that, despite partial 
coverage of misreporting cases, AAERs are suitable for analysing firms’ relatively 
intentional motivation to misreport.  
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FIGURE 2.1  Duplications of databases 
AAER-SCAL-AA refers to duplicated observations detected commonly by all three fraud detection channels, 
whereas AAER-SCAL, AAER-AA, AA-SCAL represent duplications between two fraud detectors. 
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FIGURE 2.2  Trends of accruals (PMJONES)
This figure illustrates the trends of discretionary accruals measured by PMJONES surrounding the first 
misreporting year of three fraud databases. Y-axis is the levels of PMJONES and X-axis represents the years relative 
to the first year of misreporting (the first fraud year = 0). AAER-SCAL and AAER-AA stand for duplicated AAERs 
respectively with securities class action lawsuits and restatements. 
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FIGURE 2.3  Distribution of SEC offices, AAER deviation, AAERs, firms and total 
assets
This figure illustrates the distributions of SEC offices, AAER deviation, AAERs, Compustat firms, and their total 
assets. Each variable except AAER deviation is the total sum for the years 1993-2007. AAER deviation is the 
difference between a state’s share of AAERs from total AAERs and its share of Compustat firms from total 
Compustat firms. All variables are divided into four quintiles, and darker colours represent higher quintiles. Red 
and yellow dots are the locations of the SEC headquarters and regional offices. In particular, yellow dots represent 
six newly elevated regional offices in 2007.
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FIGURE 2.4  Parallel trend assumption 
This figure illustrates the univariate trends of PMJONES (mean) of firms in both states elevated to regional offices 
and states not elevated to regional offices in 2007. X-axis represents the years relative to the year of elevation by 
the SEC, Y-axis shows mean PMJONES. 
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TABLE 2.1  Sample selection
Panel A: Sample Selection Process
Database AAER SCAL AA Compustat 
Panel Panel A Panel B Panel C
AAERs complied by CFRM  
Settled SCAL  






Less: Obs. without identifier or sufficient data 
Less: Obs. of financial firms  
 Less: With less than 10 year-industry obs. 
 Less: Obs. of audit violation 















Total firm-years (1992-2012) 1,237 1,488 14,499 179,929
 Frequency of Compustat firm-years 0.69% 0.83% 8.06% 100.0%
Total firms (1992-2012) 459 749 4,762 20,071
Panel B: Frequency of Fraud by Year 
Year AAER Private Civil Lawsuits Restatements 
Number of 
obs. 
Percentage Number of 
obs. 
Percentage Number of 
obs. 
Percentage 
1992 43 3.48 1 0.06 17 0.11 
1993 53 4.28 2 0.12 32 0.21 
1994 42 3.40 7 0.41 63 0.41 
1995 38 3.07 27 1.58 134 0.88 
1996 54 4.37 53 3.11 230 1.50 
1997 67 5.42 74 4.34 339 2.21 
1998 81 6.55 84 4.92 486 3.17 
1999 117 9.46 190 11.14 715 4.67 
2000 141 11.40 281 16.47 966 6.31 
2001 134 10.83 148 8.68 1,160 7.58 
2002 115 9.30 118 6.92 1,365 8.92 
2003 92 7.44 95 5.57 1,460 9.54 
2004 75 6.06 102 5.98 1,539 10.05 
2005 60 4.85 88 5.16 1,291 8.43 
2006 37 2.99 77 4.51 1,016 6.64 
2007 32 2.59 81 4.75 832 5.44 
2008 20 1.62 58 3.40 724 4.73 
2009 19 1.54 57 3.34 727 4.75 
2010 10 0.81 59 3.46 734 4.79 
2011 3 0.24 58 3.40 758 4.95 
2012 4 0.32 46 2.70 720 4.70 
Total 1,237 100.0 1,706 100.0 15,308 100.0 
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TABLE 2.2  Descriptive statistics
Compustat AAER SCAL AA 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Financial reporting quality 
























































































































































































SEC enforcement bias  





















































































This table reports descriptive statistics, including p-values for t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) tests of mean 
and median differences between the Compustat population and three fraud databases. p-values are presented in the 
parentheses and variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. All continuous variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percent 
levels. 
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TABLE 2.3  Pairwise correlation analysis
AAERs vs. SCAL AAERs vs. AA AAERs vs. Full sample 
(1) (2) (3) 
AAERs 
Corr. N Corr. N Corr. N 
Financial reporting quality 
RSSTt 0.010 12,526 0.017*** 53,709 0.009*** 140,595
RSSTt-1 0.061*** 11,452 0.038*** 49,214 0.022*** 123,807
RSSTt-2 0.050*** 10,400 0.033*** 44,907 0.020*** 108,687
RSSTt-3 0.047*** 9,397 0.032*** 40,792 0.020*** 95,202
Aggregated RSST (three-year) 0.095*** 9,004 0.055*** 39,334 0.034*** 91,778
Financing needs 
Actual issuance 0.039*** 15,411 0.036*** 64,827 0.024*** 179,929
Capital expenditure -0.021** 14,850 -0.030*** 62,781 -0.017*** 169,118
Total observations (max.) 15,411 64,827 179,929 
AAER firm-years (max.) 1,237 1,237 1,237 
% of AAER firm-years 8.03% 1.91% 0.69% 
This table reports the pairwise correlation analysis results between the main variables of interest of this study and 
the filing of AAERs. AAER vs. SCAL represents firms whose financial misreporting is detected by either the SEC 
or investors at least once in their firm years, while AAER vs. AA refers to firms whose financial misreporting is 
detected by either the SEC or firms’ managers at least once in their firm years. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at 1 and 99 percent levels. 
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TABLE 2.4  Simple hazard estimation results using financial reporting quality and 
financing needs 
Panel A: RSST, WC, PMJONES, SDD

























(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 






















































































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,496 31,064 5,767 32,249 5,676 31,608 5,665 31,566
Log likelihood -745 -1087 -801 -1166 -788 -1147 -784 -1141
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Panel B: Components, MJONES, PMJONES2, FMJONES

























(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
























































































































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,496 31,064 5,690 31,753 5,690 31,753 5,087 28,242
Log likelihood -739 -1077 -792 -1155 -793 -1155 -659 -962
This table reports the simple hazard estimation results between (discretionary) accruals and accounting fraud. 
Accruals are aggregated for three years prior to the incidence of fraud. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. AAER vs. SCAL represents firms whose financial misreporting is detected by either the SEC or investors at 
least once in their firm years, while AAER vs. AA refers to firms whose financial misreporting is detected by either 
the SEC or firms’ managers at least once in their firm years. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. The decrease in observations from Table 2.3 mainly results from the simple 
hazard specification which uses only the first fraud year data. To facilitate the convergence of the maximum 
likelihood estimations, a reduced industry dummy is adopted for these analyses. Variables are defined in Appendix 
2.B. 
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TABLE 2.5  Simple hazard estimation results using cash flows 
Dependent variable = Pr(AAERs) 

































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,214 29,283 5,483 30,983
Log likelihood -687 -994 -737 -1080
This table reports the simple hazard estimation results between cash flows and accounting fraud. Accruals are 
aggregated for three years prior to the incidence of fraud. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. AAER 
vs. SCAL represents firms whose financial misreporting is detected by either the SEC or investors at least once in 
their firm years, while AAER vs. AA refers to firms whose financial misreporting is detected by either the SEC or 
firms’ managers at least once in their firm years. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels respectively. The decrease in observations from Table 2.3 mainly results from the simple hazard 
specification which uses only the first fraud year data. To facilitate the convergence of the maximum likelihood 
estimations, a reduced industry dummy is adopted for these analyses. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.6  Simple hazard estimation results using market impact of financial 
misreporting 
Dependent variable = Pr(Lawsuits) 
Future settlements of private civil lawsuits Within 2 years 
AAER vs. AA 
After2 years 
AAER vs. AA 




















































Year dummy Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes
Duration dummy Yes Yes
Observations 35,301 35,301
Log likelihood -4843 -3505
This table reports the simple hazard estimation results between future settlements of securities class action lawsuits 
and financial misreporting. Accruals are aggregated for three years prior to the incidence of fraud. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. AAER vs. AA refers to firms whose financial misreporting is detected by 
either the SEC or firms’ managers at least once in their firm years. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. The decrease in observations from Table 2.3 mainly results from the 
simple hazard specification which uses only the first fraud year data. To facilitate the convergence of the maximum 
likelihood estimations, a reduced industry dummy is adopted for these analyses. Variables are defined in Appendix 
2.B. 
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TABLE 2.7  Simple hazard and bivariate probit estimation results after controlling for 
potential enforcement biases of the SEC 
Dependent variable = Pr(AAERs or Observing AAERs) 
Fraud Fraud Detect | Fraud Fraud Detect | Fraud 
































































































































Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummy Yes - - - -
Observations 65,025 76,147 76,147
Log likelihood -1065 -3175 -3174
This table reports the simple hazard (Column (1)) and bivariate probit regression estimation (Columns (2)-(5)) 
results between financial reporting quality/financing needs and accounting fraud after controlling for potential 
enforcement biases of the SEC. Accruals are aggregated for three years prior to the incidence of fraud. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels respectively. The decrease in observations from Table 2.3 mainly results from the simple hazard specification 
which uses only the first fraud year data. To facilitate the convergence of the maximum likelihood estimations, a 
reduced industry dummy is adopted for these analyses. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B.
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TABLE 2.8  Probit estimation results for the SEC’s office allocation decisions 
Dependent variable = Pr(SEC office) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Five existing offices: Included Included Included Included Excluded Excluded 
Factors affecting office allocation




























































Observations 53 53 53 52 48 48
Log likelihood -17.387 -16.850 -13.994 -12.547 -10.397 -8.961
This table reports the probit regression estimation results between potential factors affecting the SEC’s office 
allocation decision and the locations of the SEC’s major offices. Variables are aggregated by states for the years 
1993-2007. Column (4) analyses 52 states excluding Virgin Island (VI), since the U.S. Census Bureau does not 
provide sufficient state-level data. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.9  Focused investigation targets 
Panel A: Descriptive Analysis 
Focused targets Unfocused firms Difference P-value 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-test WRS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
High risk firms
Audit opinion RSST -0.081 0.040 0.136 0.101 -0.217 -0.061 0.000 0.000
Actual issuance 0.846 1.000 0.872 1.000 -0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ln(Firm age) RSST 0.146 0.167 0.021 0.060 0.125 0.107 0.000 0.000
Actual issuance 0.884 1.000 0.857 1.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000
Systematically important firms
Ln(Assets) RSST 0.159 0.097 -0.053 0.043 0.212 0.054 0.000 0.000
Actual issuance 0.917 1.000 0.818 1.000 0.099 0.182 0.000 0.000
Fortune 500 RSST 0.085 0.061 0.060 0.082 0.025 -0.021 0.021 0.000
Actual issuance 0.972 1.000 0.867 1.000 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table reports t-test and WRS results for the mean and median differences between focused and unfocused 
targets of the SEC. p-values are for t-tests and WRS tests. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
Panel B: OLS and Probit Estimation Results for Focused Investigation Targets 
Dependent variable =  
RSST
Dependent variable =  
Pr(Actual Issuance) 



























































Year dummy Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes
Observations 117,603 117,583
Adjusted R2/Log likelihood 0.217 -38,853
This table reports the OLS and probit estimation results for the SEC’s focused investigation targets. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.10  Sample selection and covariate balance  
Panel A: Sample selection 
Total firm-years (1993-2012) 171,714
    Less: Firms without any fraud allegation 165,781
Firm-years with fraud allegations at least once 
Less: Firms in states without matches 
5,933
4,663
Total matched firm-years  
Firms in states elevated to regional offices in 2007 









  Mean t-test WRS KS 
Ln(Number of AAERs) 3.278 2.975 0.670 1.000 1.000
Ln(Number of firms)  8.002 7.984 0.967 0.773 1.000
Ln(Number of Fortune 500) 4.624 4.752 0.894 0.564 0.699
Ln(Major market) 7.438 7.307 0.819 1.000 1.000
Ln(Risky industry) 7.439 7.235 0.717 0.773 1.000
Average asset size 17.012 17.217 0.780 0.773 1.000
Average Employee 0.687 0.798 0.612 0.564 0.699
Ln(Land area) 10.490 10.606 0.889 1.000 1.000
Population (change) 15.631 15.527 0.850 0.773 1.000
Housing units (change) 14.702 14.640 0.915 1.000 1.000
Pscore 0.439 0.469 0.898 1.000 1.000
Year  Matched 
This table reports the covariates balance between the eight matched states: Utah, Nevada, Georgia, Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. pscore stands for the propensity-score. p-values are for t-tests, 
Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.11  DID analysis using the SEC office decision
Dependent variable = Accruals 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
























































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 155 139 236 215 884 814
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.232 0.078 0.196 0.036 0.035
This table reports the difference-in-difference estimation results between the SEC’s office reorganisation and the 
accrual levels of AAER firms. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.12  Simple hazard estimation results using absolute value of accruals 
Panel A: RSST, WC, PMJONES, SDD
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
























(1)  (2) (4) (5) (7)  (8) (10) (11) 
























































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,518 30,835 5,791 32,015 5,700 31,374 5,689 31,344
Log likelihood -745 -1095 -805 -1176 -791 -1156 -784 -1146
Panel B: Components, MJONES, MPJONES, FMJONES
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
























(1)  (2) (4) (5) (7)  (8) (10) (11) 

























































































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,518 30,835 5,714 31,519 5,714 31,519 5,107 28,036
Log likelihood -743 -1092 -795 -1162 -795 -1163 -662 -970
This table reports the simple hazard estimation results between absolute values of accruals and accounting fraud. 
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. The decrease in observations from Table 2.3 mainly results from the simple 
hazard specification which uses only the first fraud year data. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B.
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TABLE 2.13  Simple hazard estimation results using lagged accruals 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud)
Accounting fraud AAER SCAL AA 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 








































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Duration dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 81,750 71,256 92,749 79,812 81,260 69,440 
Log likelihood -1535 -1280 -2223 -1848 -11329 -10295 
This table reports the simple hazard estimation results between Receivables (change) / Cash sales (change) and 
accounting fraud. t-1 and t-2 stand respectively for one and two years before the incidence of accounting fraud. The 
numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels respectively. The decrease in observations from Table 2.3 mainly results from the simple hazard 
specification which uses only the first fraud year data. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.14  Simple hazard estimation results using special items and write-downs 
Panel A: Special items 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
AAER SCAL AA 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 

























































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Duration dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 76,855 94,855 82,160 96,915 85,812 100,967 
Log likelihood -3414 -4014 -3965 -4825 -26533 -29564 
This table reports the simple hazard estimation results between accounting fraud and Special items (change). Cum.
represents aggregate three-year accruals. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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Panel B: Write-downs
Compustat AAER SCAL AA 






















Obs. 3,985 3,985 54 54 79 79 614 614 












Obs. 3,383 3,383 38 38 56 56 498 498 












Obs. 2,943 2,943 31 31 42 42 421 421 












Obs. 2,509 2,509 18 18 37 37 325 325 
This table reports descriptive statistics, including p-values for t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) tests of mean 
and median differences between total observations of Compustat and accounting fraud firms. p-values are presented 
in the parentheses and variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
85
TABLE 2.15  Simple hazard estimation results using capital expenditure 







AAER SCAL AA 




























































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,512 30,760 67,893 81,424 85,205
Log likelihood -742 -1077 -1221 -3715 -26011
This table reports the simple hazard estimation results between corporate fraud and capital expenditure. Numbers 
in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels respectively. To facilitate the convergence of the maximum likelihood estimations, a reduced industry 
dummy is adopted for Columns (1) and (2). Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.16  Probit estimation results using real activities management 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud)















































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Duration dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,981 28,319 5,456 30,485 613 2,334 
Log likelihood -618 -900 -732 -1065 -94 -138 
This table reports the simple hazard model estimation results between accounting fraud and real activities 
management. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. To facilitate the convergence of the maximum likelihood estimations, 
a reduced industry dummy is adopted. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.17  Probit estimation results using contemporaneous RSST
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud)
Accounting fraud AAER SCAL AA 




























































































































Year dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 117,984 112,236 112,236 112,236 114,039 117,977 
Log likelihood -5,288 -4,938 -4,803 -4,797 -5,834 -32,031 
This table reports the probit estimation results between contemporaneous RSST and accounting fraud. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.18  Simple hazard and probit estimation results using duplications with 
AAERs 

















(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 


























































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummies - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
Observations 57,315 62,042 69,110 68,532 67,709 67,063 65,097 65,540
Log likelihood -841 -876 -971 -965 -959 -947 -947 -942
This table reports the simple hazard estimation results between accounting fraud and accruals using duplicated 
dependent variables of AAERs and SCAL/AA. Accruals are aggregated for three years prior to the incidence of 
fraud. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Due to the limited sample size, Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) are estimated using 
probit models. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.19  Simple hazard and bivariate probit estimation results using alternative 
variables 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Accruals RSST WC RSST WC
Bivariate probit Fraud Detect | 
Fraud

























































































































































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - -
Observations 5,518 30,830 5,784 31,947 76,146 82,087
Log likelihood -741 -1083 -795 -1160 -3181 -3490
This table reports the simple hazard estimation results between accounting fraud and financing needs using an 
alternative variable. Accruals are aggregated for three years prior to the incidence of fraud. Numbers in parentheses 
are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels 
respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.20  Simple hazard estimation results using data after 2000 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud)







(1) (2) (3) (4)






































































Audit opinion 0.256*** 
(0.055)
Fortune 500 0.068 
(0.093)
Ln(Firm year) -0.161*** 
(0.041)
Unexpected performance 0.278** 
(0.112)
SEC enforcement bias 
Ln(Distance) -0.027*** 
(0.007)














Yes Yes Yes 0.261 
(0.220)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,941 22,204 55,601
Log likelihood -432 -641 -2266
This table reports the simple hazard model estimation results between corporate fraud and the FRQ and MM 
measures. Accruals are aggregated for three years prior to the incidence of fraud. Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. To 
facilitate the convergence of the maximum likelihood estimations, a reduced industry dummy is adopted. Variables 
are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.21  Simple hazard estimation results using growth and efficiency 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud)







(1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8)
Bivariate probit Fraud Detect | 
Fraud

































































































































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,833 32,342 74,653 74,653
Log likelihood -757 -1096 -3,146 -3143
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and prior-year discretionary accruals 
after controlling for additional variables. Accruals are aggregated for three years prior to the incidence of fraud.
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels respectively. To facilitate the convergence of the maximum likelihood estimations, a reduced 
industry dummy is adopted. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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TABLE 2.22  Static and dynamic hazard models 
Panel A: Probit  

















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 



























































































































































































































































































































































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,815 37,672 9,626 40,463 9,486 39,694 9,473 39,686 8,815 37,672 9,517 39,871 9,517 39,871 8,744 35,934
Log likelihood -2160 -3136 -2389 -3443 -2375 -3422 -2354 -3383 -2143 -3105 -2382 -3434 -2386 -3438 -2137 -3070
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Panel B: Dynamic Hazard Model 

















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 






























































































































































































































































































































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,132 35,042 6,640 37,541 6,540 36,808 6,534 36,806 6,132 35,042 6,558 36,972 6,558 36,972 5,934 33,176
Log likelihood -1126 -1463 -1239 -1600 -1219 -1575 -1209 -1561 -1122 -1452 -1225 -1584 -1225 -1584 -993 -1290
This table reports the probit and dynamic hazard model estimation results between accounting fraud and accruals, CEOs’ equity incentives, and financing needs. Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. To facilitate the convergence of the maximum likelihood estimations, a reduced 
industry dummy is adopted. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.B. 
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APPENDIX 2.A  Measures for financial reporting quality and financing needs 
In Appendix 2.A, I review the details of nine different types of financial reporting 
quality and two financing needs measures. Since there is no single agreed-upon 
measure for financial reporting quality, the adoption of multiple proxies may increase 
the power and generalisability of the analyses of this study (see Dechow et al. 2010; 
Hope et al. 2013; Burgstahler et al. 2006).  
1. Working Capital Accruals (Working Capital) and Total Accruals (RSST) 
Ever since Healy (1985), most accrual models have focused on working capital as 
a main earnings management tool (e.g., Sloan 1996; Dechow et al. 1995). Working 
capital accruals (Working capital) are relatively easy to manipulate by, for example, 
increasing accounts receivables (see Ettredge et al. 2010). Richardson et al. (2005) 
further recommend a comprehensive accrual model that incorporates not only working 
capital accruals but also non-current operating and financial accruals (RSST). As with 
working capital accruals, non-current operating assets such as capital expenditure may 
be utilised in decreasing firms’ current-year costs and deferring them to following 
years 42 . After comparing the effectiveness of a wide range of accrual types in 
predicting fraud probability, Dechow et al. (2011) find that RSST is superior to other 
financial reporting quality measures in predicting accounting fraud probabilities. 
Working capital and RSST are calculated as below (Eq. (2.5) and (2.6)). 
Working capital = Δcurrent operating assets – Δcurrent operating liabilities .... (2.5) 
42 As an alternative view, non-current assets are known to be relatively difficult to manage since the 
depreciation mechanism is rather transparent (Barton and Simko 2002; Dechow et al. 2011). 
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RSST = ΔWC + ΔNCO + ΔFIN .......................................................................... (2.6) 
where: 
WC (working capital) = current operating assets – current operating liabilities;
NOC (non-current operating assets) = non-current operating assets – non-current 
operating liabilities;
FIN (financial assets) = financial investments – financial liabilities.    
2. Components of Accruals 
Richardson et al. (2005) provide a simple but clear categorisation of the reliability 
of accrual components. According to their arguments, current and non-current 
operating assets are less reliable than other components of accruals. In particular, 
Current operating assets is supposed to be the least reliable component since the 
majority of accounting fraud is committed to overstate revenues (Dechow et al. 
1996)43. Non-current operating assets such as PP&E are also less reliable since they 
can sometimes be aggressively capitalised instead of being expensed (Richardson et 
al. 2005). On the other hand, financial assets and liabilities are more reliable since the 
prices of financial products are readily observable in the markets. Therefore, if firms’ 
accruals are composed more of unreliable components such as Current operating 
assets and Non-current operating assets, the reporting quality of these firms would be 
lower than other firms. The equations for six components of accruals are presented in 
Eq. (2.7)-( 2.12). 
43 According to their analysis, 55.4 percent of accounting fraud cases in their sample (N = 92) are related 
to overstatement of revenues.  
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Current operating assets = current assets (act) – cash (che)  ............................ (2.7) 
Current operating liabilities = current liabilities (lct) – debt in current liabilities 
(dlc)44  ........................................................................................................... (2.8) 
Non-current operating assets = total assets (at) – total current assets (act) – 
investment and advances (ivao)  ................................................................... (2.9)  
Non-current operating liabilities = total liabilities (lt) – total current liabilities (lct) 
– long-term debt (dltt)  ................................................................................ (2.10) 
Financial assets = short-term investments (ivst) + investment and advances (ivao) 
 .............................................................................................................................. (2.11) 
Financial liabilities = long-term debt (dltt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc) + 
preferred stock (pstk). All variables are deflated by total assets (att-1)  ...... (2.12)    
3. Modified Jones Model (MJONES) 
The modified Jones model (MJONES) is the most conventional measure for the 
discretionary portion of working capital accruals (see Dechow et al. 1995). While 
preceding measures focus on the magnitude of total or working capital accruals, 
MJONES helps to capture the discretionary portion of working capital accruals 
compared to firms’ peers in the same industries. Differently from the original Jones 
model (Jones 1991), MJONES assumes that all accounts receivable belongs to the 
discretionary portion of accruals. MJONES is the residual from Eq. (2.13). This study 
estimates Eq. (2.13) for each two-digit SIC-year grouping, with at least 10 
observations. Other modified versions of discretionary accrual models are usually 
variations of the original Jones model (Jones 1991) and MJONES.  
44 To maintain consistency with Richardson et al. (2005), tax payable (tap) is not deducted in this 
equation.  
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ΔWC = α0 + α1 (1/total assets (att-1)) + α2 (Δsale (sale) – Δreceivables (rect)) + α3 
(ΔPP&E (ppegt)) + ε ................................................................................... (2.13) 
where: 
WC = current assets (act) – cash (che) – current liabilities (lct) + debt in current 
liabilities (dlc) + tax payable (tap). All variables except 1/total assets (att-1) are 
deflated by total assets (att-1).
4. Forward-looking Modified Jones Model (FMJONES) 
The forward-looking discretionary accrual model (FMJONES) modifies MJONES
mainly by reclassifying parts of accounts receivable to a normal portion of accruals 
(Dechow et al. 2003). While MJONES assumes that all credit sales are discretionary, 
FMJONES considers that parts of them result from a normal increase in sales. The 
normal portion of accounts receivable is estimated from the relation between accounts 
receivable and sales (k in Eq. (2.14)), and it is then added back to the non-discretionary 
accruals. In addition, FMJONES controls for the prior-year working capital accruals 
and sales growth to exclude the remaining portion of non-discretionary accruals from 
discretionary accruals. This study estimates the following model for each two-digit 
SIC-year grouping, with at least 10 observations (Eq. (2.14)). 
  ΔWC = α0 + α1 [(1+k)Δsale (sale) – Δreceivables (rect)] + α2 (ΔPP&E (ppegt)) + α3 
(ΔWCt-1) + α4(Δsale / salet-1) + ε ................................................................. (2.14) 
where, 
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Δreceivables (rect) = β0 + kΔsales (sale) + γ. All variables except Δsale / salet-1 are 
deflated by total assets (att-1). 
5. Modified Jones Model with Current-year ROA (PMJONES) 
The modified Jones model with current-year ROA (PMJONES) modifies MJONES
by controlling for firms’ performance effects (Kothari et al. 2005). Since the levels of 
accruals are determined by firms’ net income, MJONES may be biased if the 
performance effects are not addressed properly. The simplest version of this model is 
to control for current-year ROA in MJONES as in Eq. (2.15). The performance effects 
can also be controlled for by adopting matching methods that are explained in the 
following subsection.   
ΔWC = α0 + α1 (1/total assets (att-1)) + α2 (Δsale (sale) – Δreceivables (rect)) + α3 
(ΔPP&E (ppegt)) + α4(ROA) + ε .......................................................................... (2.15) 
where: 
ROA = income before extraordinary items (ibc) / average total assets. All variables 
except 1/total assets (att-1) are deflated by total assets (att-1).
6. Performance-adjusted Modified Jones Model (PMJONES2) 
As an alternative for PMJONES, Kothari et al. (2005) further adopt a matching 
method to control for performance effects. The ROA-based matching method 
identifies pairs of firms whose ROA is the closet in the same year and two-digit SIC 
industries. The difference in MJONES of the matched pairs is then used as 
Performance-adjusted modified Jones accruals (PMJONES2). To mitigate variations 
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of this measure resulting from different firm characteristics, this study instead uses the 
difference between MJONES of each firm and the average MJONES of the firms 
belonging to the same two-digit SIC-year and ROA quintile grouping as the firm.  
7. Studentised DD Estimation Error (SDD) 
Instead of using cash sales to measure discretionary accruals, Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) focuses on the association between accruals and cash flows. Their argument is 
that accruals are of high quality when they are ultimately realised into cash flows. The 
unrealised accruals are called errors in their model. Mean-adjusted absolute Dechow-
Dichev estimation error (SDD) explicitly evaluates the accrual quality by estimating 
Eq. (2.16) that relates working capital accruals to past, present and future cash flow 
from operation. SDD represents the residuals of the model deflated by the standard 
errors of the residuals of the firms belonging to the same two-digit SIC-year grouping 
as each firm.  
ΔWC = α0 + α1 (CFO (oancft-1)) + α2 (CFO (oancft)) + α3 (CFO (oancft+1)) + ε ........  
 .......................................................................................................................... (2.16) 
8. Mean-adjusted Absolute Dechow-Dichev Estimation Error (ADD) 
Based on an alternative assumption that both positive and negative errors imply 
lower accrual quality in that the divergence between accruals and cash flows is sizable, 
Dechow et al. (2011) further adopt a measure for accrual quality. Mean-adjusted 
absolute Dechow-Dichev estimation error (ADD) is calculated by taking the difference 
between the absolute value of the residual estimated from Eq. (2.16) and the average 
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absolute residuals of the firms belonging to the same two-digit SIC-year grouping as 
each firm.  
9. Actual Issuance and Capital Expenditure 
Observing whether a firm actually issues stocks and/or debts or whether a firm 
invests in big projects provides clear evidence for firms’ financing needs. Following 
Dechow et al. (2011), two measures are adopted to proxy financing needs. First, Actual 
issuance is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose sale of common and 
preferred stock (sstk) or long-term debt (dltis) is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
Second, Capital expenditure is also an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose 
financing needs index (Eq. (2.17)) is less than -0.5, and 0 otherwise. Financing needs 
index is calculated as the difference between CFO and three-year average of capital 
expenditure.  
  Financing needs index = [CFO – (Capital expenditurest-1 (capx) + Capital 
expenditurest-2 + Capital expenditurest-3) / 3] / Total current assets (act) 
 .......................................................................................................................... (2.17) 
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APPENDIX 2.B  Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variable 
 AAERs An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms for which 
the SEC published AAERs for alleged GAAP 
violations, and 0 otherwise (AAERs compiled by 
CFRM) (Dechow et al. 2011).  
 SCALs An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms for which 
securities class action lawsuits were filed and settled 
but the SEC did not publish AAERs, and 0 otherwise. 
(http://securities.stanford.edu/).  
 AA An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose 
managers restated their prior-year financial 
statements, but for which AAERs were not filed, and 
0 otherwise (Audit Analytics).  
 Lawsuits An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms for which 
securities class action lawsuits were filed and settled 
within two years before and after the misreporting 
years of AAERs, and 0 otherwise.  
 AAER-SCAL An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms for which 
AAERs and securities class action lawsuits were filed 
simultaneously, and 0 otherwise. 
 AAER-AA An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms for which 
AAERs were filed, and whose managers restated their 
prior-year financial statements simultaneously, and 0 
otherwise. 
Accruals 
 RSST Total accruals = ΔWC (working capital) + ΔNCO 
(non-current operating assets) + ΔFIN (financial 
assets) (Richardson et al. 2005; Dechow et al. 2011). 
 where,  
WC = current assets (act) – cash (che) – current 
liabilities (lct) + debt in current liabilities (dlc);
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NOC = total assets (at) – total current assets (act) – 
investment and advances (ivao) – total liabilities (lt) 
+ total current liabilities (lct) + long-term debt (dltt);
FIN = short-term investments (ivst) + investment and 
advances (ivao) – long-term debt (dltt) – debt in 
current liabilities (dlc) – preferred stock (pstk). All 
variables are deflated by total assets (att-1). 
 MJONES (Modified 
Jones) 
The residuals (ε) from ΔWC = α0 + α1 (1/total assets 
(att-1)) + α2 (Δsale (sale) – Δreceivables (rect)) + α3 
(ΔPP&E (ppegt)) + ε, estimated for each two-digit 
SIC-year grouping (Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow et 
al. 2011).   
 where, 
WC = current assets (act) – cash (che) – current 
liabilities (lct) + debt in current liabilities (dlc) + tax 
payable (tap); 
 All variables except 1/total assets (att-1) are deflated 
by total assets (att-1). 
 PMJONES (Modified 
Jones with current-year 
ROA) 
The residuals (ε) from ΔWC = α0 + α1 (1/total assets 
(att-1)) + α2 (Δsale (sale) – Δreceivables (rect)) + α3 
(ΔPP&E (ppegt)) + ROA + ε, estimated for each two-
digit SIC-year grouping (Kothari et al. 2005; Jones et 
al. 2008).  
 All variables except 1/total assets (att-1) are deflated 




The differences between MJONES of each firm and 
the average MJONES of the firms belonging to the 
same two-digit SIC-year and ROA quintile grouping 
as each firm. Modified from (Kothari et al. 2005) to 
decrease the variations of PMJONES. 
 FMJONES (Forward-
looking modified Jones) 
The residuals (ε) from ΔWC = α0 + α1 [(1+k)Δsale 
(sale) – Δreceivables (rect)] + α2 (ΔPP&E (ppegt)) +
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α3 (ΔWCt-1) + α4(Δsale / salet-1) + ε, estimated for each 
two-digit SIC-year grouping (Dechow et al. 2003).  
 where, 
Δreceivables (rect) = β0 + kΔsales (sale)+ γ;
 All variables except Δsale / salet-1 are deflated by 
total assets (att-1). 
 SDD (Studentised accrual 
estimation error) 
The residuals of ΔWC = α0 + α1 (CFO (oancft-1)) + α2 
(CFO (oancft)) + α3 (CFO (oancft+1)) + ε, which are 
then deflated by the standard errors of the residuals of 
the firms belonging to the same two-digit SIC year 
grouping as each firm (Dechow and Dichev 2002; 
Dechow et al. 2011). 
 ADD (Mean-adjusted 
absolute value of accrual 
estimation error) 
The differences between the absolute value of the 
residuals (|ε|), which are estimated from ΔWC = α0 + 
α1 (CFO (oancft-1)) + α2 (CFO (oancft)) + α3 (CFO 
(oancft+1)) + ε, and the average absolute residuals of 
the firms belonging to the same two-digit SIC year 
grouping as each firms (Dechow and Dichev 2002; 
Dechow et al. 2011). 
Financial ratios 
 Receivables (change) The ratio of Δreceivables (rect) and average total 
assets (at) (Dechow et al. 2011). 
 Inventory (change) The ratio of Δinventory (invt) and average total assets 
(at) (Dechow et al. 2011). 
 Soft assets The ratio of (total assets (at) – net PP&E (ppent) – 
cash (che)) and total assets (at) (Dechow et al. 2011).
 Cash sales (change) The percentage change of (sales (sale) – Δreceivables 
(rect)) (Dechow et al. 2011). 
 ROA (change) The difference between income before extraordinary 
items (ib) / average total assets (at) and income before 
extraordinary items (ibt-1) / average total assets (att-1) 
(Dechow et al. 2011).  
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 Leverage Long-term debt (dltt) / total assets (at) (Dechow et al. 
2011). 
 Ln(Assets) The natural logarithm of total assets (at).  
 Special items (change) The ratio of Δspecial items (spi) and average total 
assets (at) (see Marquardt and Wiedman 2004). SPI 
includes restructuring costs (rca), writedowns (wda), 
gain/losses (gla), settlement (litigation/insurance) 
(seta), other special items (spioa), acquisition/merger 
(aqa), impairments of goodwill (gdwlia), and 
extinguishment of debt (dtea).  
 Write-downs (change) The ratio of Δwritedowns (wda) and average total 
assets (at) (see Marquardt and Wiedman 2004). 
Financing needs
 Actual issuance An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose sale 
of common and preferred stock (sstk) or long-term 
debt issuance (dltis) is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise 
(Dechow et al. 2011). 
 Capital expenditure An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose 
financing needs index is less than -0.5 (Dechow et al. 
2011). 
where, 
 Financing needs index = [CFO (oancf) – (Capital 
expenditurest-1 (capx) + Capital expenditurest-2 + 
Capital expenditurest-3) / 3] / Total current assets 
(act). 
 Net external financing 
needs  
The sum of changes in common equity (ceq), 
preferred stock (pstk) and total liability (lt), deflated 
by total assets (at) (Wang 2006b).  
Cash Flow 
CFO The ratio of cash flow from operating activities 
(oancf) and average total assets.  
CFI The ratio of cash flow from investing activities (invcf) 
and average total assets.  
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CFF The ratio of cash flow from financing activities (fincf) 




The residuals (ε) from Production costs = α0 + α1 
(1/total assets (att-1)) + α2 (sale (sale)) + α3 (Δsale 
(sale)) + α4 (Δsalet-1 (sale)) + ε, estimated for each 
two-digit SIC-year grouping (Roychowdhury 2006).  
 where, 
Production costs = COGS (cogs) + inventory (Δinvt); 
 All variables except 1/total assets (att-1) are deflated 
by total assets (att-1). 
Abnormal cash flow The residuals (ε) from CFO (oancf) = α0 + α1 (1/total 
assets (att-1)) + α2 (sale (sale)) + α3 (Δsale (sale)) + ε, 
estimated for each two-digit SIC-year grouping 
(Roychowdhury 2006; Ettredge et al. 2010).   
 All variables except 1/total assets (att-1) are deflated 
by total assets (att-1). 
Abnormal discretionary 
expense 
The residuals (ε) from Discretionary expenses = α0 + 
α1 (1/total assets (att-1)) + α2 (sale (sale)) + ε, 
estimated for each two-digit SIC-year grouping 
(Roychowdhury 2006).   
 where, 
Discretionary expense = advertising expenses (xad) 
+ R&D expenses (xrd) + selling, general, and 
administrative expenses (xsga); 
 All variables except 1/total assets (att-1) are deflated 
by total assets (att-1). 
Suspect factors 
 ROA The ratio between income before extraordinary items 
(ib) and average total assets 
 Loss An indicator variable equal to 1 for a firm whose 
income before extraordinary items (ib) is negative, 
and 0 otherwise (Houmes and Skantz 2010). 
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 Small profits/losses An indicator variable equal to 1 for a firm whose ratio 
between net income (ni) and lagged total asset (at) is 
less than 0.01 and greater than -0.01, and 0 otherwise 
(Burgstahler et al. 2006). 
Other controls 
 Stock market An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms which are 
listed on major stock markets such as NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise. 
Industry An indicator variable equal to 1 for seven two-digit 
SIC codes, which account for 51.9 percent of the total 
sample, and 0 otherwise. The seven industries are 
Business service (7300), Chemical and applied 
products (2800), Electronic & other electric 
equipment (3600), Instruments and related products 
(3800), Oil and gas extraction (1300), Industrial 
machinery & equipment (3500), and Electric, gas & 
stationary services (4900).     
 Growth Sales growth measured by Δsale (sale) / salet-1
(Richardson et al. 2006). 
 Efficiency Asset growth measured by Δtotal assets (at) / total 
assetst-1 (Richardson et al. 2006). 
SEC enforcement bias
Audit opinion An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose audit 
opinion is not unqualified, and 0 otherwise 
Ln(Distance) The natural logarithm of the distance between a firm’s 
headquarters and the closest SEC offices in 
Washington, New York, Miami, Chicago, Denver, 
Los Angeles, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Fort 
Worth, Salt Lake, and San Francisco (Kedia and 
Rajgopal 2011; Heese 2015). The latitude and 
longitude of the offices of a firm and the SEC are 
acquired from the U.S. Census Bureau Gazetteer, and 
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the distance is calculated using the Haversine 
formula.  
Political contribution 5-year accumulation of Political Action Committee 
(PAC) contribution by a firm, divided by average total 
assets (Correia 2014; Heese 2015). The PAC data are 
collected from www.fec.gov.  
Fortune 500 An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms which are 
included in the Fortune 500 list, and 0 otherwise 
(Correia 2014). The data are collected from 
http://fortune.com. 
Unexpected performance The residuals (ε) from ROAt+1 = α0 + α1 ROAt + α2 
ROAt-1 + ε, estimated for each firm (Wang 2013). 
Ln(Firm age) The natural logarithm of the years that have passed 
since the first Compustat year.  
Budget (year) The natural logarithm of SEC budget as reported in 
the SEC website (http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/ 
udgetact.htm.). The SEC budget is deflated by the 
number of Compustat firms in each year (Kedia and 
Rajgopal 2011).   
Ln(Employee) The natural logarithm of the number of employees of 
a firm (emp) (Heese 2015).  
Distance model
Ln(Number of AAERs)  The natural logarithm of the number of AAER firms 
in each state for the years 1993-2007.  
Ln(Number of firms) The natural logarithm of the number of firms 
headquartered in each state for the years 1993-2007.  
Average asset size The average Ln(Assets) of firms located in a state for 
the years 1993-2007.   
Average Employees The average Ln(Employee) of firms located in a state 
for the years 1993-2007.  
Ln(Number of Fortune 
500)  
The natural logarithm of the number of Fortune 500 
firms in each state for the years 1993-2007.  
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Ln(Major markets) The natural logarithm of the number of Stock market
in each state for the years 1993-2007.  
Ln(Risk industry) The natural logarithm of the number of Industry in 
each state for the years 1993-2007.  
Ln(Land area) The natural logarithm of the land area in square miles 
of each state as of 2000 (www.census.gvo). 
Ln(Population) The natural logarithm of population in a state in 2000 
(www.census.gvo). 
Ln(Housing units) The natural logarithm of housing units in a state in 
2000 (www.census.gvo). 
* Compustat mnemonics are presented in parentheses. 
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Chapter 3 
Excessive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud 
3.1. Introduction  
Ever since Sanders (2001) showed that options and stocks have diametrically opposite 
impacts on CEOs’ strategic decisions (see also Devers et al. 2007), it has been well 
established in the literature that options and stocks have differing linear effects on 
CEOs’ misreporting decisions. Based mainly on their different payoff structure45, prior 
studies have shown that options increase the likelihood of restatement (e.g., Efendi et 
al. 2007), litigation (e.g., Denis et al. 2006), and the combination of SEC enforcement 
actions and litigation (e.g., Khanna et al. 2015), whereas stocks decrease or do not 
have a significant impact on financial misreporting (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Efendi et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2008). However, excessive equity incentives increase 
the risk of accounting fraud commitment (Armstrong et al. 2013) because the SEC 
tends to target egregious cases (see also Richardson et al. 2002; Dechow et al. 2010)
and the size of ill-gotten gains is a main consideration when deciding on the level of 
sanctions. Therefore, it is unclear whether CEOs would ignore the increasing risk 
when making accounting fraud decisions as prior studies above have inherently 
assumed. This chapter provides empirical analyses for this question by examining 
whether CEOs change their misreporting behaviours at higher levels of equity 
45 In contrast to the convex payoff structure of options (Burns and Kedia 2006), that of stocks is linear. 
Based on this difference, prior studies largely rely on the assumption that option holders are “self-
interested agents” (Efendi et al. 2007) whereas stock holders are “loss avoiders” as stated in the prospect 
theory (see Zhang et al. 2008). 
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incentives, where they may begin to seriously consider the dark side of incentives in 
the context of accounting fraud.  
According to the economics of crime (Becker 1968), CEOs’ misreporting decisions 
are influenced by both the marginal costs (MC) and marginal benefits (MB) of their 
monetary incentives, and the MC and MB are assumed to eventually increase and 
diminish respectively. For example, the existence of aggregated punishments in the 
U.S. legal system supports the increasing MC. While additional criminal penalties like 
imprisonment are imposed on egregious fraud offenders, minor fraud cases are usually 
not punished or punished mainly by civil fines. Thus, rational CEOs would make 
optimal misreporting decisions so that their net benefits equal zero, resulting in a 
hump-shaped curve between option incentives and accounting fraud.  
Due to two main heterogeneities, the analysis of stock ownership diverges from that 
of option incentives. First, as prior studies have posited (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006), 
owner-CEOs tend to be conservative reporters because they are exposed to the 
downside risk of stock price changes. Second, the controlling power (e.g., voting 
rights) uniquely attached to stock ownership may induce CEOs to underestimate the 
potential risk of accounting fraud schemes because their discretionary power may 
deepen information asymmetry between insiders and accounting fraud detectors (see 
also Fan and Wong 2002). As a result, compared against CEOs as option holders, 
owner-CEOs are less likely to misreport at normal levels of stock ownership, whereas 
they are more likely to misreport once they acquire sufficient control over their board 
of directors. These combined effects result in a U-shaped curve between CEOs’ stock 
incentives and accounting fraud.  
Taking these considerations collectively, I hypothesise that options and stocks have 
differing non-linear impacts on CEOs’ accounting fraud decisions. This hypothesis 
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extends prior studies, which have already shown distinct linear associations between 
the two types of equity incentives and financial misreporting. Specifically, I expect 
that the non-linearity is characteristic of accounting irregularities because CEOs may 
not consider the risk effect regarding error misreporting. Thus, I provide a range of 
analysis results adopting relatively unintentional misreporting or earnings 
management measures simultaneously.  
Using both matched and unmatched samples of AAERs and its alternative proxies 
(i.e., accruals, restatements, and lawsuits) for the fiscal years 1992-2012, I find that 
the distinct linear impacts of CEOs’ option delta46 and stock ownership on accounting 
fraud are indeed reversed once they reach respective threshold levels. Specifically, 
option delta increases accounting fraud propensity until it reaches a level of 
approximately $7 million and then reverses that upward trend from that point 
(producing a hump-shaped curve). Conversely, stock ownership initially decreases 
accounting fraud propensity and then reverses its downward trend at approximately 
22 percent of stock ownership (a U-shaped curve). These findings affirm my 
hypothesis that CEOs’ excessive equity incentives change their misreporting 
behaviours in the context of accounting fraud.  
To shed light on the changes, I analyse whether CEOs’ strength of motivation to 
misreport changes depending on their risk perception. After controlling for CEO 
power, CEO overconfidence, and firm characteristics, and using the inflection points 
of the non-linear curves of option delta and stock ownership as a measure of 
motivational strength to misreport, I find that CEOs as equity holders are more 
strongly motivated when they have more discretionary power over the board and are 
overconfident about future firm performance. More specifically, CEOs as option 
46 The value sensitivity of stock options to a 1 percent change in stock price (Core and Guay 2002). 
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holders reach their inflection points at higher levels of option delta when they are also 
the founders, have fewer outside directors on the board, or hold stock options that are 
more than 67 percent in the money (see Campbell et al. 2011). Conversely, owner-
CEOs reach their inflection points at lower levels of stock ownership when they have 
longer tenures or stock price exceeds the average exercise price of their stock options 
by more than 67 percent. These findings provide supporting evidence for my argument 
that CEOs’ risk perception matters when making accounting fraud decisions.  
To provide more specific evidence for the heterogeneities in CEOs’ misreporting 
patterns at higher levels of option delta and stock ownership, I further test whether 
CEOs as option and stock holders react differently toward an external shock that may 
affect their risk perceptions. The passage of the SOX constitutes an ideal setting to test 
this question since it increased the detection risk of financial misreporting by imposing 
a set of regulations regarding both internal and external governance (Miller and 
Pashkoff 2002). After controlling for CEOs’ power, overconfidence, and competence, 
I find that SOX negatively moderates the relation between accounting fraud and the 
dummy for the higher level of Option delta, which is determined at its median. On the 
contrary, SOX does not have any significantly moderating effect on the relation 
between accounting fraud and the dummy for the higher level of Stock ownership47. 
These findings imply that, at higher levels of equity incentives, owner-CEOs are less 
susceptible to SOX than CEOs with excessive option incentives.  
However, it is still not definitely clear whether CEOs’ misreporting patterns at 
higher levels of equity incentives may indeed be explained by their risk perceptions 
and the inherent differences between options and stocks. Therefore, I identify three 
47 To avoid the potential inaccuracy in computing the marginal effects of interaction terms in binary 
models, I adopt the STATA command inteff suggested by Norton et al. (2004). 
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alternative explanations for my main arguments. First, Hanlon et al. (2003) argue that 
excessive option grants do not strongly motivate managers to improve future earnings 
(i.e., return on assets (ROA)) because the marginal utility of options diminishes as 
more options are granted. In the context of accounting fraud, CEOs may also be 
discouraged from misreporting due to the diminishing reward effect of options. 
Therefore, it is an empirical issue whether the decreasing “reward effect” or the 
increasing “risk effect” would be more influential in CEOs’ accounting fraud decisions 
(see also Armstrong et al. 2013).  
Using two unique settings where financial misreporting or earnings management is 
less likely to be intentional and, thus, CEOs may consider the risk effect less seriously, 
I test these two competing perspectives. To begin, I adopt accruals (i.e., WC, 
PMJONES, and SDD) as proxies for relatively less egregious earnings management 
strategies when compared to AAERs. In this context, I expect that any concave relation 
between option delta and accruals measures is more likely to be driven by the reward 
effect. However, I do not find a significant non-linear impact of option delta on 
accruals management, implying that CEOs are not strongly affected by the 
diminishing reward effect even in less intentional earnings management contexts. 
Further, I adopt two financial misreporting proxies that are likely to represent errors 
rather than accounting irregularities. Consistent with Hennes et al. (2008)48, I classify 
restatements and securities class action lawsuits respectively into these two categories 
of misreporting (i.e., accounting irregularities and errors). However, I also do not find 
strong concave relation between option delta and error misreporting cases. Conversely, 
I do find a strong concave impact of option delta on accounting irregularity cases. 
48 Hennes et al. (2008) classify restatement cases as intentional accounting irregularities when they 
include words like “fraud”. Consistent with this, I consider duplications with AAERs respectively with 
restatement and lawsuit cases as intentional cases.  
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These results together suggest that the diminishing reward effect is not a decisive 
factor that changes CEOs’ misreporting behaviours at higher levels of option 
incentives.  
Second, Mohd-Sulaiman (2013) argues that accounting fraud does not necessarily 
result from managers’ intentional motivation and that the lack of professional 
competence is an alternative factor that causes financial misreporting. From this 
viewpoint, we can also consider that the increasing misreporting pattern at higher 
levels of stock ownership may be explained by CEOs’ reduced competence. However, 
using three proxies for CEO competence acquired from the BoardEx database (i.e., 
Degree, CPA, and Experience), I do not find that these additional controls alter owner-
CEOs’ aggressive misreporting behaviours. These findings imply that CEOs’ 
competence levels also do not seriously undermine my argument.  
Finally, I test whether owner-CEOs’ increasing misreporting patterns at the higher 
levels of stock ownership are driven by their overconfidence about future firm 
performance. Since managers’ optimism is not necessarily realised, overconfident 
CEOs tend to be less conservative in financial reporting (Ahmed and Duellman 2013) 
and are likely to ultimately lead to intentional financial misreporting (Schrand and 
Zechman 2012) to attain their inflated expectations. Consistent with this perspective, 
I also find that CEO overconfidence (i.e., Holder67, CAPEX, and Over_invest) is 
positively associated with accounting fraud. However, the additional control of these 
variables does not affect the dual non-linear impacts of options and stocks on 
accounting fraud. This finding implies that the relation between CEOs’ equity 
incentives and accounting fraud propensity is not seriously confounded by their 
overconfidence or optimism levels in my analyses.   
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 Taken together, my results strongly suggest that, in the context of accounting fraud, 
CEOs’ excessive equity incentives drastically change their misreporting behaviours in 
differing ways, and the discrepancy results from their different perception of risk 
regarding accounting fraud as two distinct equity holders. Additionally, given that my 
main findings are not susceptible to these controls (i.e., CEO overconfident and 
competence) nor to corporate governance levels, CEO power, and their risk-taking 
incentives measured by portfolio vega49 , I posit that CEOs’ differing misreporting 
patterns at the higher end of equity incentives result from the inherent features of 
options and stocks (e.g., controlling power attached to shares). 
As an additional test, I check the validity of my implicit assumption underlying the 
adoption of a percentage measure of stock ownership instead of a dollar measure 
(stock delta 50 ), which suggests that options and stocks are differentiated by the 
controlling power attached to stock ownership. To check the validity of this 
assumption, I analyse whether these two stock ownership measures do indeed have 
heterogeneous impacts on accounting fraud. Unlike the percentage measure, I find no 
evidence of reversing effects of stock ownership when incorporating the dollar 
measure in my accounting fraud model. These results provide supporting evidence that 
the monetary measure of stock ownership alone does not fully capture the dynamic 
effects of stock ownership on CEOs’ accounting fraud decisions.  
The study makes distinct contributions to existing literature. To begin, this study 
builds on research exploring heterogeneities of options and stocks. Based largely on 
the different risk characteristics of options and stocks, these studies have reported that 
options and stocks have distinct linear impacts on CEOs’ acquisition and divestiture 
49 The value sensitivity of both stocks options and stock holdings to a 1 percent change in stock volatility 
(Armstrong et al. 2013).  
50 Stock delta is the value sensitivity of stocks to a 1 percent change in stock price (Johnson et al. 2009). 
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decisions (Sanders 2001), market reactions to firms’ IPOs (Certo et al. 2003), and 
financial misreporting (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 
2008; Peng and Röell 2008). This study extends this literature by showing that the 
diametrically opposite impacts of equity incentives are ultimately reversed at the 
higher levels of option delta and stock ownership.  
When it comes to the non-linearity of equity incentives, there is also a strand of 
literature in various management contexts. Regarding stock options, Hanlon et al. 
(2003) argue that managers are less likely to be motivated by excessive option grant 
due to its diminishing marginal utility. However, my study differs from theirs in that I 
show that, in the context of accounting fraud, the non-linearity results not from the 
decreasing reward effect of options but from the increasing risk effect of accounting 
fraud, which is one of my main contributions.  
On the other hand, since Morck et al. (1988) reported a non-monotonic association 
between managerial stock ownership and Tobin’s Q, a considerable volume of 
literature has grown up around this theme in the context of debt costs (e.g., Anderson 
et al. 2003), information content of reporting earnings (e.g., Ghosh and Moon 2010), 
and firm value (e.g., Kim and Lu 2011). To my knowledge, however, this is the first 
study to show the contrasting non-linear impacts of both stocks and options 
simultaneously. In particular, I show that the differing non-linearity results from CEOs’ 
different perception of risk regarding accounting fraud as option and stock holders 
respectively.   
This study further contributes to the literature exploring the relation between 
managerial equity incentives and accounting fraud by explicitly adopting AAERs as a 
fraud proxy (e.g., Erickson et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 2009; Armstrong et al. 2010; 
Feng et al. 2011). Although AAERs are usually considered to be an appropriate sample 
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to analyse motivational determinants of accounting fraud (Dechow et al. 2010), these 
studies have produced mixed and weak evidence on the impact of managerial equity 
incentives on accounting fraud: no effects (Erickson et al. 2006; Schrand and Zechman 
2012; Armstrong et al. 2010) and positive effects (Johnson et al. 2009; Feng et al. 
2011). As an extension of this strand of studies, Armstrong et al. (2013) show that 
managers’ risk-taking incentives measured by portfolio vega subsume the effect of 
portfolio delta51. One plausible reason for these unexpectedly mixed findings may be 
the use of a combined measure of options and stocks despite their differing payoff 
structures. In fact, by separating options and stocks, I show consistent and pronounced 
non-linear relations between CEOs’ equity incentives and accounting fraud measured 
by AAERs. I further document that the non-linearity is mainly characteristic of AAERs 
rather than other less intentional misreporting proxies. In particular, my results 
complement Armstrong et al. (2013)’s argument by showing that the effect of portfolio 
delta is rather subsumed by those of separate and quadratic specifications of option 
delta and stock ownership, not vice versa.  
The remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows. Section 3.2 
summarises prior research and section 3.3 outlines my hypotheses. Section 3.4 
describes my data and research design. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 provide empirical results 
and a battery of additional analyses and robustness checks respectively. Section 3.7 
concludes. 
51 The sum of the value sensitivities of stocks and options to a 1 percent change in stock price (Erickson 
et al. 2006).   
120
3.2. Review of literature 
This chapter focuses on the change in misreporting behaviours at the higher levels of 
CEOs’ equity incentives. There are broadly three streams of relevant literature that 
investigate the relation between various research focuses and managerial equity 
incentives. First, a considerable amount of literature has explored the heterogeneities 
between options and stocks. The study by Sanders (2001) is probably the first that 
highlights their diametrically opposite impacts on CEOs’ strategic decisions. Based on 
the different risk characteristics of options and stocks, he finds that CEOs with higher 
option value are more likely to engage in acquisitions and divestitures, whereas CEOs 
with higher stock value are less likely to do so. His argument for these findings is that 
owner-CEOs are risk-averse because they bear the downside risk of stock price 
changes, whereas CEOs as option holders are aggressive risk-takers since they are not 
exposed to that risk. Subsequent studies such as Burns and Kedia (2006), Efendi et al. 
(2007), Peng and Röell (2008) and Zhang et al. (2008) have produced similar findings 
in the contexts of both restatement and litigation propensities. Option incentives 
increase firms’ misreporting propensity, whereas their stock ownership decreases or 
does not have significant effects on financial misreporting decisions. For example, 
Peng and Röell (2008) find that top five managers’ option delta is positively associated 
with the filings of securities class action lawsuits, whereas their stock delta does not 
have a significant association with the litigation propensity.  
Second, a large body of literature provides empirical evidence that managerial stock 
ownership has non-linear effects in various management contexts. Contrary to the 
above research, this strand of literature focuses on the controlling power attached to 
stock ownership. Therefore, studies exploring non-linearity of stock incentives   
usually adopt the percentage metric of stock ownership as their main variable of 
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interest since they believe that it more effectively captures both monetary incentives 
and controlling power underlying stock ownership. A key study in this research area 
is that of Morck et al. (1988), which shows that managerial ownership has a non-
monotonic association with firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. They attribute their 
finding to the combined convergence-of-interests and managerial entrenchment 
theories. Specifically, managerial ownership increases firm value at the lower level of 
ownership since the interests of managers and outside shareholders are aligned due to 
this insider ownership. However, an excessive level of ownership may depreciate firm 
value, since managers with influential shares may be entrenched by their increased 
controlling power within firms. Several lines of empirical evidence have followed the 
initiative of Morck et al. (1988) in the contexts of information content of reported 
earnings (e.g., Ghosh and Moon 2010), firm value (e.g., McConnell and Servaes 1990; 
Kim and Lu 2011) and debt costs (e.g., Anderson et al. 2003). Ghosh and Moon (2010), 
for example, show that CEOs’ stock ownership has an inverted U-shaped association 
with the information content of firms’ reported earnings. They attribute their finding 
to the investors’ perception that CEO stock ownership improves the information 
quality of earnings at the lower level, whereas it rather deteriorates at the higher level. 
On the other hand, there are relatively few studies that report non-linear effects of 
stock options. Hanlon et al. (2003), for example, show that the dollar value of top five 
managers’ stock option grant has an inverted U-shaped association with firms’ future 
earnings measured by ROA. They attribute the non-linearity to the diminishing 
marginal returns of stock option grants. Tian (2004), using simulation analyses, further 
demonstrates that an excessive level of stock options does not strongly motivate 
managers to boost stock price, presumably because the value of each stock option 
diminishes as executives have more option grants.  
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Finally, several studies have examined the relation between managerial equity 
incentives and accounting fraud by explicitly adopting AAERs rather than 
restatements and securities class action lawsuits. Due to the SEC’s focused 
enforcement targets and standardised investigation process, AAERs are usually 
considered to be a reliable and appropriate sample to test managers’ intentional 
motivation to misreport (see Dechow et al. 2010).  
However, the empirical findings of these studies are relatively mixed and weaker 
than those of other studies adopting restatements and lawsuits. For example, the first 
empirical study in this research area, Erickson et al. (2006), does not find any 
association between CEOs’ portfolio delta and accounting fraud. Subsequent studies 
by Johnson et al. (2009) and Feng et al. (2011) report that top five managers’ stock 
delta and CEOs’ portfolio delta deflated by their total pay respectively increase the 
probability of accounting fraud. Armstrong et al. (2010), on the other hand, show some 
negative impacts of CEOs’ portfolio delta on the filings of lawsuits, but not on the 
filings of AAERs. A key characteristic of these studies, except Johnson et al. (2009)52, 
is that they adopt the combined measure of portfolio delta as their primary incentive 
proxy. An assumption underlying this research design is that options and stocks have 
congruent impacts on accounting fraud. However, options and stocks have differing 
payoff structures and, therefore, may have distinct implications in the context of 
accounting fraud. Moreover, while these studies usually adopt dollar measure of stock-
based incentives, the dollar metric of stock ownership may not fully capture its unique 
controlling power within firms.  
In sum, prior studies have focused mainly on the linear impacts of options and 
stocks on financial misreporting, and they are often based on the “untested assumption” 
52 They adopt separate dollar measures of option delta and stock delta.  
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(Sanders 2001) that options and stocks are substitutes for each other. The theoretical 
development in the next subsection begins from exactly these research gaps in the 
existing literature and attempts to provide a more comprehensive view on the dynamic 
association between equity incentives and accounting fraud. 
3.3. Theory and hypothesis development 
3.3.1. Common origins 
Equity-based incentives have long been considered to have countervailing effects on 
potential agency problems regarding interest conflicts between shareholders and 
managers (see Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, CEOs with call options may 
have incentive to distort accounting choices since their option value increases in stock 
price. This particular condition creates adverse effects that shareholders may not 
anticipate when granting options to align managers’ interests with their own.  
    According to the economics of crime, fraud offenders consider the marginal costs 
(MC) and marginal utility (MU) of their monetary incentives (see Uygur 2013) and 
the MC and MU are assumed to ultimately increase and diminish respectively (Becker 
1968; Ehrlich 1996). 
First, due to general legal penalties, the MC of option incentives rises in the context 
of accounting fraud because sensitive option incentives inevitably increase the 
magnitude of CEOs’ ill-gotten gains (see also Thevenot 2012). In fact, minor 
accounting fraud cases are usually not investigated by the SEC due to its limited 
resources (see Dechow et al. 1996; Richardson et al. 2002; Dechow et al. 2010). 
Therefore, the SEC does not file cases for a considerable number of self-admitted 
restatements. However, if financial misreporting is material and flagrant, the SEC 
brings legal proceedings against those cases, usually to impose monetary fines and/or 
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administrative penalties on the offenders (see also Bremser et al. 1991). In addition, 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) brings egregious cases to criminal courts to impose 
greater penalties like imprisonment (Ramphal 2007). The U.S. punishment system 
implies that the MC of option incentives increases. Second, the utility of option 
incentives would decrease as its magnitude increases. As shown in Hanlon et al. (2003) 
and Tian (2004), an excessive level of stock option does not strongly motivate 
managers to continue pursuing increases in future earnings and stock prices. Tian 
(2004) explains that this may be because the value of each stock option declines as 
more options are granted to managers.  
Taken together, the increasing MC and the diminishing MU of option incentives 
suggest that rational CEOs would make optimal misreporting decisions by equalising 
the MU and MC (see Becker 1968; Thevenot 2012). That is, CEOs would commit 
accounting fraud only if the MU is greater than the MC, and once the MC exceeds the 
MU, the increasing misreporting patterns would be reversed or at least weakened.   
One potential counter-argument for the simple equilibrium analysis is that 
assumptions about the MC and MU curves may be incorrect. However, the analysis 
holds only if either the MC or MU curve is increasing or diminishing respectively. If 
any one of these curves changes, then CEOs would simply maximise their net utility 
at a different level of option incentives. Nonetheless, the base effect of the hump-
shaped curve fundamentally does not change. Moreover, the drastic situation in which 
both the MC and MU are constant, or the MC is decreasing and the MU is increasing, 
is not conceivable since it would amount to a state of anarchy wherein no one is 
punished for committing accounting fraud.  
Even if we relax the assumption that the MU of option incentives is decreasing, my 
argument remains valid. Instead of considering the utility of monetary value, we may 
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simply assume that CEOs would accept the face value of monetary incentives as their 
benefits. Under this assumption, the total benefits from option incentives are linearly 
proportional to the size of option incentives (Eq. (3.1)) and, therefore, its marginal 
benefits (MB) would be always constant (Eq. (3.2)). On the other hand, the MC of 
option incentives would be positive as is assumed above (Eq. (3.3)). Any change in 
the functional forms of the MC does not affect the argument as long as it is ultimately 
increasing. 
Option incentives = O × [∂ (OV) / ∂ (P)] × (P × 0.01)  .................................. (3.1) 
MB of option incentives = c (when c = constant)  .......................................... (3.2)  
MC of financial misreporting =  [∂ (IGO) / ∂ (P)] > 0 ................................... (3.3) 
where, O = the number of options;
P = the market price of stocks;
OV = the Black-Scholes value of an individual stock option; 
IGO = the size of ill-gotten gains from option incentives.  
The story is the same with stock incentives if we ignore its linear payoff structure 
and the effects of controlling power attached to shares. Despite the difference in the 
equations (Eq. (3.1) and (3.4)), the MB in this context is constant and the MC is greater 
than zero (Eq. (3.5)-(3.6)).  
Stock incentives = S × 1 × (P × 0.01)  ........................................................... (3.4) 
MB of stock incentives = c (when c = constant)  ........................................... (3.5) 
MC of financial misreporting =  [∂ (IGS) / ∂ (P)] > 0.................................... (3.6) 
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   where, S = the number of stocks; 
IGS = the size of ill-gotten gains from stock incentives.  
The graph in the LHS of Figure 3.1 shows that CEOs would commit accounting 
fraud until MB equals MC, and they would decrease their misreporting once their net 
benefit is maximised. Thus, the relaxation of the original assumption, that the MB of 
option incentives may be constant, does not change my predictions regarding the 
relation between accounting fraud and equity incentives as in the RHS of Figure 3.1. 
Based on the equi-marginal principal, we can reasonably expect that accounting fraud 
propensity increases at the lower level of monetary incentives, whereas it decreases at 
the higher level, mainly due to the increasing MC of option incentives. Leaving the 
potential variations of stock incentives from this base relation open for discussion in 
the following subsection, I present my hypothesis on the relation between CEOs’ 
option incentives and accounting fraud as below.  
H1: CEOs’ option incentives increase (decrease) accounting fraud propensity 
at the lower (higher) level, i.e. a hump-shaped association between option 
incentives and accounting fraud.
3.3.2. Divergence 
Owner-CEOs’ misreporting decisions diverge from the base hypothesis mainly due to 
two heterogeneities of stock incentives from option incentives. First, at normal levels 
of shareholding, owner-CEOs are known to be more conservative in risk preference 
than CEOs as options holders. The linear payoff structure of stocks exposes CEOs to 
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the downside risk of change in stock prices (Gao and Shrieves 2002; Burns and Kedia 
2006). This price sensitivity may induce owner-CEOs to avoid risky reporting 
decisions that are susceptible to SEC enforcement actions.  
Second, at higher levels of ownership, the controlling power attached to stock 
ownership may cause influential owner-CEOs to underestimate the costs of 
misreporting. Voting rights linked to stock ownership tends to provide CEOs with 
increased controlling power within firms (see also Morck et al. 1988). The above 
equilibrium analysis assumes that CEOs would perceive the MC of their monetary 
incentives as it is generally estimated in legal markets. However, if CEOs believe that 
they can so effectively control the board as to prohibit any fraud evidence from leaking 
(Fan and Wong 2002; Wang 2006a), they might misperceive the ultimate risks of 
misreporting.  
Taken together, these two variations from the above base effects produce a 
combined hypothesis: that owner-CEOs with potentially conservative risk preference 
are less likely to commit accounting fraud at normal levels of stock incentives, 
whereas they are more likely to commit accounting fraud once they acquire sufficient 
control over the board at the higher level of stock incentives. As a result, I hypothesise 
the relation between CEOs’ stock incentives and accounting fraud as follows.  
H2: CEOs’ stock incentives decrease (increase) accounting fraud propensity at 
the lower (higher) level, i.e. a U-shaped association between CEOs’ stock 
incentives and accounting fraud.
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3.3.3. Risk perception 
The main hypotheses of this study are based on an assumption that CEOs’ perception 
of risk regarding accounting fraud alter their misreporting behaviours at the higher 
levels of equity incentives. Specifically, CEOs as option holders are less likely to 
misreport once their potential ill-gotten gains exceed certain critical levels. Owner-
CEOs are rather more likely to misreport once their ownership levels exceed the 
critical points to provide them with sufficient control over the board. Commonly, these 
predictions assume that CEOs consider not only the reward effect of equity incentives 
but also the risk effect of accounting fraud commitment (see O'Connor et al. 2006; 
Armstrong et al. 2013). 
To test the validity of this underlying assumption, I develop a hypothesis regarding 
CEOs’ risk perception. I use the term “perception” because, regardless of the actual 
risk levels, they may have different perceptions of the risk in mind depending on the 
factors that may affect that perceived risk (e.g., discretionary power). More 
specifically, CEOs’ perceptions about the risk of accounting fraud would ultimately 
affect the strength of their motivation to misreport. If they believe that the risk level is 
low, CEOs as option holders would keep misreporting even when they reach the 
critical level of option incentives, from where they would normally stop misreporting 
due to the increased risk. Conversely, owner-CEOs would start to misreport from 
lower than the critical level of stock incentives, from where they would normally begin 
to misreport due to their increased controlling power within firms. The relevant 
hypotheses are presented below.  
H3: The inflection point of a non-linear curve representing the misreporting 
pattern of CEOs as option (stock) holders moves forward (backward) when 
they have greater discretionary power over the board.  
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3.3.4. An external shock 
An external shock such as the passage of SOX may also affect CEOs’ risk perception; 
in this case, it increased the detection risk of financial misreporting by introducing a 
set of new regulations which are designed to strengthen both internal and external 
governance (Miller and Pashkoff 2002). In particular, if CEOs as option and stock 
holders had inherently distinct risk perceptions as I posit, they would react to SOX in 
different ways. Specifically, CEOs as option holders would naturally decrease their 
misreporting in response to SOX. On the contrary, owner-CEOs with sufficient 
controlling power may be less susceptible to the enhanced risk levels because they are 
likely to misperceive the risk due to the intensified information asymmetry by their 
ownership concentration. Therefore, I expect that the passage of SOX decreases 
accounting fraud propensity when CEOs’ option delta is higher, whereas the effect 
may not be so strong for CEOs with sufficient stock ownership as to underestimate the 
enhanced risk. To capture the setting where CEOs should consider the risk of financial 
misreporting more seriously, my analyses focus on the higher levels of CEOs’ equity 
incentives. Collectively, I present the two hypotheses below. 
H4: The passage of SOX is related to accounting fraud propensity when CEOs’ 
equity incentives are higher53. 
53 Since I posit that owner-CEOs with controlling power would be less susceptible to SOX, I lay out H4
in a null form.  
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3.4. Data and research design 
3.4.1. Sample selection  
Table 3.1 reports my sample selection process. I begin with the merged file of 
Compustat, ExecuComp and Coles et al. (2006)’s open portfolio delta data54 for the 
fiscal years 1992-2012. The initial observations are comprised of 24,544 firm-year-
CEOs after excluding financial firms55. The sample starts from 1992 to include option 
and stock data on ExecuComp, which begins in that year. The ending year 2012 is 
determined for the SEC to have had enough time to detect accounting fraud cases56. 
To avoid inconsistency in calculating option delta, I use Coles et al. (2006)’s open data, 
which provide portfolio delta for each firm-year-executive annually.  
The base sample is then merged with 1,961 fraud firm-years (1992-2012) included 
in AAERs, leaving us with 370 fraud firm-years after eliminating firm-years without 
sufficient data on Compustat and ExecuComp (Full sample). I use the comprehensive 
list of AAERs compiled by the Center for Financial Reporting and Management 
(CFRM) (Dechow et al. 2011). The loss of a significant number of cases from the 
whole CFRM database is mainly due to the requirement that AAERs must be covered 
on ExecuComp. This requirement is similar to that of Feng et al. (2011), who select 
86 fraud firms out of 896 AAER firms. 
To address sampling bias inherent in the panel-type fraud data, I further construct 
two additional sets of cross-sectionally matched samples. Despite the advantage of 
large observations, the full sample has broadly three limitations. First, the unequal 
54 See http://sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/. 
55 Due to different levels of regulation and capital structure, financial institutions are usually excluded 
from estimation samples (see Dechow et al. 1996; Beneish 1997; Erickson et al. 2006; Markelevich and 
Rosner 2013). 
56 According to Karpoff et al. (2017), it takes approximately 55.9 months (4.65 years) from a GAAP 
violation to SEC legal proceedings.  
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proportion of fraud firm-years in the total sample raises doubts on the validity of 
random sampling (see Palepu 1986; King and Zeng 2001). The fraud firm-years make 
up only 1.50 percent of the total observations. Second, financial ratios during 
manipulation periods are not reliable. Many fraud firms do not restate their 
misreporting since either they declare bankruptcy (Dechow et al. 1996; Cao et al. 2015)
or relevant data do not exist several years after the incidence of accounting fraud (see 
Dechow et al. 2011). Third, reverse causality may cause an endogeneity issue. CEOs 
may misreport to compensate for price decreases caused by accounting fraud 
commitment. Cross-sectionally matched samples address these issues by selecting 
approximately same number of fraud and non-fraud firms, and by analysing lagged 
accounting data (t-1) with the first firm-year observation (t) from multiple fraud firm-
years (see Beasley 1996; Uzun et al. 2004; Chen et al. 2006; Erickson et al. 2006; 
Johnson et al. 2009). From 739 distinct fraud firms in the CFRM database, I identify 
100 fraud firms that are covered on ExecuComp and whose first fraud years fall 
between 1992 and 2012.  
To avoid another sampling bias potentially resulting from solely analysing 
ExecuComp observations (see Cadman et al. 2010), I complement the 100 
ExecuComp (S&P 1500) fraud firms with an additional 61 fraud firms that are mostly 
not covered on ExecuComp. These firms are selected from 70 fraud firms from 
AAERs, whose violation periods match those of 100 ExecuComp fraud firms (96.7 
percent). Option and stock data for the additional fraud firms are manually collected 
directly from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) and 
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The combined sample 
constitutes Generalized propensity-score matching (GPSM) sample, resulting in 155 
fraud firms after excluding six duplications. To exploit the benefits of hand-collected 
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data of 61 fraud firms, they are further analysed separately for several additional 
analyses (Partial matching (PM) sample).  
Descriptive statistics for the three panels are reported in Table 3.2, along with p-
values of t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) tests. t-test results in Columns (1), (2), 
and (3) reveal that CEOs in fraud firms largely have higher levels of option delta but 
do not necessarily have higher levels of stock ownership than the average of 
ExecuComp firms, implying that CEOs in fraud firms may be more strongly motivated 
to misreport by option incentives. Further, Column (4) reports that there are also 
statistically significant differences in incentive levels between fraud firms in two 
respectively matched samples (GPSM and PM). Specifically, CEOs in the PM sample, 
which is mostly not covered on ExecuComp, hold more concentrated stock ownership 
but are exposed to rather lower option delta. These findings are consistent with 
Cadman et al. (2010), who argue that ExecuComp and non-ExecuComp firms are 
potentially heterogeneous. However, as will be presented in subsequent sections, three 
separate panels produce qualitatively similar empirical results, suggesting that the 
potential sampling bias does not cause serious issues at least in my analyses.  
I next compile non-fraud matches for each fraud firm in the GPSM and PM samples. 
To mitigate confounding bias inherent in observational studies (Rosenbaum 2002), 
non-fraud firms are identified using two representative matching methods, which will 
randomise my non-random samples: the propensity score (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010; 
Davidson et al. 2015) and partial (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Feng et al. 2011) matching 
methods. I explain the details of the matching process in the following subsections.  
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3.4.2. Generalized propensity-score matching (GPSM) 
GPSM expands the conventional propensity-score matching (PSM), which has been 
widely used in standard binary cases, to continuous treatment cases (Hirano and 
Imbens 2004). As with the propensity score in PSM, the generalized propensity-score 
(gpscore) also has a “balancing property” in that, within the strata of the same gpscore, 
the probability of treatment is not dependent upon the matched covariates. The gpscore
is the conditional density of the treatment given confounders, and it is estimated using 
both a treatment model (Eq. (3.7)) and a gpscore model (Eq. (3.8)). First, the 
propensity of the variation of CEOs’ stock ownership is estimated using the following 
OLS regression model:  
Ln(Stock ownershipt) = α0 + α1ROAt-1 + α2Leveraget-1 + α3Ln(Assetst-1)  
+ α4Tobin’s Qt-1 + α5Working Capitalt-1 + α6 Ln(Tenuret-1)  
+ α7Stock markett-1 + εt ..................................................... (3.7) 
To mitigate confounding effects, I select the variables from potential confounders 
that may affect both CEO stock ownership and accounting fraud propensity. For 
example, ROA, Leverage, Tobin’s Q and Working capital are chosen since they are not 
only conditions that may trigger accounting fraud incidences but also common factors 
that stock investors consider before commencing their investments. Similarly, CEO 
tenure (Ln(Tenure)) is a primary determinant of stock ownership since the longer 
CEOs hold their tenures in firms, the more chance they have to acquire shares by either 
purchasing stocks or exercising stock options (Kim and Lu 2011). Stock market and 
firm size (Ln(Assets) are also important factors that determine ownership structure 
since large and public firms usually have a more diffuse ownership structure than over-
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the-counter (OTC) market firms (Himmelberg et al. 1999)57. Further, I require that 
matched pairs are selected from firms not only in the same year but also in the same 
two-digit SIC as each fraud firm. Prior studies exploring the relation between CEOs’ 
stock-based incentives and accounting fraud also have the same requirement (e.g., 
Erickson et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 2009; Feng et al. 2011), since industry 
characteristics affect firms’ accounting fraud propensity. Firms in same industries 
usually have similar patterns of earnings management (Khanna et al. 2015). As will be 
shown in the following subsection, it inevitably decreases the covariate balances of 
matched samples. However, I believe that this tight requirement could address more 
critical biases that may be caused in its absence. The estimation results of Eq. (3.7) 
show that, as expected, most of the covariates are significantly associated with CEOs’ 
stock ownership (Table 3.3). 
I acknowledge that it may be relevant to use two treatment variables of options and 
stocks in Eq. (3.7). Instead, I adopt stock ownership as a representative treatment 
variable since I cannot use two dependent variables simultaneously. However, it is 
plausible that CEO stock ownership and option holdings have similar determinants in 
that they are commonly CEOs’ equity incentives.  
  Second, I then use the estimation from the treatment model (Eq. (3.8)) to calculate 
gpscore. Following prior literature (e.g., Kluve et al. 2012), I adopt the probability 
density function of the normal distribution as a gpscore model as below (see also 
Hirano and Imbens 2004).  
57 Since corporate governance variables (e.g., Outside directors) are constructed using the Riskmetrics 
database which begins in 1996, I do not include them in Eq. (3.7). However, to mitigate the omitted 
variable bias, I control for the variables in the accounting fraud model (Eq. (3.10)) with a reduced 
sampling window (1996-2012).   
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    =  1
√2    exp (− 12       −      ) 
 .................................................................................... (3.8) 
  where, 
   = the level of Stock ownership between 0 and 1;
    and σ = the estimations from the treatment model in Eq. (3.7).  
Finally, using the calculated gpscore, I identify one or two non-fraud matches for 
each fraud firm. To find matches whose ex ante probability of having high CEO 
ownership levels are most similar but whose actual ownership levels are most 
dissimilar, I use the distance measure proposed by Armstrong et al. (2013) as in Eq. 
(3.9). The distance measure identifies matched pairs of fraud and non-fraud firms 
using a minimum distance criterion, without replacement. The final sample size as a 
result of the GPSM process ranges between 291 and 426 firms for the fiscal years 
1992-2012 depending on two different matching ratios (1:1 and 1:2; GPSM sample).
         ,  =  (         −          ) (          ℎ    −            ℎ   ) 
 ........................................................................................................ (3.9)  
  where, 
gpscorei,j = the generalized propensity-score for firm i and j
calculated using Eq. (3.7) and (3.8);
Stock 
ownershipi,j
= CEOs’ stock ownership for firm i and j respectively;
Stock ownershipi ≠ Stock ownershipj. 
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3.4.3. Partial matching (PM) 
As an alternative matching method, I next adopt the PM method. PM is a more 
conventional tool that has been widely adopted in both accounting (e.g., Dechow et al. 
1996; Feng et al. 2011) and finance (e.g., Altman 1968) research. PM is suitable for a 
manual sample selection as GPSM cannot be used for firms with hand-collected data. 
Despite a limitation in that PM considers a relatively small number of covariates 
compared with GPSM, it is also a powerful method of matching by which researchers 
can balance their non-random samples in terms of the most critical covariates such as 
asset size, year and industry (two-digit SIC). Following Feng et al. (2011), I identify 
matched pairs based on these three criteria as of the beginning of the first fraud year. 
The final sample size resulting from the PM process is 122 firms for the fiscal years 
1992-2012 (PM sample). 
3.4.4. Covariate balance  
Table 3.4 reports the covariate balance between matched pairs identified with both 
GPSM and PM methods. Balanced covariates mitigate another potential bias: 
observed effects of options and stocks on accounting fraud propensity may result from 
other confounding effects than my variables of interest. The p-values for a parametric 
t-test of the differences in means, and two non-parametric WRS and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) tests for the differences in medians and distributions respectively, 
indicate that the two matching algorithms have successfully identified matches whose 
covariates are well balanced. Specifically, the gpscores of the GPSM sample are not 
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statistically different (p-values: 0.768-0.944), and the matched rates58 of both GPSM 
and PM samples range between 67 percent and 100 percent depending on test types.  
3.4.5. Accounting fraud model  
Due to the binary characteristics of accounting fraud cases, I estimate the effects of 
CEOs’ equity incentives on accounting fraud using the following probit regression 
model. In the interests of brevity, I attach the detailed definitions of variables in 
Appendix 3.A.  
Pr(Accounting fraudt) = β0 + β1 Option deltat-1 + β2Option delta2t-1
+ β3Stock ownershipt-1 + β4Stock ownership2t-1
                    + ∑ βCEO power + ∑ βCorporate governance  
+ ∑ βOverconfidence + ∑ βCompetence  
+ ∑ βFinancial ratios + ∑ βOther controls + ∑ βYear dummy 
+ ∑ βIndustry dummy + εt ............................................ (3.10) 
where, 
t  = the year-end of fraud year. 
Consistent with prior studies exploring determinants of accounting fraud (e.g., 
Dechow et al. 1996; Schrand and Zechman 2012; Davidson et al. 2015), I adopt 
AAERs as a proxy for intentional financial misreporting. AAERs are considered to be 
a more appropriate sample to analyse intentional GAAP violations than other proxies 
for misreporting, since the standardised SEC enforcement process tends to ensure a 
58 The number of balanced covariates divided by the total number of covariates (%).  
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homogeneous accounting fraud sample (see Dechow et al. 2011). Due to its limited 
budget, the SEC is known to prioritise more material and flagrant cases of GAAP 
violation (Bremser et al. 1991; Dechow et al. 1996; Richardson et al. 2002; Dechow 
et al. 2010). However, I also analyse alternative proxies for earnings quality and 
financial misreporting (i.e., accruals, restatements, and securities class action lawsuits) 
to provide a more comprehensive view of my arguments. 
Contrary to most prior literature exploring CEOs’ equity incentives in the context 
of financial misreporting (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; Johnson et al. 2009), I use 
distinct metrics for stocks and options: a dollar measure for options (Option delta) and 
a percentage measure for stocks (Stock ownership). The percentage measure of stock 
ownership captures not only monetary incentives but also the controlling power that 
is attached to shares (see also Ghosh and Moon 2010; Khanna et al. 2015). However, 
I also analyse the dollar measure of stocks (Stock delta) for comparison purposes. For 
Option delta, I use Coles et al. (2006)’s open data by subtracting Stock delta (Eq. (3.4)) 
from Portfolio delta. For hand-collected matched pairs, Option delta is calculated 
following Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006)’s calculation method. As an 
additional motivational variable, I include First public offering and Debt covenant 
violation. First public offering captures CEOs’ motivation to misreport as controlling 
shareholders (see Ehrhardt and Nowak 2001), and Debt covenant violation represents 
CEOs’ intention to misreport to avoid imminent triggering of debt covenants (Dechow 
et al. 1996).  
I adopt six categories of control variables: CEO power, corporate governance, CEO 
overconfidence, CEO competence, financial ratios, and other controls. For the CEO 
power and corporate governance categories, I include six variables that may increase 
or decrease CEOs’ discretionary power within firms. Firms’ governance structures are 
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known to affect CEO’s equity incentives (Davila and Penalva 2006). Following 
Dechow et al. (1996), Beasley (1996), Chen et al. (2006) and Khanna et al. (2015), 
CEO=Chairman, CEO=Founder, Ln(Tenure) and Appointment-based connectedness 
(ABS) are proxies for CEOs’ ability to affect board composition and operations. For 
example, CEOs with longer tenures may have more opportunity and freedom to affect 
the appointment process of directors and executives (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988) 
and CEOs working with connected board members may have more influence on 
management decision-making (Khanna et al. 2015). On the contrary, Outside director
and Outside blockholder have the opposite effect on CEO power from inside and 
outside of firms respectively.  
For overconfidence measures, I adopt Holder67, CAPEX, and Over_invest. 
Holder67 is an option-based proxy for CEOs’ overconfidence about future stock price, 
which is equal to one for firms whose CEOs hold stock options that are more than 67 
percent in the money (Campbell et al. 2011). On the other hand, CAPEX and 
Over_invest are investment-based measures for overconfidence representing abnormal 
levels of investment compared to those of firms’ industry peers (Schrand and Zechman 
2012; Ahmed and Duellman 2013). For competence measures, I adopt Degree, CPA, 
and Experience. While Degree and CPA represent CEOs’ professional knowledge, 
Experience proxies for their professional experience before joining current firms as a 
CEO59.  
For the remaining two categories, I add major financial ratios (e.g., ROA and 
Leverage) and Stock market, which are proposed in major prior literature (e.g., 
59 Through the merging process of BoardEx with ExecuComp, I lose a significant portion of firms 
(remaining observations = 7,031). The loss of observations results from two factors. First, not all CEOs 
on ExecuComp are covered by BoardEx. Second, the two databases have different identifiers for CEOs 
and thus I require name matching (see also Huang et al. 2011). 
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Beneish 1999; Ettredge et al. 2010; Dechow et al. 2011). I also adopt Portfolio vega
as a proxy for CEOs’ risk-taking incentives (Armstrong et al. 2013).  
Due to data availability60, I estimate a more parsimonious model excluding Degree, 
CPA, Experience, Outside director, ABC, Outside blockholder, First public offering, 
and Debt covenant violation for my main analyses of the full and GPSM samples. 
However, by exploiting limited or hand-collected data, I analyse more extended 
models incorporating these variables for various additional analyses.  
3.5. Main findings 
3.5.1. Univariate quintile analysis 
Table 3.5 reports univariate quintile analysis results of Option delta and Stock 
ownership in relation to accounting fraud frequencies. To mitigate endogeneity issues, 
these analyses concern the GPSM sample, whose covariates are already balanced 
(Table 3.4). The analysis results reveal that Option delta has largely positive 
associations with accounting fraud frequencies (Columns (1) and (2)), whereas Stock 
ownership has negative associations (Columns (3) and (4)). These initial findings are 
largely consistent with those of the previous literature on restatements and class action 
lawsuits (e.g., Peng and Röell 2008). Further, the lower and higher quintiles of option 
delta and stock ownership show asymmetrically opposite impacts on accounting fraud 
frequencies even though they are not statistically significant. These results imply that 
there may be more dynamic and non-monotonic associations between accounting 
fraud and CEOs’ equity incentives (Armstrong et al. 2010).   
60 For example, corporate governance variables can be constructed from 1996, since Riskmetrics begins 
in that year.  
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3.5.2. Different non-linear effects 
The hypothesis tests in Table 3.6 (Panel A) examine whether CEOs’ option delta and 
stock ownership influence their accounting fraud decisions in differing and non-linear 
ways (H1 and H2). To mitigate sampling bias, I analyse both unmatched and matched 
samples (full and GPSM) in tandem. Columns (1)-(2) report that the coefficients for 
Option delta and Option delta2 are both significant, and positive and negative 
respectively, when adopting the full sample. The regression estimates indicate that the 
relation between option delta and accounting fraud is hump-shaped61 (LHS of Figure 
3.2), supporting H1. Option holdings increases accounting fraud propensity at the 
lower level of Option delta, but the effect is ultimately reversed presumably due to the 
increasing risk of financial misreporting. The inflection point of Option delta, from 
where CEOs are discouraged to commit accounting fraud, is approximately $7 
million62.  
Conversely, the coefficients for Stock ownership and Stock ownership2 are both 
significant, but negative and positive respectively in the same columns. These 
estimates indicate that the relation between stock ownership and accounting fraud is 
U-shaped (RHS of Figure 3.2), supporting H2. Contrary to stock options, stock 
ownership seems to curb CEOs’ accounting fraud behaviours at its lower level, but it 
starts to motivate them to misreport once ownership exceeds certain critical levels. 
CEOs who have acquired sufficient controls over the board may underestimate the risk 
of misreporting. The inflection points of Stock ownership in Panel A are at levels of 
61 To identify the shape of the concave relation, I adopt three strategies. First, using the coefficients and 
their signs of quadratic terms in Eq. (3.10), I check their preliminary shapes and whether their inflection 
points are within the ranges of our interest (e.g., 1-100 percent of stock ownership). Second, using 
predicted values of Eq. (3.10), I illustrate their graphical shapes as in Figure 3.2. Finally, using 
piecewise spline specifications, I confirm both hump-shaped and U-shaped curves of option delta and 
stock ownership respectively (the PM sample).  
62 I calculated the inflection points using the marginal effects presented in Panel C. 
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22-23 percent. These threshold levels are consistent with those in prior research, which 
posits that CEOs acquire effective control over their firms at ownership levels of 5-35 
percent (see e.g., Ghosh and Moon 2010). Taken together, these results affirm H1 and 
H2 that CEOs’ equity incentives affect their accounting fraud decisions in differing 
and non-linear ways.  
The analyses of alternative GPSM samples provide supporting evidence that my 
results are not susceptible to potential sampling bias. To address the bias resulting from 
analysing solely non-random ExecuComp firms (Cadman et al. 2010), GPSM sample 
is composed of both ExecuComp and non-ExecuComp firms. Columns (4)-(5) 
consistently reveal that options and stocks have significant and differing non-linear 
impacts on accounting fraud, affirming H1 and H2 again.  
Despite the matching processes adopted for GPSM sample, some coefficients for 
control variables are still statistically significant (Columns (4)-(5)). There are three 
main reasons for these results. First, matching does not guarantee perfect covariate 
balances (see King and Nielsen 2016). Second, not all covariates in the fraud model 
(Eq. (3.10)) are included in the treatment model (Eq. (3.7)). Third, there may be some 
hidden effects that multivariate analyses bring about. For instance, the coefficients for 
CEO=Chairman, which was not considered through the matching algorithm63 , are 
highly significant in Columns (4) and (5), since CEOs who are also the Chairmen of 
the board may have greater influence over reporting decisions (Dechow et al. 1996). 
Finally, it is informative to note that, despite some differences from Armstrong et 
al. (2013)64, I also find that the effect of Portfolio vega subsumes that of Portfolio 
63 I did not include CEO=Chairman in Eq. (3.7) since it is not clear whether the duality increases CEO 
ownership or, conversely, CEOs with higher ownership exploit the duality opportunity.   
64 Three main differences are: unit of analysis (top five executives vs. CEO), the calculation of variables 
(self-calculated vs. Coles et al. (2006)’s open data), and sample periods (1992-2009 vs. 1992-2012). 
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delta (Columns (1)-(2) in Panel B). However, the statistical significance of Portfolio 
vega disappears when I incorporate the separate and quadratic specifications of Option 
delta and Stock ownership (Column (4)). This implies that the effect of Portfolio vega
is rather subsumed by those of Option delta and Stock ownership, or that there is 
multicollinearity among these variables. To avoid potential multicollinearity issues, I 
adopt Portfolio vega only in the main analysis (Column (4) in Panel A), but the results 
are not susceptible to this additional control.  
3.5.3. Risk perception 
My main analyses are based on the assumption that CEOs consider the risk of financial 
misreporting while committing accounting fraud. To provide empirical evidence for 
this assumption, I examine whether CEOs’ concerns over that risk affect their strength
of motivation to misreport (H3).  
Table 3.7 reports the comparative analysis results by different levels of CEOs’ 
discretionary power and overconfidence. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) in Panel A 
consistently show that the inflection points of the quadratic curves of both option delta 
and stock ownership do indeed change depending on the levels of CEO power, 
supporting H3. As for option holders, CEOs reach their inflection points at higher 
levels of Option delta when they are also the founders (CEO=Founder) ($4.13 mil. → 
$ 6.22 mil.; LHS of Figure 3.3). This result implies that CEOs with more discretionary 
power are less susceptible to being influenced by the increased risk of misreporting. 
Conversely, CEOs as stock holders reach their inflection points at lower levels of Stock 
ownership when they have longer tenure (24.3 percent → 15.7 percent; RHS of Figure 
3.3), suggesting that powerful CEOs are likely to underestimate the risk. These results 
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affirm that CEOs’ risk perception ultimately affects their strength of motivation to 
misreport. 
We also find that CEOs in firms with a lower percentage of outside directors 
(Outside director) and overconfident CEOs measured by the option-based measure 
(Holder67) reach their inflection points of stock options at higher levels than CEOs 
without these conditions (Columns (4)-(5) in Panel B and Columns (1)-(2) in Panel C). 
However, I do not find similar results when adopting alternative investment-based 
overconfidence measures (CAPEX and Over_invest in Columns (3)-(6)). A plausible 
explanation for these differences is that CEOs spending more on long-term investment 
opportunities tend not to be strongly motivated to misreport even when they are 
overconfident about their future firm performance.  
3.5.4. Decomposition of stock incentive 
Another theory underpinning my argument is the managerial entrenchment effect 
discussed by Morck et al. (1988), which would provide an explanation for why 
relatively conservative owner-CEOs drastically change their misreporting patterns at 
higher levels of stock ownership. In spite of intense research around this theme (e.g., 
Kim and Lu 2011), we still lack direct empirical support for the effect. Using Kalay et 
al. (2014)’s voting premium measure, I provide empirical evidence for the 
entrenchment argument in the context of accounting fraud. Voting premium is 
calculated by deducting the price of a synthetic stock (  ( )), which is estimated by 
the put-call parity in Eq. (3.11), from its stock market price (S)65. Since the synthetic 
65 The sample is composed of the merged observations of Optionmetrics and ExecuComp, resulting in 
12,954 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 1996-2012. Consistent with Kalay et al. (2014) and 
Lin et al. (2018), we adopt pairs of American-style call and put options whose strike prices and 
maturities are the same. We then exclude options whose maturities exceed 90 days, quotes are locked 
or crossed, and volume and implied volatility data are missing. Instead, we keep options whose 
moneyness is between 0.1 and -0.1. We finally require that these pairs have at least 10 observations in 
each year. 
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stock price represents the value of a stock without voting rights, voting premium 
ideally captures shareholders’ control rights or willingness to exercise their voting 
rights by paying an additional premium to the synthetic stock price. The premium is 
then scaled by the market price (S) to normalise and averaged for a year (Voting 
premium). By multiplying Voting premium with Stock delta in Eq. (3.10), I finally 
decompose CEOs’ stock incentive into its control rights (i.e., Stock delta × Voting 
premium) and monetary portions (i.e., Stock delta).  
Consistent with the entrenchment effect, Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.8 reveal 
that the coefficient of Stock delta × Voting premium is positive and significant whereas 
that of Stock delta is negative and significant. These findings indicate that, among two 
separate portions of stock incentive, control rights (i.e., voting premium) may 
engender GAAP violations whereas its monetary portion does the opposite. To address 
a potential confounding effect in that voting premium may increase due to control 
contest in a mergers and acquisitions context (see Lin et al. 2018), I further control for 
firms’ ex ante probability of takeover (Pr(Takeover)) in Column 3. The additional 
control, however, does not alter our results.  
  ( ) =   −   +   ( ) +   (   ) −          +        ..........    (3.11) 
where, 
  ( ) = the price of synthetic stock implied in the put-call parity with 
maturity T; 
C / P = premiums of call/put options;
PV(X) = present value of a bond with par value X;
PV(Div) = present value of dividend payments;
EEPcall (put) = early exercise premium for call (put) option. 
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2.5.5. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)  
To provide more specific evidence that CEOs as option and stock holders react to the 
risk of financial misreporting differently, I further test whether the passage of the SOX 
moderates the relation between accounting fraud and CEOs’ equity incentives in 
distinct ways (H4). In particular, I focus on CEOs’ misreporting behaviours at higher 
levels of option delta and stock ownership, which are my main areas of research.  
Figure 3.4 illustrates two trends of accounting fraud rates66 committed by CEOs 
with higher levels of option delta and stock ownership, which are determined at their 
respective medians. From this illustration, I can affirm that the accounting fraud rate 
of option holders are generally higher than those of stock holders, and the increasing 
patterns of accounting fraud rates of both CEO types (i.e., option and stock holders) 
are reversed downward after the IT bubble around 2000. Surprisingly, after the passage 
of the SOX in 2002 (the vertical line), the accounting fraud rate of option holders drops 
more drastically than that of owner-CEOs. This implies that option holders reacted to 
the enhanced risk of financial misreporting more actively than stock holders.  
I also test the two interaction effects of the passage of the SOX (SOX) with the 
higher levels of option delta (Ho) and stock ownership (Hs) respectively (Eq. (3.12)). 
If CEOs’ as option and stock holders had different risk perceptions about SOX, SOX 
× Ho and SOX × Hs would show distinct signs and/or statistical significance. As 
expected, Table 3.9 reports that the statistical significance of the coefficients of these 
two interaction terms are heterogeneous. Specifically, Column (1) shows that SOX × 
Ho has a significant and negative association with accounting fraud whereas SOX × 
Hs does not have a significant association with accounting fraud (H4). A similar 
difference is also found when I additionally incorporate a CEO competence variable 
66 The number of AAERs scaled by total ExecuComp firms. 
147
(i.e., Degree) in the model (Column (2)). From these findings, I can reasonably infer 
that CEOs as option and stock holders have reacted to the passage of SOX in different 
ways: CEOs as stock holders were less susceptible to SOX than as option holders, 
supporting H4. 
It is also informative to note that the signs and statistical significance of the 
interaction terms in binary models may be incorrect67. To address this bias, I adopt Ai 
and Norton (2003)’s method to compute interaction effects and find that my analyses 
are robust (Figure 3.5).  
Pr(Accounting fraudt) = γ0 + γ1Option deltat-1 + γ2Option deltat-1× Ho
+ γ3Stock ownershipt-1 + γ4Stock ownershipt-1× Hs
                    + γ5SOX + γ6SOX× Ho + γ7SOX× Hs + γ8Ho + γ9Hs
                                    + ∑γFinancial ratios + ∑γCEO power  
+ ∑γCEO overconfidence + ∑γCEO competence  
+ ∑γCorporate governance + ∑γOther controls 
                                    + ∑γYear dummy + ∑γIndustry dummy + εt .................... (3.12) 
  where, 
Ho = an indicator variable equal to 1 if CEOs’ option delta is greater 
than or equal to its median, and 0 otherwise; 
Hs = an indicator variable equal to 1 if CEOs’ stock ownership is 
greater than or equal to its median, and 0 otherwise.  
67 Contrary to linear models, the interaction effect in binary models is the cross derivative of the 
expected value of dependent variable. However, standard software does not consider this (Ai and 
Norton 2003).  
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3.5.6. Decreasing marginal utility of stock option 
To sort out alternative explanations for the non-linearity of CEOs’ misreporting 
behaviours, I conduct three additional analyses. To begin, Hanlon et al. (2003) argue 
that excessive option grants to managers tend rather to demotivate them in improving 
firm performance (i.e., ROA) due to the diminishing marginal utility of stock options. 
In the context of accounting fraud, excessive option delta may instead discourage 
CEOs from misreporting either due to the decreasing reward or increasing risk of 
penalties. I test these alternatives using two unique contexts, in which CEOs may not 
seriously consider the risk of earnings management or financial misreporting.  
First, compared to AAERs, accruals are a relatively legitimate earnings 
management strategy that is originally allowed within managerial discretion. Second, 
Hennes et al. (2008) suggest a straightforward procedure to distinguish accounting 
irregularity and error restatements. For example, they classify restatement cases 
containing the words like “fraud” or irregularities” in reference to accounting 
irregularities, and errors otherwise. Consistent with this method, I categorise 
restatement and securities class action lawsuit cases into irregularities and errors68. If 
the diminishing marginal utility effect were a main driver of the non-linearity of stock 
options, then I might expect that option delta would show non-linearity even in these 
two contexts, in which CEOs may not be exposed to the critical risks of financial 
misreporting. The sample selection process of restatements and lawsuits is 
summarised in Table 3.10 (Panel B)69. 
68 Specifically, I consider the duplicated misreporting cases with AAERs as accounting irregularities 
(i.e., Non-AAER Restatements and Non-AAER Lawsuits) and the remaining exclusions as errors (i.e., 
AAER-Restatements and AAER-Lawsuits). 
69 Dismissed or ongoing lawsuit cases are deleted to mitigate the risk of analysing frivolous lawsuits, 
and cases that are not relevant to financial misreporting or disclosure issues are also not included in the 
sample.  
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However, contrary to the decreasing marginal utility hypothesis, I do not find strong 
concave relations between option delta and these two categories of relatively less 
intentional earnings management (i.e., WC, PMJONES, and SDD) and financial 
misreporting measures (Columns (1), (3), and (5) in Panel A, and Columns (1) and (3) 
in Panel C). Instead, I do find that the duplicated misreporting cases with AAERs (i.e., 
AAER-Restatements and AAER-Lawsuits) have strong non-linear relations with CEOs’ 
option delta (Columns (2) and (4) in Panel C). These findings imply that the non-
linearity of stock options may not be driven by the reward effect but by the risk effect, 
and the non-linearity is mainly characteristic of AAERs.   
3.5.7. Lack of professional competence 
I further test whether the increasing misreporting pattern at the higher levels of stock 
ownership is driven by CEOs’ lack of professional competence. Mohd-Sulaiman (2013) 
posits that accounting fraud does not necessarily result from managers’ intentional 
motivation, but simply results from CEOs’ insufficient oversight over firms’ reporting 
process. In fact, CEOs with excessive stock ownership (> 22.4 percent) in my main 
analysis are significantly less competent (i.e., Degree, CPA, and Experience) than 
CEOs with normal levels of shares.   
Table 3.11 reports that, as expected, CEOs with PhD/ MBA (Degree) or more 
working experience before their current tenure (Experience) are less likely to 
misreport (Columns (1) and (5)). Moreover, Columns (1)-(6) consistently show that 
owner-CEOs’ increasing misreporting patterns do not change even when I explicitly 
control for CEOs’ competence levels in Eq. (3.11). These findings imply that CEO 
competence is not a critical factor in determining owner-CEOs’ increasing 
misreporting patterns at the higher levels of stock ownership. On the other hand, the 
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insignificance of the linear term of Stock ownership does not result from the additional 
control of CEO competence but from the loss of observations through the merging 
process of ExecuComp and BoardEx (24,544 → 7,031) as I can check from Columns 
(2), (4), and (6).   
3.5.8. Overconfidence 
I finally test whether CEOs’ aggressive misreporting behaviours at higher level of 
stock ownership result from their overconfidence about future firm performance. 
Overconfident CEOs may hold more shares in expectation of an increase in stock 
returns. In that case, owner-CEOs’ misreporting patterns may be driven by their 
optimism, not by the inherent characteristics of stock ownership (i.e., controlling 
power). In fact, Ahmed and Duellman (2013) and Schrand and Zechman (2012) argue 
that overconfident managers tend to be less conservative in financial reporting and are 
likely to ultimately lead to intentional accounting fraud.   
  Using three proxies for CEO overconfidence (i.e., Holder67, CAPEX, and 
Over_invest), I find that, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman 
2013), optimistic CEOs are more likely to misreport (Columns (1) and (2) in Table 
3.12). However, I do not find that the additional controls of the overconfidence 
variables in Eq. (3.11) alter the non-linearity of stock ownership. These findings imply 
that CEOs’ overconfidence does not undermine my argument that the aggressive 
misreporting behaviours of CEOs at higher ownership levels are driven by the inherent 
differences between stocks and options (i.e., controlling power), not seriously by other 
confounding factors.  
In sum, my analyses so far consistently demonstrate that differing non-linear effects 
of options and stocks on CEOs’ misreporting decisions can be explained by their 
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different perception of the risk regarding accounting fraud commitment. Based on the 
findings of prior studies that have already shown distinct linear effects of stocks and 
option on firms’ restatement and lawsuit propensities (e.g., Zhang et al. 2008; Peng 
and Röell 2008; Efendi et al. 2007; Burns and Kedia 2006), this study extends them 
by providing new empirical findings showing that the differing linear effects are 
ultimately reversed when the reward effect of equity incentives is overtaken by the 
risk effect of financial misreporting. 
3.6. Robustness checks 
3.6.1. Sampling bias 
To mitigate sampling bias, I already analysed two distinct estimation samples (i.e., full 
and GPSM samples) and showed that my findings are not susceptible to the choice of 
these alternative samples (Table 3.6). One remaining sampling issue is that the full and 
GPSM samples include mainly ExecuComp firms, whose characteristics may be 
different from those of non-ExecuComp firms (Cadman et al. 2010). Therefore, I 
further construct a Partial Matching (PM) sample which is mostly composed of non-
ExecuComp firms (90.1 percent). This additional sample is analysed using the 
piecewise spline specifications (PS) of Stock ownership (see Morck et al. 1988). The 
PS method enables us to find a parsimonious way to fit to the rather skewed stock 
ownership variable in the PM sample70 by dividing it into the lower and higher levels 
at its knots (Eq. (3.13) and (3.14)). To avoid arbitrariness in determining the knot (2.4 
percent), I develop an algorithm that automatically identifies an ownership level where 
the two slopes of PS variables are the most statistically different71. For a robustness 
70 The inflection point of CEOs’ stock ownership in PM sample is 2.4 percent, whereas those in full and 
GPSM samples are between 22.4 percent and 23.1 percent.  
71 The knot is automatically identified using the following algorithms. First, the coefficients of both 
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check, the results do not change within wide intervals of alternative knots between 1.7 
and 5.0 percent of stock ownership.  
Using this PM sample and the PS specifications, I affirm that the distinct non-linear 
impacts of CEOs’ equity incentives are still valid even in this alternative sample 
(Columns (1)-(2) in Table 3.13).  
Stock ownership (1) (Stock ownership < knot)  
    = Stock ownership if Stock ownership < knot 
    = knot if Stock ownership ≥ knot ..................................................................... (3.13) 
  Stock ownership (2) (Stock ownership ≥ knot) 
    = 0 if Stock ownership < knot 
    = Stock ownership – knot if Stock ownership ≥ knot ....................................... (3.14) 
3.6.2. Omitted incentives 
To mitigate potentially omitted variable bias, I already adopted a comprehensive range 
of controls in Eq. (3.10) (i.e., CEO power, overconfidence, competence, risk-taking 
incentives, and corporate governance). However, the association between accounting 
fraud and CEOs’ equity incentives may be spurious, particularly when uncontrolled 
incentives that are associated with firm performance or stock prices (e.g., First public 
offering) motivate CEOs to keep misreporting even after they have benefited 
sufficiently from their own equity holdings (e.g., Option delta). Therefore, by 
exploiting the benefits of hand-collected data in the PM sample, I further test whether 
higher and lower levels of stock ownership are statistically significant. Second, the multiplication of 
two coefficients is negative. Finally, their slope differences are most statistically significant (the lowest 
sum of squared errors). 
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my main findings are robust regarding this bias. Column (2) in Table 3.13 confirms 
that the significant and non-linear coefficients for both option delta and stock 
ownership remain unchanged even after I control for two additional incentive 
variables, i.e., First public offering and Debt covenant violation.  
3.6.3. Alternative variables  
To check the sensitivity of the findings to other specifications of equity incentive 
variables, I estimate Eq. (3.10) after substituting Option delta and Stock ownership
with three alternatives. First, I adopt top management team (TMT) as an alternative 
unit of analysis for CEOs. Despite the potential heterogeneities among TMT members 
(see Hambrick et al. 1996), TMT has been widely analysed by prior studies based on 
the assumption that the TMT may decide together on management issues (e.g., 
Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993). Table 3.14 reveals that TMT stock ownership and 
TMT option delta have similar effects on accounting fraud to those of Option delta and 
Stock ownership. These findings suggest that my main test results are not susceptible 
to the alteration of the unit of analysis. However, this does not directly imply that 
CEOs and TMT are mutual substitutes in analysing equity incentives as determinants 
of accounting fraud. The impact of TMT on accounting fraud may be mostly attributed 
to the effects of CEOs. In fact, CEOs’ equity incentives account for the majority of 
TMT incentives72 (see Aggarwal and Samwick 2003).  
Second, I further adopt a combined measure of CEOs’ stock-based incentives 
(Portfolio delta) as a substitute for the separate proxies, Option delta and Stock 
ownership. Despite scepticism over “the assumption of substitution” between options 
72 CEOs’ stock ownership, for example, occupies 73.6 percent of TMT stock ownership in GPSM 
sample.  
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and stocks (Sanders 2001), many studies have adopted Portfolio delta as a measure 
for CEOs’ stock-based incentives (e.g., Feng et al. 2011; Armstrong et al. 2010). 
However, I have already pointed out a potential limitation of this combined measure: 
it may not capture the heterogeneities of options and stocks. Consistent with the 
findings of prior studies (e.g., Erickson et al. 2006), Table 3.15 affirms this argument 
by showing that there are no significant associations between accounting fraud and 
Portfolio delta. These findings imply that separate measures of options and stocks are 
better at estimating the effects of CEOs’ equity incentives on accounting fraud. Overall, 
the results of these additional analyses validate the adoption of distinct measures for 
options and stocks in the context of accounting fraud.  
Finally, I test whether the monetary and percentage measures of stock ownership 
are indeed heterogeneous in the context of accounting fraud. Based on the assumption 
of their heterogeneities, I have so far adopted the percentage measure of stock 
ownership (Stock ownership) to capture the controlling power of stock ownership (see 
e.g., Khanna et al. 2015; Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi 2014). To test the validity of this 
assumption, I estimate Eq. (3.10) by substituting Stock ownership with a monetary 
measure, Stock delta. As in Eq. (3.4), Stock delta is the value sensitivity of stock 
ownership to a one percent change in stock price (Burns and Kedia 2006; Johnson et 
al. 2009).  
Table 3.16 reports the analysis results. As expected, Column (2) reveals that Stock 
delta does not have significant and non-linear impact on accounting fraud. Instead, 
Stock delta has a negative but insignificant association with accounting fraud (Column 
(1)) as in Burns and Kedia (2006). These results imply that the monetary portion of 
stock ownership alone does not fully capture the dynamic effects of stock ownership 
on accounting fraud. Contrary to option holdings, stock ownership provides CEOs 
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with controlling power over their firms and it affects their misreporting decisions. By 
acquiring these controls, CEOs may underestimate the risks related to accounting 
fraud commitment and this misperception encourages them to misreport despite the 
actual level of the risk. The comparison of the effects of monetary and percentage 
measures of stock ownership in Table 3.6 and Table 3.14 provides firm evidence to 
support my argument that owner-CEOs’ controlling power causes the non-linear 
effects of stock ownership in the context of accounting fraud.  
3.6.4. Reverse causality 
To test the sensitivity of the results regarding reverse causality bias, I already adopted 
probit cross-sectional regression analyses (GPSM and PM samples) as in Dechow et 
al. (1996), in addition to probit panel regressions (full sample). By analysing lagged 
independent variables (t-1) and the first-year observation of dependent variable (t), the 
cross-sectional setting avoids the possibility that fraud incidence, in turn, affects CEOs’ 
equity incentives. As reported in previous sections (e.g., Table 3.6), the analyses of 
probit cross-sectional regression produce qualitatively similar results to those of panel 
regression.  
Further, I address one remaining issue regarding the simultaneity bias in the cross-
sectional regression analyses. Reverse causality bias may arise if CEOs increase their 
option and stock holdings in the expectation of committing accounting fraud in the 
future (see Viswanathan and Wei 2008). To mitigate this bias, I estimate Eq. (3.10) 
after controlling for the potentially intentional changes in equity incentives between t-
1 and t-2. Table 3.17 affirms that the main findings of this study are not susceptible to 
both CEOs’ potentially intentional changes (increase or decrease) and increase in 
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equity incentives before the incidence of accounting fraud. Overall, the potential 
reverse causality issue does not cause serious bias to my results.  
3.6.5. Partial observability 
As a final robustness check, I test whether the findings are robust regarding potentially 
undetected fraud cases. By research design, I analyse AAERs that have been detected 
by the SEC as material GAAP violations. Like most research of this type, this research 
design causes partial observability bias (Poirier 1980), in that not all material 
misreporting cases are included in AAERs. To mitigate this bias, I already analysed 
alternative misreporting proxies to AAERs. Additionally, I adopt the bivariate probit 
regression model proposed by Poirier (1980) and adopted by Chen et al. (2006), Wang 
(2013), and Khanna et al. (2015) in the research exploring corporate fraud. Contrary 
to a normal probit regression model, this extended model combines an accounting 
fraud commitment model with an accounting fraud detection model to adjust the 
coefficients in the accounting fraud model conditional on the detection probability. 
The model requires that the fraud and detection models do not have exactly the same 
variables (Wang 2013). Following Wang (2013), benefits from accounting fraud (e.g., 
Option delta and Stock ownership) are excluded from the detection model. Instead, 
audit opinions (Audit opinion) are included in the detection model since they usually 
trigger SEC investigations. However, the analysis results do not alter even when I 
incorporate options and stocks in the detection model. Audit opinion is an indicator 
variable set to one if the audit opinion in the first fraud year is not unqualified. Table 
3.18 affirms that the main findings of this study do not change even in the bivariate 
probit regression settings73.  
73 Due to frequent convergence failures of the bivariate probit model, I conduct this analysis only for 
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3.7. Conclusion 
Using both unmatched and matched samples and by adopting option delta and stock 
ownership as proxies for CEOs’ equity incentives, I find that options and stocks have 
differing non-linear effects on CEOs’ accounting fraud decisions. Specifically, I report 
that CEOs as option and stock holders, respectively, drastically change their 
misreporting behaviours at certain critical levels of option delta and stock ownership. 
Once reaching these critical levels, CEOs as option holders are less likely to misreport, 
whereas owner-CEOs are more likely to misreport. Further analyses indicate that these 
behavioural changes may be driven by CEOs’ different perceptions of the risks 
regarding accounting fraud as two types of equity holders. At higher levels of equity 
incentives, CEOs as option holders are seriously concerned about the risk due to 
increased ill-gotten gains, whereas owner-CEOs underestimate the risk due to their 
increased control within firms. I also sort out three alternative explanations for the 
change in misreporting patterns and document that they are not strongly driven by the 
diminishing marginal utility of option holdings or CEOs’ lack of professional 
competence and overconfidence.  
Like most research of this type, this study is also subject to some caveats. First, 
even though I adopt both GPSM and PM sampling methods, matching itself does not 
eliminate bias resulting from unobservable covariates (Rosenbaum 2002). However, I 
mitigate these concerns by controlling for a wide range of additional variables. Further, 
as explained earlier, omitted motivational factors may bias against the findings 
regarding stock options. If the accounting fraud model (Eq. (3.10)) had omitted critical 
this robustness check. For the convergence issue of maximum likelihood methods, see Agresti and 
Kateri (2011). 
158
incentive variables, the reversing effect of options would not be observed. Second, the 
accounting fraud model does not explicitly control for CEOs’ personal wealth levels 
since they are not directly observable in the U.S. context. To a limited extent, however, 
Stock ownership mitigates this bias since CEOs’ stock ownership is known to account 
for approximately 45 percent of CEOs’ wealth (Elsilä et al. 2013). Finally, the 
accounting fraud proxy, AAERs, may be exposed to the partial observability bias. By 
adopting alternative misreporting proxies and the bivariate probit regression model, 
however, I aimed to address this issue.  
In addition to the theoretical contributions mentioned in the introduction section, 
my results provide practical implications for both accounting regulators and capital 
market investors. First, the findings should be of interest to accounting regulators, who 
have a responsibility to detect accounting fraud: CEOs with average option incentives 
or excessive stock incentives are more likely to misreport. Second, the differing non-
linear effects of options and stocks on accounting fraud suggest that, as a 
compensation plan, shareholders should consider not only the choice between options 
and stocks, but also their respective levels of existing equity incentives.  
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Figure 3.1  Equilibrium analysis of accounting fraud
This figure illustrates an equilibrium analysis of the marginal benefit and cost of option delta in the context of 
accounting fraud, along with a prediction on the relation between option delta and accounting fraud propensity 
(Pr(AF)). Option delta is the value sensitivity of stock options to a 1 percent change in stock price. MB represents 
marginal benefit and MC stands for marginal cost. 
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Figure 3.2  Differing non-monotonic effects  
This figure illustrates differing non-linear effects of option delta and stock ownership on accounting fraud 
propensity (full sample). Lines are the predicted values of accounting fraud propensity estimated using Eq. (3.10) 
after setting controlling variables at their respective means, whereas dots are those estimated without adjusting 
control variables. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A. 
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Figure 3.3  Changing inflection points  
This figure illustrates changing inflection points of the non-monotonic curves of option delta and stock ownership 
in the context of accounting fraud (full sample). Lines are the predicted values of accounting fraud propensity 
estimated using Eq. (3.10) after setting control variables at their respective means, whereas dots are those estimated 
without adjusting control variables. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A. 
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Figure 3.4  The effects of SOX on CEOs’ misreporting patterns 
This figure illustrates changing trends of misreporting patterns around the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
in 2002 (full sample). Lines are accounting fraud rates of firms whose CEOs belong to the higher levels of Option 
delta and Stock ownership respectively. Accounting fraud rate is the number of AAERs scaled by total ExecuComp 
firms in each year. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A. 
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Figure 3.5  Interaction effect estimation for probit models
Panel A: Option delta (Column (1)) 
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Panel A: Option delta (Column (2)) 
Panel B: Stock ownership (Column (2)) 
This figure illustrates the interaction effects of the frim-years after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
and the higher levels of Option delta / Stock ownership (LHS), and their z-statistics computed using Ai and 
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Table 3.1  Sample selection 
Full Sample excluding financial firms (1992-2012) 24,544 firm-years 
AAERs compiled by CFRM  1,961 firm-years  
  Less: Firm-years without sufficient data (1,591)
 ExecuComp fraud firm-years  370
Propensity-score matching sample  291-426 firms B + C
Distinct fraud firms complied by CFRM  739 firms 
Less: Firms without sufficient data (639)
ExecuComp fraud firms 100
 Non-ExecuComp fraud firms  61 A 
  Less: Duplications (6)
 ExecuComp and Non-ExecuComp fraud firms  155 B 
 Non-fraud matches   136-271 C 
Partial matching sample  122 firms A + D
Distinct fraud firms published by the SEC  70 firms 
Less: Firms without sufficient data (9)
 Non-ExecuComp fraud firms  61 A 
Non-fraud matches  61 D 
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Table 3.2  Descriptive statistics  
Panel A: Mean 
Compustat and 
ExecuComp 
Full Sample GPSM PM 
























Option delta 24,544 0.025 370 0.026 0.212 155 0.505 0.000 61 0.168 0.370 0.077
Stock ownership 24,544 0.250 370 0.635 0.000 155 0.095 0.000 61 0.192 0.000 0.001
ROA 24,541 0.041 370 0.034 0.346 155 -0.104 0.000 61 -0.362 0.000 0.247
Leverage 24,460 0.228 370 0.216 0.316 153 0.256 0.091 61 0.257 0.272 0.937
Ln(Assets) 24,542 21.053 370 21.442 0.000 155 20.154 0.000 6118.120 0.000 0.000
Working Capital 23,869 0.230 370 0.242 0.199 151 0.172 0.003 61 0.093 0.000 0.651
Tobin’s Q 24,486 1.684 370 2.342 0.000 154 3.001 0.000 61 3.649 0.000 0.450
CEO=Chairman 24,069 0.559 358 0.659 0.000 154 0.714 0.000 61 0.656 0.133 0.361
CEO=Founder 23,618 0.326 358 0.520 0.000 151 0.497 0.000 61 0.459 0.028 0.543
Ln(Tenure) 22,827 1.748 357 1.859 0.035 147 1.815 0.353 61 1.756 0.942 0.625
Stock market 24,544 0.929 370 0.878 0.000 155 0.800 0.000 61 0.672 0.000 0.039
Portfolio delta 23,337 1.222 346 3.958 0.000 155 2.474 0.214 61 2.001 0.630 0.783
Stock delta 24,073 0.970 356 3.249 0.000 155 1.971 0.318 61 1.839 0.588 0.942
Holder67 24,544 0.311 370 0.476 0.000
CAPEX 24,544 0.168 370 0.162 0.852
Over_invest 24,544 0.293 370 0.335 0.065
Portfolio vega 24,544 0.011 370 0.020 0.000
%  Fraud 1.50% 0.63% 0.25% 
Panel B: Median 
Compustat and 
ExecuComp 

























Option delta 24,544 0.079 370 0.215 0.000 155 0.089 0.983 61 0.002 0.000 0.000
Stock ownership 24,544 0.003 370 0.003 0.499 155 0.005 0.613 61 0.125 0.000 0.046
ROA 24,541 0.052 370 0.047 0.060 155 0.050 0.560 61 0.030 0.042 0.211
Leverage 24,460 0.216 370 0.228 0.927 153 0.228 0.841 61 0.070 0.032 0.085
Ln(Assets) 24,542 20.922 370 21.380 0.000 155 20.144 0.000 61 18.266 0.000 0.000
Working Capital 23,869 0.198 370 0.197 0.563 151 0.228 0.412 61 0.271 0.080 0.243
Tobin’s Q 24,486 1.282 370 1.380 0.017 154 1.395 0.068 61 1.812 0.001 0.110
CEO=Chairman 24,069 1.000 358 1.000 0.000 154 1.000 0.000 61 1.000 0.133 0.360
CEO=Founder 23,618 0.000 358 1.000 0.000 151 0.000 0.000 61 0.000 0.028 0.541
Ln(Tenure) 22,827 1.792 357 2.079 0.005 147 1.946 0.225 61 1.946 0.718 0.702
Stock market 24,544 1.000 370 1.000 0.000 155 1.000 0.000 61 1.000 0.000 0.040
Portfolio delta 23,337 0.192 346 0.397 0.000 155 0.284 0.011 61 0.146 0.090 0.010
Stock delta 24,073 0.055 356 0.070 0.007 155 0.081 0.010 61 0.070 0.928 0.182
Holder67 24,544 0.000 370 0.000 0.000
CAPEX 24,544 0.000 370 0.000 0.852
Over_invest 24,544 0.000 370 0.000 0.065
Portfolio vega 24,544 0.004 358 0.002 0.000
%  Fraud 1.50% 0.63% 0.25% 
This table reports descriptive statistics, including p-values for Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) tests of median 
differences among three samples and ExecuComp observations. Since GPSM and PM samples include non-
ExecuComp samples that are collected manually, they do not have statistics for Holder67, CAPEX, Over_invest, 
and Portfolio vega. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A.  
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Table 3.3  GPSM estimation using OLS regression  







Working Capital 0.535*** 
(0.112) 









Adjusted R2 0.259 
This table reports the OLS estimation results between Ln(Stock ownership) 
and potential confounders of both Stock ownership and accounting fraud. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively.  
Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A.  
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Table 3.4  Covariate balance  
Variables GPSM PM 




t-test WRS KS Fraud Non-Fraud t-test WRS KS 
ROA 0.050 0.044 0.201 0.869 0.273 0.032 0.021 0.865 0.711 0.520
Leverage 0.228 0.167 0.199 0.290 0.336 0.070 0.056 0.532 0.321 0.385
Ln (Assets) 20.144 20.481 0.184 0.408 0.004 18.266 18.220 0.990 0.986 1.000
Working Capital 0.228 0.256 0.222 0.263 0.294 0.271 0.313 0.361 0.639 0.520
Tobin’s Q 1.395 1.372 0.086 0.834 0.583 1.812 1.569 0.478 0.941 0.671
Ln (Tenure) 1.946 2.197 0.037 0.034 0.029 1.946 1.792 0.815 0.951 0.929
Stock market 1.000 1.000 0.002 0.002 0.197 1.000 1.000 0.019 0.019 0.274
Year Matched Matched 
Industry Matched Matched 
% Matched (A) 67% 78% 78% 89% 89% 100%
% Matched (B) 71% 86% 86% 100% 100% 100%
gpscore 0.084 0.083 0.944 0.768 0.986 - - - - -
Stock ownership 0.005 0.033 0.843 0.003 0.001 0.125 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.000
Option delta 0.089 0.055 0.005 0.053 0.012 0.002 0.007 0.293 0.126 0.007
Observations 155 136 291 291 291 61 61 122 122 122
This table reports the covariates balance of matched pairs (1:1 matches of both GPSM and PM samples). % Matched 
(A) is the number of balanced covariates divided by the total number of covariates. % Matched (B) is the number 
of balanced covariates divided by the total number of covariates excluding Market and Ln(Assets). gpscore stands 
for the Generalized Propensity-Score. P-values are for t-tests, Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) tests. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A.   
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Table 3.5  Quintile analysis 
Option delta Stock ownership 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q (T) Q(C) Fraud 
Freq. 
SE Obs. Mean 
diff. 
p -value Fraud 
Freq. 
SE Obs. Mean 
diff. 
p -value 
5 4 0.506 0.503 85 0.141 0.064 0.365 0.484 85 0.136 0.054 
5 3 0.212 0.005  0.066 0.359 
5 2 0.306 0.000  0.024 0.748 
5 1 0.053 0.493 -0.216 0.005 
4 3 0.365 0.484 85 0.071 0.328 0.229 0.423 83 -0.070 0.302 
4 2 0.165 0.017 -0.112 0.107 
4 1  -0.088 0.238 -0.352 0.000 
3 2 0.294 0.458 85 0.094 0.155 0.299 0.460 87 -0.042 0.552 
3 1  -0.159 0.031 -0.282 0.002 
2 1 0.200 0.402 85 -0.253 0.004 0.341 0.477 85 -0.240 0.002 
1 - 0.453 0.501 86  0.581 0.496 86 
TTL   426  426 
This table reports the quintile analysis results of Option delta and Stock ownership (GPSM). Q(T), treatment quintile, 
is the higher quintiles of Option delta and Stock ownership respectively than Q(C), control quintile. Fraud Freq. is 
the number of fraud firms divided by the total number of firms in GPSM sample. Reported data in Fraud Freq. are 
for quintiles in Q(T). SE represents the standard error of the Fraud. Freq. Obs. stands for the number of observations 
in each quintile. Mean diff. represents the difference in Fraud Freq. between Q(T) and Q(C). P-values are for the 
Mean diff. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A. 
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Table 3.6  Probit estimation results using equity incentives 
Panel A: Regression 
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERs)
































































































































































Observations 21,975 18,703 18,426 412 277
Log likelihood -1,653 -1,513 -1,467 -217 -157
Panel B: Reduced form 
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERs)


























Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes









Observations 20,355 20,355 20,352 20,352
Log likelihood -1,691 -1,685 -1,683 -1,668
Panel C: Marginal effects 
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERs)





















































































































































Industry dummy No Yes Yes Matched Matched
Observations 21,975 18,703 18,426 412 277
Inflection point:
Options 7.33 6.90 6.60 8.95 7.95
Stocks 0.231 0.224 0.161 0.232 0.233
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both Option delta and Stock 
ownership. Due to data availability, Columns (4) and (5) in Panel A do not incorporate Holder67 and Portfolio 
vega. Consistent with Armstrong et al. (2013), Panel B is estimated using contemporaneous variables. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A.  
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Table 3.7 Analysis of sub-samples 
Panel A: CEO power 
Dependent variable = Pr(AAERs) 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO power CEO=Founder CEO=Chairman Ln(Tenure) 
Yes No Yes No Long Short 
Motivation 
























































































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,146 10,671 9,598 7,010 8,051 9,204 
Log likelihood -735 -700 -940 -520 -790 -646 
Inflection point: 
 Options 6.22 4.13 5.95 - - 3.59 
   (p-value for diff.) 0.000 
 Stocks 16.1 - 14.1 - 15.7 24.3 
(p-value for diff.) 0.000 
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Panel B: Corporate governance  
Dependent variable = Pr(AAERs) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Corporate governance ABC Outside director 
High Low High Low 
Motivation 















































































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,597 5,343 4,362 4,987 5,166 
Log likelihood -1048 -647 -338 -358 -625 
Inflection point: 
 Options 5.25 5.43 - 4.97 5.17 
(p-value for diff.) 0.000 
 Stocks 18.4 16.8 - - 20.4 
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Panel C: CEO overconfidence  
Dependent variable = Pr(AAERs) 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Overconfidence Holder67 CAPEX Over_invest 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Motivation 











































































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,160 9,033 1,543 14,883 4,727 12,431 
Log likelihood -616 -633 -187 -1229 -471 -959 
Inflection point: 
 Options 7.25 2.39 - 6.56 - 6.71 
   (p-value for diff.) 0.000 
 Stocks 24.25 24.50 17.50 15.61 17.04 17.02 
   (p-value for diff.) 0.000 0.001 0.796 
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both Option delta and Stock ownership
by sub-samples of distinct CEO power, corporate governance, CEO overconfidence, and CEO competence (Full 
sample). Due to small sample size, the sub-sample analyses of CPA do not converge. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A.   
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Table 3.8  Interactive analysis of voting premium. 
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERs) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Motivation 












































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 







Observations 9,433 8,565 8,499 
Log likelihood -1015 -919 -907 
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Stock delta using its interaction term 
with Voting premium (full sample). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels 
respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.9  Interactive analysis of SOX effect  
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERs) 
(1) (2) 
Motivation 
























































































Observations 18,703 8,224 
Log likelihood -1578 -758 
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both Option delta and Stock 
ownership using their interaction terms with SOX (full sample). H is an indicator variable equal to 1 if Option delta 
or Stock ownership is greater than or equal to their respective medians. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.10 OLS and probit estimation results using alternative misreporting measures
Panel A: Accruals
Dependent variable = Accruals 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Accruals WC PMJONES SDD 
Motivation 













































































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,255 21,255 21,158 21,158 20,239 20,239 
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.091 0.091 0.031 0.031 
Panel B: Sample selection 
Database Restatements Lawsuits 
Settled securities class action lawsuits (1990-2015) 
Restatements complied by Audit Analytics (1980-2012) 28,301 
3,008 
Less: Obs. not covered on Compustat 
Less: Obs. Of financial firms 
 Less: Obs. before 1992 or after 2012 









ExecuComp fraud firm-years (1992-2012) 3,561 529 
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Panel C: Restatements and securities class action lawsuits 
Dependent variable = Pr(financial misreporting) 



































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,698 18,009 19,102 12,003
Log likelihood -7,934 -1,137 -1,732 -395
This table reports the probit estimation results between alternative earnings management or financial misreporting 
proxies, and both Option delta and Stock ownership (Full sample). Numbers in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are 
defined in the Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.11  Probit estimation results using CEO competence 
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERs) 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
CEO competence Degree CPA Experience 
Motivation 































































































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,031 7,031 7,031 7,031 7,031 7,031 
Log likelihood -649 -655 -655 -655 -650 -655 
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both Dollar option delta and Stock 
ownership after controlling for CEO overconfidence (Full sample). Numbers in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are 
defined in the Appendix 3.A. 
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Table 3.12  Probit estimation results using CEO overconfidence 
Dependent variable = Pr (Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2) (3) 
Overconfidence Holder67 CAPEX Over_invest 
Motivation 
























































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes







Observations 18,703 18,426 18,406
Log likelihood -1513 -1473 -1469
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both Dollar option delta and Stock 
ownership after controlling for CEO competence (full sample). Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined 
in the Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.13  Probit estimation results after controlling for addition variables 
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)































































































































































Observations 122 122 122 122




This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both Option delta and Stock 
ownership after controlling for Outside blockholder, First public offering, and Debt covenant violation (PM 
sample). Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A.  
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Table 3.14  Probit estimation results using alternative unit of analysis 
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERs) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Full Sample GPSM 
Motivation


































































































Industry dummy Yes Matched Matched
Observations 17,655 351 223
Log likelihood -1,438 -159 -114
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both TMT stock ownership and TMT 
option delta (full sample). Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.15  Probit estimation results using portfolio delta  
Dependent variable = Pr (Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) 














































































































Industry dummy Yes Yes Matched Matched
Observations 18,703 18,703 412 122
Log likelihood -1,525 -1,525 -243 -50
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Portfolio delta. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 3.A. 
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Table 3.16  Monetary measure of stock ownership 
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERs) 
































































Year dummy Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes
Observations 18,703 18,703
Log likelihood -1,520 -1,520
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both Option delta and Stock delta 
(Full sample). Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix 3.A.  
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Table 3.17  Reverse causality  
Dependent variable = Pr (AAERTs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
GPSM (1:2) GPSM (1:1) 


































Change in equity incentives












































































































Year dummy Yes & Matched Yes & Matched Yes & Matched Yes & Matched
Industry dummy Matched Matched Matched Matched
Observations 412 412 277 277
Log likelihood -215 -212 -155 -154
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both Option delta and Stock 
ownership after controlling for prior-year changes in equity incentives (GPSM sample). Numbers in parentheses 
are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels 
respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 3.A. 
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Table 3.18  Bivariate probit estimation results using equity incentives 
(1) (2) 



































































































Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,608 17,608
Log likelihood -1345 -1338
This table reports the bivariate probit estimation results between accounting fraud, and both Option delta and 
Stock ownership (Full sample). To facilitate the convergence of models, a reduced industry dummy is adopted. It 
is constructed to set for 1 for firms included in the top 50 percent of two-digit SIC industries. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 3.A. 
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APPENDIX 3.A  Variable definitions
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable 
 Accounting fraud An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms for which 
the SEC published AAERs for alleged GAAP 
violations, and 0 otherwise (AAERs are compiled 
by CFRM) (Dechow et al. 2011).  
 Restatements An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that 
restated their misreporting, and 0 otherwise (Audit 
Analytics).  
 Lawsuits An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms for which 
securities class action lawsuits regarding financial 
misreporting are filed (Stanford Law School). 
WC Current operating assets deducted by current 
operating liabilities.  
PMJONES (Modified Jones 
with current-year ROA)
The residuals (ε) from ΔWC = α0 + α1 (1/total assets 
(att-1)) + α2 (Δsale (sale) – Δreceivables (rect)) + α3 
(ΔPP&E (ppegt)) + ROA + ε, estimated for each 
two-digit SIC-year grouping (Kothari et al. 2005; 
Jones et al. 2008).  
 All variables except 1/total assets (att-1) are deflated 
by total assets (att-1). 
SDD (Studentised accrual 
estimation error)
The residuals of ΔWC = α0 + α1 (CFO (oancft-1)) + 
α2 (CFO (oancft)) + α3 (CFO (oancft+1)) + ε, which 
are then deflated by the standard errors of the 
residuals of the firms belonging to the same two-
digit SIC year grouping as each firm (Dechow and 
Dichev 2002; Dechow et al. 2011). 
Motivation 
Option delta The value sensitivity of option value to a 1 percent 
change in stock price (Core and Guay 2002). The 
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scale is adjusted by dividing by 1,000,000 (Johnson 
et al. 2009). 
 Stock ownership The shares excluding stock options of each CEO 
divided by total shares (shrown _excl_opts_pct). 
 Stock delta The value sensitivity of stocks to a 1 percent change 
in stock price. 
 Portfolio delta The sum of the sensitivities of stocks and options to 
a 1 percent change in stock price (Coles et al. 2006).
 Portfolio vega The value sensitivity of both stock options and stock 
holdings to a 1 percent change in stock volitivity 
(Armstrong et al. 2013). 
 TMT stock ownership The shares of all officers on the BOD divided by 
total shares (Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993).  
 TMT option delta The sum of Option delta of all officers on the BOD. 
 First public offering  An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s IPO date 
for major exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ) or first going public date for OTC 
markets (OTC Pink Sheet and OTCBB) falls during 
or up to two years before accounting fraud, and 0 
otherwise.  
 Debt covenant violation An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm violated 
debt covenants during or two years after accounting 
fraud, and 0 otherwise (Dechow et al. 1996). If 
firms with debts do not file 10-Q/10-K with the SEC 
or filed for bankruptcies, this paper assumes them 
to be debt covenant violations since they are usually 
automatic violations of debt covenants.  
Financial ratios 
 ROA The ratio of income before extraordinary items (ib) 
to average assets (at).  
 Leverage The ratio of debt in current liability (dlc) and long-
term debt (dltt) to total assets (at). 
 Ln(Assets) The natural logarithm of total assets (at).  
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 Working Capital The ratio of working capital (current asset – current 
liability; wcap) to total assets (at).  
 Tobin’s Q The ratio of the sum of market value of equity 
(mktval) and book value of liability (lt) to total 
assets (at). 
CEO power 
 CEO = Founder An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in which 
a CEO is also a founder of the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
A CEO is assumed to be a founder if his/her tenure 
(becameceo) is longer than or equal to CRSP first 
date or Compustat’s first data date.  
 CEO = Chairman  An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in which 
a CEO is also a Chairman of the board, and 0 
otherwise. 
 Ln(Tenure) The natural logarithm of the number of years that a 
CEO holds his/her position until current year. 
CEO overconfidence 
 Holder67 An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose 
CEOs hold stock options that are more than 67 
percent in the money, and 0 otherwise (Campbell et 
al. 2011). 
 CAPEX An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose 
ratio of capital expenditure to lagged total assets is 
greater than the medians of their industry peers (12 
Fama-French industries), and 0 otherwise (Ahmed 
and Duellman 2013).  
 Over_invest An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose 
residual of a regression of asset growth on sales 
growth, which is estimated for each two-digit SIC-
year grouping, is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise 
(Schrand and Zechman 2012).  
CEO competence 
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Degree An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose 
CEOs hold PhD, MBA, or JD/LLM, and 0 
otherwise (BoardEx). 
CPA An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms whose 
CEOs hold CPA, CFA, CMA, or CTA, and 0 
otherwise (BoardEx). 
 Experience The natural logarithm of the number of professional 
career years that a CEO spent before joining current 
CEO position (BoardEx). 
Corporate governance 
 ABC (Appointment-based  
 connectedness) 
The ratio of directors and the four-highest paid 
named executives who have been appointed during 
the current CEO’s tenure (Khanna et al. 2015).    
 Outside director The ratio of outsider directors on the BOD to the 
total number of directors. 
 Outside blockholder The shares held by outside blockholders divided by 
total shares.  
Other controls 
 Stock market An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is listed on 
major stock markets such as NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise.  
 SOX An indicator variable equal to 1 if 1 firm-years fall 
behind 2002, and 0 otherwise.  
Pr(Takeover) The fitted value of Pr(Takeovert) = α0 + α1ROAt-1 + 
α2Leveraget-1 + α3Ln(Assets)t-1 + α4Tobin’s Qt-1 + 
α5Asset structuret-1 + α6Blockholder ownershipt-1 + 
∑Year + ∑Industry + ε (Lin et al. 2018). 
 Year dummy An indicator variable equal to 1 for the IT bubble 
(1999-2000) and 2 for the financial crisis (2007-
2009), and 0 otherwise. This unique definition is 
used only for matched samples (GPSM and PM 
samples). 
* Compustat and ExecuComp mnemonics are presented in parentheses.  
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Chapter 4 
Controlling Shareholders’ Control-Ownership Wedge 
4.1. Introduction
It is well established in the literature that controlling shareholders’74 voting rights 
exceeding their cash investment in firms, i.e., control-ownership wedge, causes firms’ 
aggressive earnings management, as measured by relatively indirect proxies such as 
discretionary accruals (Fan and Wong 2002; Francis et al. 2005; Kim and Yi 2006; 
Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012). However, the specific context of accounting fraud 
entails substantial costs of financial misreporting (e.g., losses from a drop in stock 
prices or legal costs for fraud allegations) for controlling shareholders (see Karpoff et 
al. 2008b). Moreover, these costs are amplified when the control-ownership wedge is 
combined with controlling shareholders’ ownership concentration (a common feature 
of business groups) and the additional imposition of government regulation uniquely 
associated with Korean chaebols. Although prior research claims that control-
ownership wedge induces firms’ “opportunistic earnings management” (Kim and Yi 
2006), it is unclear whether controlling shareholders would ignore the increased 
economic and legal costs associated with accounting fraud. This study fills the void in 
the literature by testing the extent to which these two cost factors interact with the 
potentially exacerbating effect of control-ownership wedge on firms’ accounting fraud 
74 Following La Porta et al. (1999), Fan and Wong (2002), Haw et al. (2004), and Lin et al. (2011), I 
focus on the largest ultimate owners as a proxy for controlling shareholders.   
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decisions. 
According to the expropriation hypothesis widely adopted by prior researchers 
including Kim and Yi (2006), firms would manage their earnings to conceal the 
economic distortions caused by controlling shareholders’ expropriating activities (e.g., 
related-party transactions). Consistent with prior research relying on this theory, I 
expect that firms with deeper control-ownership wedge are more likely to commit 
accounting fraud. However, I conversely hypothesise that firms affiliated with 
business groups or chaebols are less likely to commit accounting fraud because, in 
these two settings, controlling shareholders incur more serious and direct costs of 
accounting fraud. For example, controlling shareholders in business groups are 
exposed to substantial losses from any stock price crash once disputed misreporting is 
announced to markets. Furthermore, controlling shareholders in chaebols are faced 
with higher chances of detection due to the additional imposition of stringent 
regulation that tightens monitoring over their expropriating activities. The relative 
legitimacy of earnings management strategies (accruals management vs. accounting 
fraud) distinguishes the hypotheses and empirical results of prior studies (e.g., Kim 
and Yi 2006) from my study, because controlling shareholders may not seriously 
consider these cost factors when managing earnings generally within GAAP.  
In contrast to “opportunism by executives” in the U.S. context, “opportunism by 
controlling shareholders” (Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010) is prevalent in many Asian 
and European countries (see e.g., La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000). In 
particular, the Korean sample provides an ideal setting to investigate my research 
question, because chaebols are usually controlled by their individual ultimate owners75. 
75 Conversely, business groups, for example, in China, Japan, and Germany are largely influenced by 
the government, professional managers, and big banks respectively (see Darrough et al. 1998; Chen et 
al. 2006; Ding et al. 2007; Lee and Lee 2014). 
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This implies a higher likelihood of expropriation by controlling shareholders. 
Moreover, chaebols are regulated by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC)76
rules, the like of which rarely exist in other jurisdictions (Kim et al. 2008). In contrast 
to the generic definition of business groups77, Korean chaebols are required to disclose 
the details of their ownership structure and related-party transactions (RPTs), and are 
prohibited from increasing the additional control-ownership wedge. These 
characteristics provide a unique set of conditions in which to test not only the impact 
of the control-ownership wedge but also its potential variations in business groups and 
chaebols. My study is the first to provide separate analyses of unregulated business 
groups and regulated chaebols by the KFTC rules, and to report their incremental 
impact on firms’ accounting fraud propensity.  
Using 433-465 matched pairs of fraud and non-fraud firms from Korea for the fiscal 
years 1998-2014, I first find that control-ownership wedge is positively associated 
with firms’ accounting fraud propensity, when controlling shareholders’ voting rights 
are held constant. This implies that control-ownership wedge motivates controlling 
shareholders not only to deteriorate firms’ financial reporting quality as evidenced by 
prior research (e.g., Kim and Yi 2006), but also ultimately to violate GAAP. Further 
analyses reveal that the detrimental effect of control-ownership wedge is stronger 
when the levels of RPTs among affiliated firms, dividend pay-outs, and debt leverage 
are higher (presumably to avoid debt covenant violations). These are potential 
mechanisms by which controlling shareholders may expropriate their affiliated firms.  
76 The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is a “ministerial-level central administrative organisation 
under the authority of the Prime Minister and also functions as a quasi-judiciary body”. See 
http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/index.jsp. 
77 Prior studies such as La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), and Faccio et al. (2001) define 
business groups as a group of firms whose ultimate owners hold both control-ownership wedge and 
concentrated voting rights of over 10-20 percent. The rationale for this definition is that 10-20 percent 
of ownership may provide shareholders with sufficient power to control their firms. 
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However, in contrast to prior research adopting relatively indirect and legitimate 
proxies for financial reporting quality (e.g., Kim and Yi 2006), I further find that, in 
the context of accounting fraud, the detrimental effect of control-ownership wedge is 
mitigated or even reversed when combined with controlling shareholders’ ownership 
concentration and government regulation. Specifically, at most of the ownership 
concentration levels of controlling shareholders between 10 percent and 60 percent, I 
do not find that firms affiliated with business groups are more likely to commit 
accounting fraud, implying that ownership concentration may mitigate the detrimental 
effect of control-ownership wedge. The detrimental effect persists only at the 
extremely high levels of ownership of over 70 percent.  
Further analyses suggest that the non-monotonic effect of business group affiliation 
can be explained by the costs that the cash component of voting rights (i.e., cash flow 
rights) may incur to controlling shareholders. Consistent with Wang (2006a), 
ownership concentration has a non-linear association with accounting fraud propensity 
in my sample (see also Khanna et al. 2015). Regarding control-ownership wedge and 
cash flow rights, the latter, particularly, has a mitigating effect on accounting fraud 
propensity. In contrast to control-ownership wedge, cash flow rights cause more direct 
costs to controlling shareholders because, as owners with substantial cash investment 
in firms, they also suffer from any inefficiency resulting from their expropriating 
activities.  
I also document that firms affiliated with chaebols are less likely to commit 
accounting fraud, implying that government regulation may even reverse the 
detrimental effect of control-ownership wedge. In particular, additional difference-in-
difference (DID) analyses strongly support the reversing effect of government 
regulation. Accounting fraud propensity significantly decreases after firms are 
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designated as chaebols by the KFTC, presumably because chaebols are placed under 
tighter monitoring for expropriation by the public as well as the government. Tighter 
monitoring inevitably results in these increased economic and legal costs of 
expropriation. I also show that the reversing effect is unlikely to be strongly dominated 
by the political influence of large business groups.  
I make a number of contributions to the literature. First, to my knowledge, my study 
is the first examining the distinct effects of business groups and chaebols from those 
of control-ownership wedge, in the context of accounting fraud. Prior research shows 
congruent effects of control-ownership wedge, business groups, and chaebols using 
relatively indirect proxies for financial reporting quality (e.g., Fan and Wong 2002; 
Kim and Yi 2006; Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012). This study, however, extends the 
literature by providing novel evidence that the detrimental effect of control-ownership 
wedge is countered by the existence of potential exposure to economic and legal cost 
considerations inherent to accounting fraud.  
Second, my study adds to the literature exploring the characteristics of business 
groups and chaebols (e.g., Riyanto and Toolsema 2008; Byun et al. 2013; Almeida et 
al. 2015) by highlighting that they are shrewd enough to actively manage their 
earnings (as shown by prior research e.g., Kim and Yi 2006) without seriously crossing 
into GAAP violations. The findings provide insight into their enduring popularity as 
investment targets (e.g., Samsung and Hyundai78 ), despite the concerns over their 
potential aggressiveness in earnings management.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 summarises prior 
research and discusses my hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes my data and research 
78 The top four largest chaebols occupy approximately 60 percent of the total market capitalisation of 
Korean stock markets (See http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/insight/19558-led-top-4-top-
4-conglomerates-take-60-korean -stock-market-cap-increase). 
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design. Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 provide empirical results, a battery of additional 
analyses and robustness checks respectively. Section 3.7 concludes.
4.2. Review of literature and hypothesis development 
My study focuses on the potential variations in the detrimental impact of control-
ownership wedge on firms’ reporting decisions, especially in the context of accounting 
fraud. A large volume of literature provides empirical evidence that control-ownership 
wedge is negatively associated with firms’ financial reporting quality in both Asian 
and European countries. Most previous studies adopted relatively indirect proxies such 
as discretionary accruals (e.g., Haw et al. 2004; Kim and Yi 2006), income smoothing 
activities (e.g., Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012) and earnings-return relation (e.g., Fan 
and Wong 2002), and are based on the expropriation hypothesis. Francis et al. (2005) 
extend these studies by analysing U.S. data. By adopting dual class ownership 
structure and earnings-return relation as respective proxies for control-ownership 
wedge and earnings informativeness, they show that earnings are less likely to be 
informative for firms with dual class shares.  
Similarly, other studies report that business group and chaebol affiliations are 
positively associated with firms’ discretionary accruals (e.g., Kim and Yi 2006; 
Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012) and are negatively related to the magnitude of value-
relevance of earnings and book value (e.g., Bae and Jeong 2007). Despite the 
heterogeneity in the definition of business groups and chaebols, these studies report 
qualitatively similar results, implying that government regulations may not cause 
heterogeneities in the context of firms’ relatively legitimate earnings management 
strategies.  
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On the other hand, two competing empirical findings exist regarding the impact of 
controlling shareholders’ ownership concentration on firms’ earnings management. 
While Jaggi et al. (2009) and Hasnan et al. (2013) show that concentrated family 
ownership is negatively associated with firms’ discretionary accruals or accounting 
fraud incidences, Fan and Wong (2002) report that controlling shareholders’ 
ownership concentration is negatively associated with firms’ earnings-return relation. 
A mediating finding is reported by Wang (2006a), who demonstrates that founding 
family ownership has a U-shaped association with firms’ accruals management in the 
U.S. context. Specifically, firms with concentrated family ownership are initially more 
likely to produce quality financial reporting because controlling families have stronger 
incentives to monitor managers than minor shareholders do. This helps reduce agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. Conversely, firms with an excessive 
level of ownership are rather less likely to report quality earnings because controlling 
shareholders with increased control over the board of directors may not be tightly 
disciplined by corporate governance systems.  
From the review of literature exploring the link between controlling shareholders’ 
ownership structure and firms’ earnings management, I identify two research gaps. 
First, prior studies examine the influence of business group and chaebol affiliations 
on various relatively legitimate proxies for financial reporting quality (e.g., 
discretionary accruals), potentially ignoring variations in their impact on firms’ 
accounting fraud decisions which expose controlling shareholders to economic and 
legal costs. However, the increased costs that accounting fraud incurs to controlling 
shareholders may change their incentive mechanisms to avoid the costs. Second, 
despite the wide adoption of the expropriation hypothesis in the literature (e.g., Kim 
and Yi 2006), we still do not have empirical evidence on the moderating effect of 
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control-ownership wedge on the relation between controlling shareholders’ 
expropriation and firms’ misreporting behaviours. I provide a discussion of 
institutional background and my hypotheses in the following sections.  
4.2.1. Institutional background  
Chaebols have contributed to the rapid economic growth of Korea ever since the end 
of the Korean War in 1953. With the help of ample financing opportunities centrally 
organised by the government at the initial stage of Korean economic development, 
chaebols have thrived in the global markets, and the Korean economy, in return, has 
grown to be the 11th largest as of 2015 (see IMF 2016).  
On the other hand, chaebols have been criticised due to their opaque ownership 
structure. In contrast to average U.S. firms with diffuse stock ownership, chaebols are 
characterised by combined ownership and control, deep control-ownership wedge, and 
prevalence of family businesses. Their shareholders usually exercise increased voting 
rights using various control enhancing mechanisms among affiliated firms. Moreover, 
they often influence firms’ management decisions “from outside the boardroom” 
without holding responsible management positions, presumably to reduce potential 
legal liabilities (Seo 2016).  
To address side effects of chaebols, the Korean government adopted tight 
regulations in 1987. The KFTC designates chaebol-affiliated firms annually, whose 
total assets as a group exceed about $4.2 billion and whose ultimate owners hold more 
than 30 percent of shares of each firm. The designated chaebol firms are then required 
to disclose details of their RPTs as well as ownership structure, and prohibited from 
increasing new cross-holding of shares and providing guarantees for bank loans of 
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affiliated firms (KFTC 2015). This unique regulation distinguishes chaebols from the 
generic definition of business groups. 
4.2.2. Expropriation hypothesis and control-ownership wedge 
Controlling shareholders may affect firms’ accounting fraud decisions directly and 
indirectly. First, their stock holdings constitute a direct incentive to influence firms’ 
misreporting decisions, and control-ownership wedge helps facilitate that influence 
(see also Francis et al. 2005). Second, their expropriating activities such as RPTs may 
indirectly induce firms to manage earnings. According to the expropriation hypothesis, 
firms would manage earnings to conceal the economic distortions caused by 
controlling shareholders’ expropriation, because they would invite outside 
interventions (e.g., litigation or regulatory enforcement) if not properly addressed 
(Kim and Yi 2006; Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012). Controlling shareholders with 
control-ownership wedge may be incentivised to expropriate their firms because the 
costs of expropriation (e.g., inefficiencies caused by RPTs) are shared by outside 
investors in business groups (see Fan and Wong 2002), and their economic costs are 
ultimately limited to their cash investment in firms.  
I thus expect that firms whose controlling shareholders have deeper control-
ownership wedge are more likely to commit accounting fraud when their voting rights 
are held constant, as they may not be able to conceal their inefficiencies through 
legitimate earnings management strategies. 
 H1. Control-ownership wedge of controlling shareholders is positively associated 
with firms’ accounting fraud propensity.  
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4.2.3. Business group affiliation 
In the context of accounting fraud, the detrimental effect of control-ownership wedge 
may be curbed when combined with the ownership concentration that is a common 
feature of typical business groups. In contrast to other earnings management strategies 
conducted mainly within GAAP, accounting fraud incurs additional economic and 
legal costs to controlling shareholders (see also Karpoff et al. 2008b). Moreover, their 
concentrated ownership amplifies the costs because it inevitably entails a significant 
portion of cash flow rights (see Khanna and Rivkin 2001; Almeida et al. 2015; KFTC 
2015). In fact, controlling shareholders in my samples hold 79.9-80.1 percent of their 
voting rights as cash flow rights. Due to these increased costs, business groups, on 
average, are less likely to commit accounting fraud than non-business group affiliated 
firms.  
On the other hand, excessive levels of ownership concentration are known in fact 
to deteriorate firms’ financial reporting quality because controlling shareholders may 
be entrenched by their controlling power over firms (Wang 2006a), resulting in a non-
monotonic effect of business group affiliation on firms’ accounting fraud decisions. I 
thus hypothesise that firms affiliated with business groups are likely to show differing 
misreporting behaviours at different ownership concentration levels of controlling 
shareholders as below.
H2. Business group affiliation is negatively (positively) associated with firms’ 
accounting fraud propensity at the lower (higher) level of ownership 
concentration of controlling shareholders.
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4.2.4. Chaebol affiliation 
Large business groups in Korea are under more scrutiny by the government as it 
additionally imposes a set of stringent regulations that make controlling shareholders’ 
expropriation more costly. Once designated, chaebols are put under tighter monitoring 
by the public and the government, resulting in controlling shareholders’ higher costs 
of expropriation. The increased costs would then curb the detrimental effect of their 
control-ownership wedge. Therefore, I further hypothesise that firms affiliated with 
chaebols are less likely to commit accounting fraud than non-chaebol affiliated firms.  
H3. Chaebol affiliation is negatively associated with firms’ accounting fraud 
propensity.
4.2.5. Expropriating activities 
According to the expropriation hypothesis, controlling shareholders’ control-
ownership wedge would affect the strength of the relation between controlling 
shareholders’ expropriating activities and accounting fraud propensity. To test this, I 
adopt three readily testable expropriating mechanisms.  
First, controlling shareholders with deep control-ownership wedge are more likely 
to be involved in RPTs. For example, they can benefit by transferring their affiliated 
firms’ resources to the firms where they have more cash flow rights (see Kang et al. 
2014). Second, firms with a higher level of control-ownership wedge are likely to pay 
more dividend to outside shareholders to offset their concerns about the opportunistic 
nature of their ownership structure (Faccio et al. 2001). Since excessive RPTs 
conducted at lower than market prices and dividend pay-outs exceeding firms’ 
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capacity cause economic distortions in firms, they are more likely to misreport to 
conceal those inefficiencies (see Appendix 4.A).  
Finally, firms with a high level of leverage and control-ownership wedge are more 
likely to commit accounting fraud. Since highly leveraged firms may have higher 
chances of violating debt covenants (see Dechow et al. 1996), controlling shareholders 
may influence firms’ misreporting decisions, for instance, to avoid losses from firms’ 
bankruptcy declaration. 
H4. Controlling shareholders’ control-ownership wedge positively moderates 
the relation between their expropriating activities and firms’ accounting fraud 
propensity. 
4.3. Data and research design 
4.3.1. Sample selection  
The sample selection process is summarised in Table 4.1. The base sample is chosen 
from the KIS-Value database, which is equivalent to Compustat in the U.S. The base 
sample begins in 1998 because the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), which is 
equivalent to the SEC in the U.S., started providing audited financial statements 
electronically in that year. The resulting sample consists of 113,498 firm-years from 
1998 to 2014, after excluding financial institutions and firms without sufficient data 
for matching samples. I manually construct the control-ownership wedge variable 
using the open data provided by the FSS.  
To synchronise the sample window, I collect data for 405 accounting fraud firms 
whose first fraud year also falls between 1998 and 2014. Similar to the SEC in the 
U.S., the FSS releases its enforcement actions regarding egregious financial 
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misreporting cases. Due to resources constraints, however, inevitably the FSS 
investigates and sanctions only a proportion of misreporting cases, even when firms 
voluntarily restate their financial statements. Therefore, the accounting fraud cases 
analysed in this chapter do not include misreporting cases that are likely to be due to 
simple error or minor misreporting cases from the FSS’s perspective. Due to data 
unavailability, I do not analyse restatement cases that are not included in FSS’s 
database (i.e., Korean AAERs).  The sample ends in 2014 in order for the FSS to have 
had sufficient time to finish their investigation. The fraud firms are then merged with 
the base sample after eliminating financial firms and firms without sufficient data for 
matching, leaving 235 fraud firms. The loss of fraud firms with missing data is largely 
either because firms do not disclose their lists of shareholders or because their ultimate 
owners are funds, banks or the government, in which cases these ultimate owners are 
not expected to have an impact on firms’ accounting fraud decisions.
Descriptive statistics of the total KIS-Value observations and accounting fraud firms 
are reported in Table 4.2, along with p-values of t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) 
tests. t-tests and WRS results in Columns (1) and (2) reveal that fraud firms are larger 
in asset size and more likely to be listed on major stock markets than the average KIS-
Value observations. Furthermore, the performance (ROA) of fraud firms is poorer in 
the year before the first fraud year. These characteristics are potential confounders for 
both the incidence of accounting fraud and firms’ ownership structure.  
In order to address this potential endogeneity issue, I adopt three strategies. To begin 
with, I employ propensity score matching, which increases the average covariate 
balance of my sample firms by identifying matches whose average characteristics 
(propensity scores) are most similar. However, the balanced propensity score does not 
guarantee that each covariate of sample firms is also balanced (see King and Nielsen 
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2016). As a complementing matching method, I thus adopt a conventional partial 
matching method, which focuses more on key variables that may cause endogeneity 
issues (see Dechow et al. 1996). I expect that the potential confounding bias inherent 
in observational studies (see Rosenbaum 2002) may be mitigated through these two 
matching processes. Finally, to address the remaining bias, I control again for major 
covariates, including the variables used in the matching processes, in my accounting 
fraud model to be presented in the following subsection. The total sample size as a 
result of the matching processes ranges between 433 and 465 firms. 
4.3.2. Generalized propensity-score matching (GPSM) 
Generalized propensity-score matching (GPSM) proposed by Hirano and Imbens 
(2004) expands the conventional propensity-score matching (PSM) to continuous 
treatment cases like the variation of control-ownership wedge as in this study. The 
generalized propensity-score (gpscore), which is the probability of treatment given 
confounders, is estimated using both a treatment model (Eq. (4.1)) and a gpscore
model (Eq. (4.2)). First, the treatment model is estimated using the OLS regression 
presented below. Even though it may be more appropriate to have adopted control-
ownership wedge as the dependent variable of the treatment model, the largest 
immediate owners’ ownership concentration (Immediate voting rights79) is used as an 
alternative because it is the only ownership variable available currently on the KIS-
Value database. However, as seems plausible, both Immediate voting rights and Wedge 
79 The largest immediate owner is the largest stockholder among shareholders who directly own the 
stocks of a firm (see e.g., Chen et al. 2006). Differently from the largest ultimate owner, who is always 
an individual, the largest immediate owner may be either an individual or an institution. However, their 
ownership concentrations are highly correlated (ρ = 0.895-0.900, p-value = 0.000). 
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ratio may have common determinants in that they are fundamentally similar types of 
ownership variables.     
Ln(Immediate voting rights)t = β0 + β1ROAt-1 + β2Leveraget-1 + β3Working Capitalt-1
            + β4Markett-1 + β5Ln(Assets)t-1 + β6Ln(Firm age)t-1 + εt ............... (4.1) 
I select the determinants of Immediate voting rights so that confounding bias is 
mitigated. The selected covariates are potential confounders that may affect both the 
ownership structure of controlling shareholders and firms’ accounting fraud decisions. 
For example, ROA, Leverage, and Working capital are major financial ratios that may 
affect firms’ fraudulent misreporting and, simultaneously, shareholders’ investment 
decisions. Additionally, a firm’s age increases the chances that the ownership structure 
is more diffuse since the greater the firm’s age (Ln(Firm age)), the more shareholders 
could have traded their stocks in markets (see Beneish 1999). According to 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), stock market (Market) and firm size (Ln(Assets)) also affect 
firms’ ownership structure since public and larger firms usually have more diffuse 
ownership structures than small non-listed firms do. Consistent with my predictions, 
the estimation of Eq. (4.1) reported in Table 4.3 confirms that all covariates are 
significantly associated with Immediate voting rights.  
Second, the estimation of the treatment model is then used to calculate gpscore, 
which is the probability of having a higher level of ownership concentration (Eq. (4.2)). 
Following prior literature (e.g., Kluve et al. 2012), I adopt the probability density 
function of the normal distribution as a gpscore model as below (see also Hirano and 
Imbens 2004). 
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    =  1
√2    exp (− 12       −      ) 
 .................................................................................... (4.2) 
 where, 
   = the level of Immediate voting rights between 0 and 1;
    and σ = the estimations from the treatment model in Eq. (4.1).  
Finally, I identify a non-fraud match for each fraud firm using the gpscore calculated 
above. To find matches whose gpscores are most similar but the level of actual 
ownership concentration is most dissimilar, I use the distance measure (Eq. (4.3)) 
proposed by Armstrong et al. (2010). I choose matched pairs based on the closest 
distance criteria and on a without-replacement basis, from firms in the same year and 
industry (two-digit SIC) as of the beginning of the first fraud year.  
         ,  =  (         −          ) (     −      ) 
 ........................................................................................ (4.3)  
where, 
gpscorei,j = the generalized propensity-score for firm i and j calculated 
using Eq. (4.1) and (4.2);
IVRi,j = Immediate voting rights for firm i and j respectively;
IVRi ≠ IVRj. 
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4.3.3. Partial matching 
To complement GPSM, I further construct an alternative sample using more 
conventional partial matching (PM). Instead of focusing on the average covariate 
balance of fraud and non-fraud firms summarised as gpscore, PM aims at balancing 
several key variables selected based on the nature of the research focus. Due to the 
advantage of balancing key variables almost perfectly, a large body of research 
exploring determinants of accounting fraud in the U.S. setting has adopted the PM 
method using various matching criteria (see Schrand and Zechman 2012). Following 
Feng et al. (2011), I identify matched pairs whose asset sizes are most similar among 
firms in the same year and industry as of the beginning of the first fraud year. 
4.3.4. Covariate balance 
Table 4.4 reports the covariate balance between fraud and non-fraud firms identified 
by the two complementary matching processes explained above. Despite the strict 
matching requirements of this study (i.e. the same industry requirement), the p-values 
for a parametric t-test of the differences in means and two non-parametric WRS and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests for the differences in medians and distributions 
respectively indicate that the identified matches are well balanced in terms of both 
gpscore and respective covariates. As seen in Table 4.4, the gpscores of the GPSM 
sample are not statistically different (p-values: 0.883-0.986), and the matched rates (% 
Matched) of t-test and the results of WRS and KS tests range between 50 percent and 
83 percent in both the GPSM and PM samples. 
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4.3.5. Accounting fraud model 
Due to the dichotomous nature of fraud and non-fraud matches, I estimate the effects 
of control-ownership wedge, firms’ affiliation with business groups, and their 
association with chaebols on firms’ accounting fraud decisions using the following 
probit regression model (Eq. (4.4)). Consistent with prior research exploring 
accounting fraud in the U.S. context (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Davidson et al. 2015), 
I adopt accounting fraud allegations filed by the FSS after a lengthy investigation 
process as a proxy for accounting fraud. 
To test my hypotheses, I adopt three main variables of interest. To begin, Wedge 
ratio is considered as a proxy for control-ownership wedge. This variable captures the 
controlling shareholders’ decision-making process, which is expected to be influenced 
by the relative size of benefits to costs of their expropriating activities. In line with 
prior research (e.g., Claessens et al. 2000), it is defined as control-ownership wedge 
over total voting rights. Following La Porta et al. (1999), Fan and Wong (2002), Haw 
et al. (2004), and Lin et al. (2011), I identify controlling shareholders and their control-
ownership wedge by tracing the largest ultimate shareholder of each firm, from the 
lowest to the highest firm along the ownership chain of each business group (see 
Figure 4.1 of Appendix 4.A.)80.  
  Following Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio et al. (2001), Business group (X%) is 
defined as a group of firms with both control-ownership wedge and controlling 
shareholders with more than X% of shares. X% ranges between 10 percent and 70 
80 Controlling shareholders’ total voting rights (Voting rights), i.e., the denominator of Wedge ratio, is 
calculated using the final link method, which assumes that controlling shareholders exercise voting 
rights equalling the sum of the direct ownership of a controlling shareholder and its affiliate on each 
ownership chain (see Ryu and Yoo 2011). This is consistent with KFTC regulation. 
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percent of stock ownership. Regulation is an indicator variable equal to one for firms 
which are designated as chaebol affiliated firms by the KFTC81.  
Additionally, I incorporate four categories of control variables. First, potential 
expropriation is controlling shareholders’ key incentive to influence firms’ accounting 
fraud decisions. To control for the effects of expropriation and to test the expropriation 
hypotheses empirically, I adopt three representative expropriation variables, i.e., RPTs, 
Dividend, and Leverage. Second, controlling power over firms may provide 
controlling shareholders with the means to influence firms’ misreporting decisions. To 
control for these potential effects, I adopt three variables. As with the duality of CEO 
and Chairman in the U.S. setting, controlling shareholders who are also CEO of their 
firms (Largest=CEO) may exert more power over the board of directors and, thus, 
increase the probability of accounting fraud. On the other hand, Outside directors and
BigN auditor are expected to curb the incidence of accounting fraud from inside and 
outside of firms respectively. Finally, to mitigate the remaining omitted variable bias, 
I control for major financial ratios and other variables (such as ROA, Ln(Assets), 
Working capital) suggested in prior research (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996).
Pr(Accounting fraudt) = α0 + α1Wedge ratio (or Business group (X%))t-1
+ α2Regulationt-1 + α3RPTst-1 + α4Dividendt-1 + α5Leveraget-1
+ α6ROAt-1 + α7Ln(Assetst-1) + α8Working Capitalt-1  
+ α9Largest=CEO t-1 + α10Outside directorst-1  
+ α11BigN auditort-1 + α12Stock markett-1 + α13Ln(Firm age)t-1  
+ α14Government bankt-1 + ∑αYear dummy + εt .................. (4.4)
81 To avoid potential multicollinearity among ownership variables, I introduce Business group (X%) and 
Wedge ratio separately in my estimation of Eq. (4.4). On the other hand, I include Regulation in all 
specifications of accounting fraud model because different levels of regulation may cause endogeneity 
of Wedge ratio and Business group (X%).  
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4.3.6. Difference-in-difference (DID) analysis
Cross-sectional probit regression analyses may not be sufficient to test H3. First, I 
have so far matched my main samples based on the controlling shareholders’ 
probability of having similar levels of ownership concentration. However, to directly 
test the effect of chaebol affiliation, I should match them based on the probability of 
chaebol designation. Second, a simple regression model does not fully capture the 
dynamic impact of government regulation on firms’ accounting fraud decisions around 
the timing of chaebol designation. Therefore, I further adopt a DID design and a newly 
matched sample.  
To use a DID design, two assumptions must be satisfied. First, the designation of 
chaebol by the KFTC must be exogenous (see Lechner 2011). To meet this condition, 
I match chaebol and non-chaebol firms using the PSM of Eq. (4.5) incorporating two 
formal screening criteria for chaebol designation adopted by the KFTC82. Matched 
pairs are selected from firms in the same year. Second, the trends of accounting fraud 
frequency before the designation of chaebol must be parallel (see Abadie 2005). 
Figure 4.1 graphically shows that both chaebol and non-chaebol firms in the PSM 
sample have increasing trends of fraud frequencies one year before the chaebol
designation, implying that their fraud frequencies would have been similar in the 
absence of the KFTC regulation. However, the assumption is not perfectly fulfilled 
over the one-year window. To test the sensitivity of DID analyses to different year 
82 To designate chaebols, the KFTC considers controlling shareholders’ ownership concentration (30 
percent) and group assets size ($4.2 billion). As with in GPSM, I adopt Immediate voting rights as a 
proxy for ownership structure. For group asset size, I use each firm’s total assets as a substitute measure, 
because group asset size is not readily available for all firms on KIS-Value. Moreover, even if it were 
available, it is not suitable for identifying matches of individual firms with similar asset sizes. I 
construct a PSM sample without replacement and using a nearest neighbour method.  
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windows, I thus conduct the analyses over four different time periods, i.e., one to three 
years before and after chaebol designation, and the whole sample period (see Chang 
et al. 2016). 
Pr(Chaebol designationt) = β0 + β1Immediate voting rightst-1 + β2Ln(Assetst-1) + εt  
(4.5) 
Panel A of Table 4.5 summarises the sample selection process and its resulting 
covariate balance of chaebol and non-chaebol firms. From the base sample of KIS-
Value in Table 4.1, I first select 261 distinct chaebol firms with sufficient data for PSM 
for the fiscal years 1998-2014. For each chaebol affiliated firm, I then identify one 
non-chaebol match wherever possible, resulting in 509 firm observations, or 5,414 
firm-year observations.  
Reports on covariate balance in Panel B of Table 4.5 further affirm that the 
covariates of the matched sample are ideally balanced, supporting the assumption that 
government regulation is exogenous in these matched samples. The pscores of the 
PSM sample are not statistically different (p-values: 0.226) and each covariate is also 
well randomised (p-values: 0.165-0.600).  
Using the matched sample, I then estimate the following probit regression model in 
Eq. (4.6). To construct DID specifications, I re-define Regulation. While in Eq. (4.4) 
it was an indicator variable equal to one for the specific firm years when firms are 
affiliated with chaebols, it now represents all firm years of firms that are designated 
as chaebol at least once during the whole sample window. Conversely, it is zero for all
firm years of firms that are never designated as chaebol during the sample period. Post
is set to one for the firm years since firms were designated as chaebol, and zero 
otherwise. For non-chaebol firms, it is equal to one for firm years since they are 
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matched with chaebol firms, and zero otherwise. Therefore, the coefficient for 
Regulation × Post (γ3) captures the effect of chaebol designation on accounting fraud 
propensity for chaebol firms relative to non-chaebol firms. Wedge ratio and several 
control variables such as Largest= CEO and Outside directors are not included in Eq. 
(4.6) because they should be manually collected for large samples. However, to control 
for firms’ ownership structure, I incorporate Immediate voting rights instead of Wedge 
ratio (see also Himmelberg et al. 1999). The inclusion of Immediate voting rights, 
however, does not alter my findings.     
Pr(Accounting fraudt) = γ0 + γ1Regulation + γ2Postt + γ3Regulation × Postt
+ γ4Immediate voting rights + γ5Immediate voting rightst2
+ γ6Dividendt + γ7Leveraget + γ8ROAt + γ9Ln(Assetst) 
+ γ10Working Capitalt + γ11BigN auditort
+ γ12Ln(Firm age) + γ13Government bankt  
+ ∑γYear dummy + ∑γIndustry dummy + εt ..................................... (4.6) 
4.4. Main findings 
4.4.1. Pairwise correlation analysis 
Table 4.6 reports the results of pairwise correlation analyses between ownership 
variables and accounting fraud. The results show that Accounting fraud is positively 
correlated with Wedge ratio. However, Accounting fraud has some non-monotonic 
associations with Business group (X%) depending on the levels of controlling 
shareholders’ ownership concentration and on negative relations with Regulation.  
The initial analysis results of Wedge ratio are consistent with those of prior literature 
adopting discretionary accruals as a proxy for firms’ financial reporting quality (e.g., 
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Kim and Yi 2006). However, the results of Business group (%) and Regulation are 
heterogeneous from those studies, implying that GAAP violations may have different 
implications in the context of controlling shareholders’ ownership structure. 
4.4.2. Control-ownership wedge and accounting fraud  
Table 4.7 reports the estimates of Eq. (4.4) regarding the relation between Wedge ratio
and accounting fraud. Columns (1)-(6) show that Wedge ratio has positive and 
significant associations with accounting fraud propensity. These findings support H1. 
The results are robust regarding alternative matching methods (i.e., GPSM and PM), 
and the inclusion of additional controls such as government regulation (Regulation), 
controlling shareholders’ expropriating activities (RPTs, Dividend, and Leverage), and 
firms’ corporate governance (e.g., Outside directors) and financing opportunities 
(Government bank). 
Due to the matching algorithms, control variables are statistically significant only 
excepting that (1) the matching processes are not perfect, (2) some covariates are not 
included in the treatment model (Eq. (4.1)), or (3) there are hidden effects that 
multivariate analyses may cause. In fact, ROA and Stock market, which are not 
balanced even after applying two matching algorithms, show negative and positive 
associations with accounting fraud propensity respectively. On the other hand, BigN 
auditor, which is not included in the treatment model since it is not expected to 
influence the ownership structure of controlling shareholders, is negatively associated 
with accounting fraud propensity, suggesting that major auditors may have a deterring 
effect on the incidences of accounting fraud.  
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4.4.3. Business group affiliation and accounting fraud  
Columns (1)-(8) in Table 4.8 further reveal that, in contrast to the effect of Wedge ratio, 
Business group (X%) largely does not have statistically significant associations with 
accounting fraud at most of the ownership levels. This implies that the detrimental 
effect of Wedge ratio is mitigated by controlling shareholders’ ownership 
concentration. A negative and significant association is observed only at extremely 
high levels of ownership - over approximately 70 percent (Columns (3) and (4)) - 
suggesting a non-monotonic effect of ownership concentration. These findings support 
H2. 
Table 4.9 provides a likely explanation for the non-monotonic effect by showing 
where the mitigating effect originates from. First, Columns (1) and (2) reveal that the 
ownership concentration of controlling shareholders has a non-linear association with 
accounting fraud propensity, whose inflection points range between 63.1 percent and 
68.0 percent. This implies that ownership concentration mitigates the detrimental 
effect of Wedge ratio below the critical points from where controlling shareholders 
may be entrenched by their concentrated ownership (see Morck et al. 1988).  
Second, Columns (3) and (4) further show that the non-monotonic effect is mainly 
characteristic of the cash component of voting rights (Cash flow rights (%)). 
Specifically, Cash flow rights (%) is negatively associated with accounting fraud 
propensity for most of the ownership ranges (0-81.1 percent), whereas Wedge (%) does 
not have such an effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that firms affiliated 
with business groups are not more likely to commit accounting fraud than non-
business group affiliated firms, because controlling shareholders’ ownership 
concentration backed by their own cash investment may curb the detrimental effect of 
control-ownership wedge in the context of accounting fraud.  
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4.4.4. Chaebol affiliation and accounting fraud  
To test the additional effects of government regulation, I further estimate both a simple 
probit regression (Eq. (4.4)) and a DID model (Eq. (4.6)). DID analyses provide more 
direct evidence for the role of government regulation in curbing financial misreporting 
by adopting the designation of chaebol affiliation as an exogeneous event. First, 
Columns (1)-(4) in Table 4.7 and Columns (3)-(4) in Table 4.8 show that Regulation
largely has negative and significant associations with accounting fraud propensity, 
supporting H3. Even though the statistical significance of these associations is not as 
strong as those of Wedge ratio and its statistical significance even disappears in 
alternative samples (Columns (5)-(6) in Table 4.7) and specifications of ownership 
variables (Table 4.8), the consistently negative coefficients of Regulation imply that 
the detrimental effect of control-ownership wedge may be at least marginally 
mitigated by the government regulation imposed on chaebol affiliated firms.  
Second, additional DID analyses further affirm H3. Columns (1)-(8) in Table 4.10 
consistently report that the coefficients of Regulation × Post are negative and highly 
significant, implying that, relative to non-chaebol firms, chaebol firms experience a 
drop in accounting fraud frequency after they are designated as chaebol. On the other 
hand, chaebol affiliated firms are more likely to commit accounting fraud than non-
chaebol affiliated firms before the chaebol designation (coefficients of Regulation: 
positive), implying that the financial reporting quality of chaebol firms was originally 
poorer than non-chaebol firms. The accounting fraud propensity of non-chaebol firms 
is increasing through the sample periods (coefficients of Post: positive), suggesting 
that the accounting fraud frequencies of chaebol affiliated firms would have increased 
even in the absence of the KFTC regulations. In particular, Columns (1)-(6) report the 
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focused estimation results of Eq. (4.6) using narrower windows of sample periods: one 
to three years before and after chaebol designation (see also Chang et al. 2016). These 
analyses capture the more immediate effect of chaebol designation on firms’ 
accounting fraud propensity during the time period in which the parallel assumption 
is more likely to hold.  
4.4.5. Expropriation mechanisms 
I finally test the expropriation hypothesis by adopting three potential expropriating 
activities of controlling shareholders. First, Columns (1) and (4) in Table 4.11 show 
some evidence that RPTs and Dividend are, indeed, positively associated with 
accounting fraud propensity when Wedge ratio is higher. The main effects of 
expropriations, when their interaction terms are controlled for separately, are not 
statistically significant (Columns (1) and (3)) or instead show a negative effect 
(Columns (2) and (4)), implying that these expropriation mechanisms alone may not 
cause accounting fraud incidences. The main effect of Dividend, in particular, is 
negatively associated with accounting fraud propensity because fraud firms usually do 
not have a consistent ability to pay dividend (Caskey and Hanlon 2013), but 
controlling shareholders with high levels of control-ownership wedge have an 
incentive to pay more dividend to offset the concerns of outside shareholders over their 
opportunistic ownership structure.  
Second, Columns (5) and (6) further show that Leverage is also positively 
associated with accounting fraud propensity when Wedge ratio is higher. Additionally, 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.9 provide evidence on controlling shareholders’ 
potential incentive to directly benefit from their stock holdings. These findings, 
together, support the expropriation hypothesis (H4).  
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4.5. Additional analyses 
4.5.1. Political connectedness 
An alternative explanation for the distinct effects of business groups and chaebols
from those of control-ownership wedge is that the effects may be driven by the 
political influence of large business groups. To rule out such an alternative, I conduct 
two additional analyses. The long history of government-driven economic growth in 
Korea implies that business and government elites may be connected with each other 
and that these connections may hinder the incidence and detection of accounting fraud, 
not only by providing favourable financing opportunities to firms but also by 
influencing the auditing or investigation processes of disputed misreporting cases.  
The distinction between business groups and chaebols, however, provides an ideal 
setting to identify a unique mechanism through which large business groups react to 
government regulation, by enabling the adoption of a DID analysis around chaebol
designations. In particular, the analysis results of the immediate effect (one to two 
years after chaebol designation) of government regulation suggest that the lower levels 
of accounting fraud propensity of chaebol affiliated firms may not be driven by their 
political influence (Columns (1)-(2) in Table 4.10). It is not conceivable that firms’ 
political influence has changed drastically for the short period of time around chaebol
designations.   
Additionally, I control for two variables that represent the potentially political 
influence of business groups and chaebols. To begin, the main results presented in 
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 already included Government Bank, which is an indicator 
variable set to one if a firm’s main creditor bank is owned by the government (Byun 
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et al. 2013). The effects of Business group (X%) and Regulation were robust regarding 
the inclusion of this variable, implying that favourable funding opportunities may not 
be a seriously confounding factor. Furthermore, I estimate the sensitivity of Eq. (4.4) 
to the inclusion of a more direct proxy for firms’ political connectedness with the 
government, i.e., Political connectedness. It is an indicator variable set to one if any 
executive or director of a firm is a former member of parliament (MP) or minister 
(Byun et al. 2013)83. Columns (1)-(4) in Table 4.12 confirm that the effects of Business 
group (X%) and Regulation on accounting fraud also do not change even after 
controlling for this additional political connectedness variable. These tests suggest that 
business groups and chaebols’ potentially political influence does not seriously 
undermine my argument.    
4.5.2. Managerial influence 
Alternatively, the detrimental effect of control-ownership wedge or ownership 
concentration may be driven by controlling shareholders’ duality in key management 
positions like CEO. However, as widely accepted by prior research and even by the 
KFTC, I assumed that controlling shareholders are able to influence firms’ 
misreporting decisions even without holding CEO positions. To test this assumption, 
I provide two further analyses. 
First, Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 report that Largest=CEO does not have any significant 
association with accounting fraud propensity or rather decreases it depending on 
83 Since non-listed and some listed high-tech firms are not required to disclose the members of their 
board of directors, I plausibly assume that these firms do not have political connectedness with the 
government. Compared to listed firms, non-listed firms in Korea are usually smaller in asset size and 
younger in firm ages, and, thus, they may not have sufficient ability to recruit ex politicians and high-
ranking government officials. To avoid arbitrariness, I adopt Political connectedness only in this 
additional analysis. 
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model specifications and sampling methods (Columns (2) and (5)-(8) in Table 4.8). 
This finding implies that controlling shareholders may not intentionally hold CEO 
positions for accounting fraud purposes. In fact, the duality mechanism is not so 
popular in Korea84. Conversely, it is known that controlling shareholders of chaebols
are averse to holding CEO positions to avoid potential legal liabilities, and prefer 
unofficial influence “from outside the boardroom” (see Seo 2016).  
Second, Table 4.13 further reveals that, differently from controlling shareholders’ 
ownership concentration, CEO ownership (CEO ownership) mainly has a negative and 
significant association with accounting fraud propensity, and non-linear effects on 
accounting fraud propensity influenced by CEOs do not exist or they are weaker if 
present. These findings imply that CEO ownership in Korean firms tends to improve 
firms’ financial reporting quality. Taken together, the detrimental effect of controlling 
shareholders’ ownership structure on firms’ reporting decisions may not be critically 
influenced by their managerial influence as a CEO.  
4.5.3. Outside blockholders 
I finally test whether the impacts of three ownership variables are confounded by the 
existence of outside blockholders (Outside blockholder). Blockholders other than the 
largest controlling shareholders may exert their influence on firms’ accounting fraud 
decisions by increasing governance levels (“voice”) or by selling shares when firms 
are not reliable (“exit”) (Edmans 2014). To test this potential effect, I additionally 
incorporate Outside blockholder into Eq. (4.4) and find that Outside blockholder is 
indeed negatively associated with accounting fraud despite being insignificant. 
84 In my sample, 49.4 percent of fraud firms have the same controlling shareholders and CEOs, whereas 
61.7-62.0 percent of non-fraud firms have this duality.  
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However, I report that my findings are not susceptible to the ownership levels of 
blockholders (Columns (1)-(6) in Table 4.14), affirming my main argument.  
4.6. Robustness checks 
4.6.1. Family ownership 
I have so far analysed individual controlling shareholders’ control-ownership wedge 
and ownership concentration because, in Korea, non-listed firms and some listed high-
tech firms are not required to disclose the family ownership of their controlling 
shareholders to the public. However, family owners potentially vote together with 
controlling shareholders, and controlling shareholders may hold their own shares 
under their family names. To address this potential bias, I construct a reasonable proxy 
for the family ownership variable85 and show that the results do not change even after 
I include family ownership in the existing ownership structure variables (Table 4.15). 
4.6.2. The final or weakest link method 
I also test whether the findings are robust regarding an alternative calculation method 
of the wedge ratio variable. Following La Porta et al. (2002) and the regulation of the 
KFTC, I assumed that controlling shareholders can exercise their voting rights up to 
the final link on their ownership chains in addition to their direct cash flow rights (i.e., 
the final link method). However, other studies have alternatively assumed that 
85 First, actual family ownership data are collected for most listed firms. Second, if family relationship 
is identified by news articles, obituaries and footnotes of other disclosed financial statements, then the 
family ownership variable is constructed by matching the identified family names with their disclosed 
ownership data. Third, the family ownership variable is also constructed if both the first and last names 
of shareholders are the same, because Koreans have that tradition when naming brothers and sisters. 
Using these data, I test whether my findings are susceptible to the inclusion of family ownership into 
Wedge ratio, Business group (X%), and Regulation respectively. To avoid arbitrariness, however, 
Family ownership is used only in this additional analysis. Moreover, to economise the data collection 
process, I do not conduct DID analyses again, after including family ownership. 
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controlling shareholders’ voting rights may be limited to the weakest link on their 
ownership chains - the weakest link method (e.g., Claessens and Fan 2002). To check 
the sensitivity of the findings to these alternatives, I estimate Eq. (4.4) by substituting 
Wedge ratio with Wedge ratio (weakest). 
Despite the different assumptions on the size of voting rights that controlling 
shareholders may exercise, Table 4.16 confirms that my analysis results do not alter 
even when I adopt Wedge ratio (weakest) as a proxy for controlling shareholders’ 
control-ownership wedge.  
4.6.3. Direct or indirect ownership through affiliated firms 
I further test the validity of Wedge ratio (alternatively, Cash flow rights ratio) as my 
main explanatory variable. My construction of this variable relies on the assumption 
that controlling shareholders’ impact on firms’ misreporting decisions is determined 
by the cash and non-cash components of voting rights. A rationale for this assumption 
is that controlling shareholders ultimately incur costs from their cash investment in 
firms. However, the direct and indirect portions of cash flow rights may also have 
distinct effects on firms’ misreporting decisions as Wedge ratio, which is all indirect 
ownership, does. To test this potential effect, I estimate Eq. (4.4) after decomposing 
Cash flow rights ratio into direct and indirect components. 
Analysis results reveal that both Direct cash flow rights ratio and Indirect cash flow 
rights ratio congruently have negative and significant associations with accounting 
fraud propensity (Table 4.17). This finding implies that the immediacy of ownership 
(direct or indirect) does not matter, critically, so long as controlling shareholders have 
invested their own cash flows in their firms.  
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4.6.4. Multicollinearity 
To avoid potential multicollinearity among ownership variables in that shareholders 
with control-ownership wedge usually hold concentrated ownership, I did not include 
Voting rights in Eq. (4.4). The selection of ownership variables in prior literature is not 
consistent. While Haw et al. (2004) and Kim and Yi (2006) do not control for 
ownership concentration, Fan and Wong (2002) and Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) 
include both control-ownership wedge and ownership concentration in their empirical 
models, presumably to isolate the effect of their main variable of interest. Additional 
analysis results affirm that the findings are largely robust regarding the inclusion of 
Voting rights in Eq. (4.4) (Table 4.18).  
4.6.5. Partial observability 
Finally, I test whether the findings are also robust regarding potentially undetected 
fraud cases by the FSS. Since we cannot consider all misreporting firms from Korean 
AAERs (see Poirier 1980), it is meaningful that this type of study tests the robustness 
of their findings regarding the partial observability bias. Following Chen et al. (2006), 
Wang (2013), and Khanna et al. (2015), I adopt the bivariate probit model, which 
adjusts the coefficients of a fraud commitment model by combining it with a fraud 
detection model. In addition to the accounting fraud model of reporting firms 
presented in Eq. (4.4), I construct a simple fraud detection model for the FSS by 
removing benefits from accounting fraud (e.g., Wedge and ROA) (see Wang 2013), 
which are the main motivations for accounting fraud. On the other hand, I incorporate 
Audit opinion as a unique variable for the detection model, because it could trigger 
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investigation by the FSS. The bivariate regression estimates consistently affirm that 
my results are not susceptible to potential partial observability bias (Table 4.19)86.  
4.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I test the extent to which the potentially detrimental effect of control-
ownership wedge interacts with controlling shareholders’ ownership concentration 
and the additional imposition of government regulation, particularly in the context of 
accounting fraud. Using matched samples of Korean firms, I find that control-
ownership wedge is positively associated with accounting fraud propensity, but 
business groups and chaebols are not: firms’ affiliation with chaebols is, in fact, 
negatively associated with accounting fraud propensity. These are novel findings 
suggesting that business groups and chaebols, which have long been considered as 
aggressive earnings manipulators, do not seriously cross into accounting fraud 
commitment.  
As with most research of this type, the findings should be interpreted with some 
caveats. First, this research relies on the assumption that controlling shareholders 
could influence firms’ accounting fraud decisions even without holding key 
management positions. However, this assumption is widely accepted by prior cross-
country studies (e.g., Fan and Wong 2002), the media (e.g., Evans 2016) and the KFTC 
in the institutional context of Korea. I further empirically demonstrate the mechanism 
through which controlling shareholders affect firms’ accounting fraud decisions (e.g., 
86 Due to frequent convergence failures of the bivariate probit model, I conduct this analysis only for 
this robustness check. For the convergence issue of maximum likelihood methods, see Agresti and 
Kateri (2011). 
224
RPTs) and, conversely, I do not find strong evidence that the detrimental effect of 
control-ownership wedge is associated with managerial opportunism. Second, I also 
assume that expropriation by controlling shareholders is controlled for in my 
accounting fraud model by incorporating RPTs, Dividend, and Leverage. However, 
potential expropriating activities cannot be limited to these three mechanisms. Despite 
this limitation, I believe that the inclusion of RPTs in the model may reduce the 
potential endogeneity issue, because RPTs are the main expropriating mechanism that 
the expropriation hypothesis suggests.  
With these caveats in mind, my study suggests that the detrimental effect of control-
ownership wedge is countered by the cost factors inherent in an accounting fraud 
context. In particular, my findings validate the role of government regulation in 
curbing firms’ fraudulent misreporting and provide valuable insights into the enduring 
popularity of large business groups as investment targets, despite the long-held 
concerns over their aggressiveness in earnings management.  
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Figure 4.1   Parallel trend assumption 
This figure illustrates the univariate trends of fraud frequencies of both chaebol and non-chaebol firms. PSM stands 
for Propensity-Score Matching. X-axis represents the years relative to the year of chaebol designation by the KFTC, 
Y-axis shows mean fraud frequencies. 
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Table 4.1  Sample selection 
Sample selection Obs. Firms 
Original file of KIS-VALUE excluding financial firms (1998-2014) 
 Less: Observations without sufficient data  






Distinct fraud firms detected by the FSS (1993-2014) 
Less: Firms before 1998  
Distinct fraud firms detected by the FSS (1998-2014) 
Less: Financial firms  
 Less: Duplications 
 Less: Firms without sufficient data  











Non-fraud matches (1998-2014) 200-230 firms 
Total matched firms (1998-2014)  433-465 firms 
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Table 4.2  Descriptive statistics  
Total observation Fraud firms 
















ROA 113,498 0.049 0.038 234 -0.195 -0.005 0.000 0.000
Leverage 113,498 0.611 0.610 235 0.607 0.563 0.501 0.005
Working Capital 113,498 0.063 0.065 235 0.075 0.128 0.206 0.006
Ln(Assets) 113,498 24.284 23.975 235 24.583 24.336 0.000 0.000
Stock market 113,498 0.186 0.000 235 0.800 1.000 0.000 0.000
Ln(Firm age) 113,470 2.628 2.708 235 2.699 2.708 0.068 0.242
BigN auditor 112,975 0.314 0.000 235 0.264 0.000 0.041 0.041
Government bank 108,216 0.413 0.000 232 0.440 0.000 0.561 0.561
Regulation  113,498 0.059 0.000 235 0.038 0.000 0.305 0.305
Wedge ratio - - - 235 0.256 0.589 - -
Business group (70%) - - - 235 0.060 0.000 - -
RPTs - - - 235 0.634 0.032 - -
Dividend - - - 235 0.117 0.000 - -
This table reports descriptive statistics, including p-values for t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) tests of mean 
and median differences between total observations of KIS-Value and fraud firms. Variables are defined in 
Appendix 4.B. Wedge ratio, Business group (70%), RPTs, and Dividend do not have statistics for the total 
observations because they are manually collected only for matched firms.     
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Table 4.3  GPSM estimation using OLS regression 





Working Capital -0.011** 
(0.006) 









Adjusted R2 0.269 
This table reports the OLS estimation results between the Ln(Immediate voting 
rights) and potential confounders of both controlling shareholders’ ownership 
structure and accounting fraud. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels 
respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.4  Covariate balance  
Variables Panel A (GPSM) Panel B (PM) 




t-test WRS KS Fraud 
Non- 
Fraud 
t-test WRS KS 
ROA -0.197 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.195 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ln(Firm age) 2.711 2.606 0.124 0.114 0.194 2.699 2.649 0.483 0.843 0.380
Leverage 0.607 0.611 0.939 0.217 0.190 0.607 0.551 0.217 0.666 0.904
Working Capital 0.073 0.044 0.584 0.130 0.078 0.075 0.116 0.364 0.458 0.706
Stock market 0.798 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ln(Assets) 24.596 24.182 0.001 0.001 0.005 24.583 24.548 0.792 0.704 0.928
Year Matched Matched 
Industry Matched Matched 
% Matched (A) 63% 63% 50% 75% 75% 75%
% Matched (B) 83% 83% 67% 83% 83% 83%
gpscore 0.471 0.475 0.883 0.882 0.986 - - - - -
Wedge ratio 0.258 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.256 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.001
Business group (20%) 0.326 0.250 0.082 0.082 0.560 0.323 0.274 0.245 0.244 0.938
Business group (70%) 0.060 0.301 0.124 0.124 0.995 0.060 0.104 0.078 0.078 0.974
Regulation 0.039 0.050 0.566 0.565 1.000 0.038 0.073 0.095 0.095 0.999
Observations (Max.) 233 200 433 433 433 235 230 465 465 465
This table reports the covariates balance between the matched pairs. % Matched (A) is the number of balanced 
covariates divided by the total number of covariates. % Matched (B) is the number of balanced covariates divided 
by the total number of covariates excluding Market and Ln(Assets). gpscore stands for the Generalized Propensity-
Score. P-values are for t-tests, Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests. Variables are 
defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.5  Sample selection and covariate balance 
Panel A: Sample selection PSM
Distinct chaebol firms (1998-2014) 1,019
 Less: Firms without sufficient data  595
 Less: Firms that did not exist both before and after chaebol designation 332
Total matched firms (1998-2014) 509
Chaebol firms 261
Non-chaebol firms 248
Total firm-years (1998-2014) 5,414
Panel B: Covariate balance chaebol Non-chaebol p-value 
PSM   Mean t-test WRS KS
Immediate voting rights 0.468 0.493 0.342 0.600 0.597
Ln(Assets) 25.168 24.987 0.165 0.166 0.466
Pscore 0.121 0.105 0.226 0.289 0.758
Year  Matched 
This table reports the covariates balance between the matched pairs. PSM represents Propensity-Score Matching. 
pscore stands for the propensity-score. p-values are for t-tests, Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) tests. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.6  Pairwise correlation analysis  
Panel A (GPSM) Panel B (PM) 
               Accounting fraud 
Wedge ratio 0.198*** 0.176*** 
Business group (10%) 0.181*** 0.130*** 
Business group (40%) -0.072 -0.027 
Business group (70%) -0.074 -0.082* 
Regulation -0.028 -0.078* 
Observations (Max.) 433 465 
This table reports the pairwise correlation analyses results between ownership variables and accounting fraud. 
GPSM represents Generalized Propensity-Score Matching, while PM stands for partial matching. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 
4.B.
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Table 4.7  Probit estimation results using wedge ratio 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Matching GPSM GPSM GPSM PM PM PM 
Ownership structure 














































































































































































Observations 432 427 427 456 450 450
Log likelihood -201 -191 -191 -239 -229 -227
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Wedge ratio. Each column reports the 
test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents Generalized Propensity-Score Matching, while PM 
stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B. 
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Table 4.8  Probit estimation results using business group 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) 
Matching GPSM GPSM GPSM GPSM PM PM PM PM 




































































































































































































































































Observations 427 427 427 427 450 450 450 450
Log likelihood -193 -193 -192 -192 -233 -234 -236 -234
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Business group (%). Each column 
reports the test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents Generalized Propensity-Score Matching, 
while PM stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.9  Probit estimation results using voting rights and cash flow rights  
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Matching GPSM PM GPSM PM
Ownership structure 





































































































































Year dummy Yes & Matched Yes & Matched Yes & Matched Yes & Matched









Observations 427 450 427 450
Log likelihood -185 -231 -183 -222
Inflection point (Voting rights) 0.680 0.631
Inflection point (Cash flow rights) 0.811 0.683
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Voting rights. Each column reports 
the test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents Generalized Propensity-Score Matching, while 
PM stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B. 
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Table 4.10  DID analysis using regulation  
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 











































































































































Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

















Observations 556 113 1,466 371 2,037 485 4,720 1,307
Log likelihood -44 -23 -86 -34 -122 -47 -199 -88
This table reports the difference-in-difference estimation results between accounting fraud and Regulation, using 
the PSM sample. PSM represents Propensity-Score Matching. Overall effect represents the DID effects during the 
whole sample periods, while immediate effects are estimated using data one year/three years before and after 
chaebol designations. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. To facilitate the convergence of maximum likelihood 
estimations, a reduced industry dummy is adopted for these analyses. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.11  Interactive analysis of expropriation 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Matching GPSM PM GPSM PM GPSM PM 
Interaction RPTs RPTs Dividend Dividend Leverage Leverage 
Ownership structure 


















































































































































































































Observations 427 450 427 450 410 434
Log likelihood -190 -227 -190 -226 -176 -220
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Wedge ratio/Regulation using 
interaction terms. GPSM represents Generalized Propensity-Score Matching, while PM stands for partial matching. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.12  Probit estimation results using political connectedness 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Matching GPSM PM GPSM GPSM 
X% 30% 70% 
Ownership structure 





























































































































Year dummy Yes & Matched Yes & Matched Yes & Matched Yes & Matched









Observations 427 445 427 427
Log likelihood -191 -218 -193 -192
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Wedge ratio after controlling for 
Political connectedness. Each column reports the test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents 
Generalized Propensity-Score Matching, while PM stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B. 
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Table 4.13  Probit estimation results using CEO ownership 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Matching GPSM GPSM PM PM 
Ownership structure 

















































































































































Observations 479 479 497 497 
Log likelihood -211 -211 -234 -229 
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and CEO ownership. Each column 
reports the test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents Generalized Propensity-Score Matching, 
while PM stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B.   
239
Table 4.14  Probit estimation results after controlling for outside blockholder 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Matching GPSM GPSM GPSM GPSM GPSM GPSM 









































































































































































































Observations 432 427 427 427 427 427
Log likelihood -200 -190 -190 -193 -193 -191
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Wedge ratio / Business group (%). 
Each column reports the test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents Generalized Propensity-
Score Matching, while PM stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are defined in 
Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.15  Probit estimation results using family ownership 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Matching GPSM GPSM PM PM GPSM GPSM 
Family ownership Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
X% 30% 70% 
Ownership 
structure 




























































































































































































































Observations 386 386 411 411 386 386 
Log likelihood -166 -164 -196 -194 -167 -166 
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Wedge ratio including family 
ownership. Each column reports the test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents Generalized 
Propensity-Score Matching, while PM stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.16  Probit estimation results using alternative specifications of wedge 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Matching GPSM PM GPSM PM 
Ownership structure 
































































































































Year dummy Yes & Matched Yes & Matched Yes & Matched Yes & Matched 









Observations 427 441 427 441 
Log likelihood -183 -214 -190 -216 
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and different specifications of the wedge 
variable. Each column reports the test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents Generalized 
Propensity-Score Matching, while PM stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard 
errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. Variables are 
defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.17  Probit estimation results using cash flow rights ratio 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Matching GPSM GPSM PM PM 
Ownership structure 
































































































































Year dummy Yes & Matched Yes & Matched Yes & 
Matched 
Yes & Matched 









Observations 427 427 441 441 
Log likelihood -189 -188 -214 -214 
This table reports the probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Cash ratio/Direct cash ratio and 
Indirect cash ratio. Each column reports the test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents 
Generalized Propensity-Score Matching, while PM stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels 
respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.18  Probit estimation results using components of voting rights 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Matching GPSM PM GPSM PM 
Ownership structure 

































































































































































Observations 427 441 427 441 
Log likelihood -181 -211 -180 -210 
This table reports the probit estimation results using components of Voting rights (%): Wedge (%) and Cash flow 
rights (%). Each column reports the test results by different matching methods: GPSM represents Generalized 
Propensity-Score Matching, while PM stands for partial matching respectively. Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B.   
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Table 4.19  Bivariate probit estimation results using wedge ratio and business group 
Dependent variable = Pr(Accounting fraud) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Model Fraud Detect | 
Fraud 
Fraud Detect | 
Fraud 
Fraud Detect | 
Fraud 
Matching GPSM GPSM GPSM 
X % 30% 70% 








































































































































































Observations 427 427  427 
Log likelihood -172 -174 -173 
This table reports the bivariate probit estimation results between accounting fraud and Wedge ratio/Business 
group(X%). Each column reports the probit estimation results by different matching methods: GPSM represents 
Generalized Propensity-Score Matching, while PM stands for partial matching. Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix 4.B. 
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APPENDIX 4.A  Controlling shareholders’ motivational mechanism of 
control-ownership wedge 
In Appendix 4.A, I provide additional analyses on controlling shareholders’ 
motivational mechanisms by which they expropriate their firms and adjust their 
ownership structure. I illustrate the mechanisms using two hypothetical ownership 
structures.  






This figure illustrates the costs and benefits that wedge structure brings about for controlling minor shareholders 
(CMS). A, B and C represent firms directly and indirectly held by the CMS, and α, β and γ stand for the percentages 
of shares held by the CMS and its firms. T and P represent tunneling and propping respectively, while V and CF
stand for voting and cash flow rights respectively. Numbers in the parentheses are hypothetical ones. 
First, Figure 4.2. describes an exemplary mechanism through which controlling 
shareholders cause inefficiencies in firms through RPTs among affiliated firms. 
Increased control by control-ownership wedge provides an ideal condition for 
controlling shareholders to extract private benefits at the expense of outside investors 
(Grossman and Hart 1980; Burkart et al. 1998; Faccio and Lang 2002; La Porta et al. 
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2002; Joh 2003). Using control-ownership wedge, they can increase benefits without 
incurring proportional costs (Fan and Wong 2002).  
In the LHS of Figure 4.2., controlling shareholders have cash flow rights (CF; 15 
percent) amounting to the sum of α (5 percent) and β (20 percent) × γ (50 percent), 
where α, β, and γ represent the percentages of shares held by the controlling owners 
or their associated firms87. However, using a pyramiding structure, they can exercise 
voting rights (V; 55 percent or 25 percent) up to either the sum of α and γ – the final 
link method – or the sum of α and min(β, γ) – the weakest link method (see Ryu and 
Yoo 2011). According to the final link method (e.g., La Porta et al. 2002) and the KFTC 
regulation, control-ownership wedge (W; 40 percent) is defined as the difference 
between γ and β × γ, which is simply the difference between V (55 percent) and CF
(15 percent). Controlling shareholders benefit from this ownership structure by 
increasing the size of their expropriation and shift the costs of increased benefits on 
outside investors.  
To begin, control-ownership wedge increases the maximum size of their potential 
expropriation (E)88 exactly by W (40 percent) of firm C’s net assets (ΔE = NA × W). 
Without the ownership divergence, controlling shareholders could expropriate firm C
only by CF (15 percent). Moreover, by transferring E from firm C to firm A, where 
the controlling owners have more direct cash flow rights (100 percent), the increased 
benefits (ΔE) can be materialised in firm C. In typical RPTs, firm C is expropriated by 
selling or purchasing products to and from firm A at lower and higher than market 
prices respectively (see Riyanto and Toolsema 2008). These effects are equivalent for 
87 Numbers in the parentheses are hypothetical ones.  
88 E is defined as the difference between tunneling (T) and propping (P) in this chapter. “Tunneling 
refers to a transfer of resources from a lower-level firm to a higher-level firm in the pyramidal chain, 
whereas propping concerns a transfer in the opposite direction intended to bail out the receiving firm 
from bankruptcy.” (Riyanto and Toolsema 2008, p. 2178) 
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controlling shareholders to having V (55 percent) directly of firm C while bearing the 
costs of CF (15 percent) as is illustrated in the RHS of Figure 4.2. Through this process, 
controlling shareholders can increase their private benefits by ΔE, and it remains in 
firm C as economic distortions or inefficiencies.
Figure 4.3.  Leverage effects of control-ownership wedge 
This figure illustrates the analysis of the leverage effects of wedge using a hypothetical ownership structure: cash 
flow rights (CF) = [0, 0.25], wedge (W) = [0, 0.25], voting rights (V) = 0.25, expropriation (E) = $200 and wedge 
ratio (WR) = [0, 1]. TB stands for total benefits while TC represents total costs. Net benefits (NB) are the 
inefficiencies caused by increasing WR.
Second, Figure 4.3. further illustrates how controlling shareholders maximise their 
net benefits by adjusting the proportion of CF and W of their voting rights (Wedge 
ratio). In this setting, controlling shareholders can change both CF and W between 0 
percent and 25 percent, and V is fixed at 25 percent. Accordingly, their Wedge ratio
(WR = W / V = (V－CF) / V) changes between 0 and 1. As in Eq. (4.7) and Eq. (4.8) 
respectively, controlling shareholders’ total benefits (TB) are the product of the dollar 
amount of E ($200) and V (25 percent), and the total costs (TC) are the product of E
and adjustable CF. In the LHS of Figure 4.3., they acquire constant TB because E and 
V do not change in this setting, whereas they can decrease TC by adjusting their Wedge 
ratio because W does not incur additional costs to controlling shareholders as shown 
above. Therefore, their net benefits (NB) are ultimately proportional to the size of W
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(Eq. (4.9)), which is exactly the costs borne by outside shareholders, not by controlling 
shareholders themselves. This illustration reveals that controlling shareholders can 
increase their net benefits of expropriation by adjusting Wedge ratio (RHS of Figure 
4.3.).   
Total benefits (TB) = E × V (when E = T - P)  ................................................... (4.7) 
Total costs (TC) = E × CF .................................................................................. (4.8) 
Net benefits (NB) = TB - TC = E × W ................................................................ (4.9) 
 where, E = the net dollar amount of expropriation ($200); 
T = the dollar amount of tunneling;
       P = the dollar amount of propping;
V = voting rights (25 percent);
 CF = cash flow rights;
       W = V - CF = wedge. 
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APPENDIX 4.B  Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable 
 Accounting fraud An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms for which 
the FSS published AAERs for alleged GAAP 
violations, and 0 otherwise.  
Ownership structure 
 Cash flow rights Fraction of shares held directly or indirectly by the 
largest ultimate owners by investing their own cash 
flows in their firms (La Porta et al. 2002). The 
largest ultimate owners are individuals identified by 
tracing from the lowest to the highest firm along 
ownership chains of firms. 
 Direct cash flow rights Direct portion of Cash flow rights.    
 Indirect cash flow rights Indirect portion of Cash flow rights held through 
associated firms.    
 Control-ownership wedge Fraction of shares held by the largest ultimate 
owners indirectly through associated firms without 
investing their own cash flows.  
 Voting rights  The sum of Cash flow rights and Control-ownership 
wedge (La Porta et al. 2002).   
 Wedge ratio Control-ownership wedge over Voting rights (La 
Porta et al. 2002).  
 Business group (X %) An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms which 
have both control-ownership wedge and controlling 
shareholders having more than X% of shares, and 0 
otherwise. (see La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 
2000; Faccio et al. 2001).  
 Regulation  An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms which are 
designated as chaebol by the KFTC, and 0 otherwise 
(Kim and Yi 2006; Byun et al. 2013). In DID 
analyses, it is an indicator variable equal to 1 for 
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firms which are designated as chaebol at least once 
during the sample window, and 0 otherwise.  
 Post An indicator variable equal to 1 for firm years from 
when they are designated as chaebol, and 0 
otherwise. For non-chaebol firms, it is equal to 1 for 
firm years from when they are matched with 
chaebol firms, and 0 otherwise.   
 Immediate voting rights Fraction of shares held by either individuals or 
institutions, who are the largest direct owners of 
firms.   
 CEO ownership Fraction of shares held directly by a CEO.   
 Family ownership Fraction of shares held by families of controlling 
shareholders. For missing data, I construct the 
variable whenever familial relationship is 
reasonably identified as below:  
a) A firm discloses the largest shareholder’s 
familial relationships; 
b) The relationship is identified by news articles; 
c) Both the first and last names of major 
shareholders are the same.  
Potential expropriations 
 RPTs  Related party transactions (operating sales + 
operating purchase + non-operating transactions) / 
Book value of equity (Kang et al. 2014). 
 Dividend The dividend per share (DPS) divided by the 
earnings per share (EPS) (see Faccio et al. 2001). If 
EPS is less than zero, I use the maximum Dividend. 
 Leverage The ratio of total liability to total assets. 
Financial ratios 
 ROA The ratio of income before tax expense to average 
assets.  
 Ln(Assets) The natural logarithm of total assets.  
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 Working Capital The ratio of working capital (current asset – current 
liability) to total assets.  
Controlling shareholders’ power
 Largest=CEO  An indicator variable equal to 1 for firms in which a 
CEO is also the largest ultimate owner, and 0 
otherwise (see Claessens et al. 2000). 
 Outside directors The ratio of outsider directors on the board to the 
total number of directors.  
 Audit opinion An indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit opinion 
in the first fraud year is not unqualified, and 0 
otherwise.  
 Big N auditor An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is audited 
by major auditors: Big 4 or Big 5 depending on 
fiscal years, and 0 otherwise (Kim and Yi 2006). 
Political connectedness 
 Government bank  An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s main 
creditor bank is owned by the government, and 0 
otherwise (Byun et al. 2013).  
 Political connectedness An indicator variable equal to 1 if any executive or 
director of a firms is a former member of parliament 
(MP) or minister (Byun et al. 2013). If a firm is not 
required to disclose its executives and directors, I 
assume no political connectedness. 
Other controls 
 Stock market An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is listed on 
major stock markets such as KSE and KOSDAQ, 
and 0 otherwise (Kim and Yi 2006). 
Ln(Firm age) The number of years since the establishment of a 
firm.  
 Outside blockholder The shares held by outside blockholders divided by 
total shares.  
Industry An indicator variable equal to 1 for seven two-digit 
SIC codes, which account for 53.3 percent of the 
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total sample, and 0 otherwise. The ten industries are 
Wholesale trade (G46000), Manufacture of 
computer, electronic and optical products (C26000), 
Retail trade (G47000), Construction of buildings 
(F41000), Manufacture of other transport 
equipment (C30000), Real estate activities 
(L68000), Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers 
and semi-trailers (C29000), Manufacture of 
chemical products (C20000), Manufacture of basic 
metals (C24000), and Libraries, archives, museums 
and other cultural activities (R91000).     
 Year dummy An indicator variable equal to 1 for the Asian 
financial crisis (1997-1998) and the global financial 
crisis (2007-2009), and 0 otherwise (Mitton 2002). 




Summary of Conclusions 
5.1. Summary of findings 
This thesis investigates the impacts of equity incentives on accounting fraud 
propensity both in and outside the U.S. context. As a prerequisite analysis, I also 
examine whether AAERs constitute a reliable database to analyse relatively intentional 
motivation to misreport.  
First, Chapter 2 documents that AAERs are composed of firms that are more likely 
to represent material accounting irregularities than SCAL and AA firms, which are 
exclusively identified by capital market investors and firms’ managers respectively. 
Further analyses indicate that the characteristics of AAERs may be explained by the 
SEC’s strategic approaches in utilising constrained resources, in addition to AAERs’ 
inherently egregious nature in that they involve accountants. Specifically, the SEC 
tends to focus more on high-risk and systematically important firms as enforcement 
targets and to allocate regional offices mainly where larger firms are more populated. 
Through this optimisation, the SEC may reduce inefficiencies inherent in its 
accounting fraud investigation process and mitigate the potential geographic bias. 
Second, Chapter 3 shows that CEOs’ stock option delta and stock ownership have 
differing non-linear associations with accounting fraud propensity. I interpret this 
finding as evidence that CEOs as option and stock holders drastically change their 
misreporting behaviours at certain critical levels of equity incentives. Once reaching 
these critical levels, CEOs as option holders are less likely to misreport, whereas 
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owner-CEOs are more likely to misreport. Further analyses indicate that these changes 
in misreporting patterns may be driven by CEOs’ disparate perceptions of the risks 
regarding accounting fraud commitment as two types of equity holders. At higher 
levels of equity incentives, CEOs as option holders are seriously concerned about the 
increased risk, whereas owner-CEOs underestimate it due to their enhanced control 
within firms.  
  Finally, Chapter 4 documents that controlling shareholders’ control-ownership wedge 
is positively associated with accounting fraud propensity, but business group and 
chaebol affiliations are not. In particular, I report that firms’ affiliation with chaebols
is, in fact, negatively associated with accounting fraud propensity. These are novel 
findings suggesting that business groups and chaebols, which have long been 
considered as aggressive earnings manipulators (e.g., Kim and Yi 2006), are shrewd 
enough to actively manage their earnings without seriously crossing into GAAP 
violations. Further analyses suggest that the distinct effects of business groups and 
chaebols from those of control-ownership wedge may be explained by controlling 
shareholders’ substantial cash flow rights in business groups and the tightened levels 
of monitoring over their expropriation in chaebols.  
These results together suggest that accounting fraud context exposes CEOs and 
controlling shareholders with excessive equity incentives not only to the reward 
opportunities but also to the risk of bearing economic and legal costs. This exposure 
leads to variations in their misreporting behaviours at average incentive levels or in 
their earnings management strategies within GAAP. Accounting fraud allegations 
released by accounting regulators (e.g., the SEC) constitute a relatively reliable 
database for these analyses.    
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5.2. Contributions and implications 
This thesis contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms through which 
accounting fraud is committed, in relation to equity incentives of CEOs and controlling 
shareholders, and provides several practical implications for both accounting 
regulators and researchers. First, Chapter 2 contradicts Karpoff et al. (2017)’s recent 
study arguing that each financial misreporting database has shortcomings, in that it 
covers only partial cases. Recognising this issue in current databases, I document that, 
despite the coverage issue, AAERs constitute a relatively reliable accounting fraud 
database that is more likely to represent material accounting irregularities rather than 
simple errors. The results should be of interest to researchers who use AAERs to proxy 
for material accounting irregularities and to investigate motivational determinants of 
accounting fraud.  
  Second, Chapter 3 adds to the extensive literature which has documented that options 
and stocks have diametrically linear opposite effects on financial misreporting 
propensity, and that stocks and options have non-linear impacts on various research 
focuses such as firm value and performance. I extend these two strands of studies by 
demonstrating that CEOs’ financial misreporting patterns at average incentives levels 
are reversed at higher levels depending on how they perceive the risk of accounting 
fraud commitment. In particular, relying on the uniqueness of the accounting fraud 
context, I show that this non-linearity results mainly from an increase in risk effect 
rather than a decrease in reward effect. These findings are the first to report dual non-
linearity of stocks and options simultaneously and provide empirical evidence for the 
differences in misreporting patterns of stock- and option holders based on their 
disparate risk tolerance as two equity holders. Practically, the results should be of 
interest to accounting regulators, who have a responsibility to detect accounting fraud. 
256
Specifically, the findings suggest that regulators with constrained resources should 
consider targeting firms with CEOs holding average option delta or excessive stock 
ownership for investigation, since they are more likely to be incentivised to misreport 
in relation to equity incentives.  
Finally, the findings of Chapter 4 contribute to the literature which has already 
shown congruent impacts of control-ownership wedge, business groups, and chaebols 
in the contexts of relatively indirect and less egregious earnings management strategies 
(i.e., accruals management). By contrast, I report that the detrimental effect of control-
ownership wedge is curbed by the cost factors that accounting fraud context uniquely 
imposes on controlling shareholders: ownership concentration in business groups and 
government regulation in chaebols. Practically, this study suggests that regulators in 
other jurisdictions than Korea should consider adopting regulations for the potential 
risk of control-ownership wedge after sufficiently considering their institutional 
backgrounds. The findings also provide insights into the enduring popularity of large 
business groups and chaebols as investment targets, despite the concerns over their 
potential aggressiveness in earnings management.  
5.3. Caveats  
I acknowledge several limitations in this thesis. First, due to the non-random nature of 
accounting fraud cases, this thesis is inevitably exposed to sampling bias. To address 
this issue, I provide additional analysis results of matched samples (i.e., GPSM and 
PM) along with those of unmatched samples except in Chapter 2 where the adoption 
of a matching sample is not feasible. Second, this thesis is inherently exposed to the 
partial observability bias in that there could be accounting fraud cases that have not 
been detected by the SEC, capital market investors, and firms’ managers. Even though 
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there is no single and perfect solution for this issue, I have attempted to mitigate this 
bias by adopting the bivariate probit regression model and employing multiple proxies 
for financial misreporting instead of a single one. Third, Chapter 4 is particularly based 
on the assumption that controlling shareholders can influence firms’ financial 
misreporting decisions even without holding key management positions. Even though 
this assumption is the one that is widely employed in this type of study, I further seek 
to provide empirical support for this assumption by showing that managerial 
ownership does not have a significant impact on firms’ accounting fraud propensity in 
the Korean context. Finally, the analysis results of Chapter 2 should not be generalised 
to suggest that AAERs are superior to other databases or that the SEC’s enforcement 
is effective in general. I acknowledge that the reliability of AAERs is valid only in a 
relative sense and the relative reliability of AAERs does not necessarily guarantee the 
effectiveness of SEC enforcement in general. A further study could evaluate the 
effectiveness or efficiency of SEC enforcement actions as a separate research topic.  
5.4. Future studies  
I identify two additional future areas of research that are not investigated in this thesis. 
First, in contrast with research on bankruptcy predictions (e.g., Shumway 2001), 
studies attempting to establish a better accounting fraud prediction model are 
relatively rare. Current models largely incorporate accounting ratios and stock market 
data (e.g., Beneish 1999; Jones et al. 2008; Dechow et al. 2012; Mingzi et al. 2016). 
However, if we could identify any alternative accounting fraud detector who has the 
independent ability to evaluate misreporting even before it is revealed by the SEC to 
the public (see e.g., Gao et al. 2016; Gao et al. 2017), the information produced by 
that accounting fraud detector (e.g., credit default swap traders as in Gao et al. (Gao 
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et al. 2016)) would improve the predictive power of current models and therefore this 
research would have crucial implications for our current methods.  
Second, with only some exceptions (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; Beneish 1999; 
Dechow et al. 2011), the mechanisms by which firms are motivated to commit 
accounting fraud regarding their financing needs have not been fully investigated. 
There is, therefore, a definite need for investigation of firms’ financing, refinancing, 
and investment patterns in the context of accounting fraud. In this thesis, I document 
that, after controlling for the financed levels in the first misreporting year, misreporting 
firms do not seem to invest significantly more than non-misreporting firms for the 
three years prior to the first misreporting year89. A much more comprehensive study 
would reveal specific conditions in which firms are more likely to misreport in relation 
to their financing and investment activities.  
89 Using matched samples, McNichols and Stubben (2008) also report that misreporting firms do not 
show significantly higher levels of investment prior to misreporting events. Instead, they find 
pronounced over-investment patterns in misreporting firms during manipulation periods.   
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